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Worldwide child and youth poverty and deprivation remain 
the biggest barrier to achieving a better life in adulthood. 
Progress in lifting children out of poverty in the last de-
cades has been slow and limited in the developing world, 
while the recent global economic crisis has exacerbated 
child poverty, youth unemployment, and social exclusion 
in many developed countries. By critically unraveling the 
long-term consequences of growing up poor, the close 
linkages between multiple deprivations and violation of 
human rights in childhood and adolescence, and their ef-
fects on labor market entry and future career in a number 
of developing and developed countries, this book signifi -
cantly enriches the existing literature. Drawing on multiple 
disciplinary perspectives it makes a forceful case for the 
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been	 marginal	 or	 produced	 mixed	 results	 in	 developing	 countries,	 while	
poverty	 and	 social	 exclusion	 have	 exacerbated	 in	 many	 developed	 ones.	
Within	this	context,	this	book	critically	examines	the	major	structural	caus‐
es	 and	 life‐cycle	processes	 connecting	poverty	 and	disadvantage	 in	 child‐
hood,	adolescence,	and	early	adulthood.	It	raises	the	question	of	what	poli‐
cy	 strategies	 can	 break	 the	 vicious	 cycle	 of	 intergenerational	 poverty	
transmission.		
According	 to	 data	 provided	 by	 international	 organizations	
(UNICEF,	 ILO)	about	half	of	 the	world’s	children	 live	 in	poverty	(suffering	





working	 poverty	 across	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 (with	 Africa	
exhibiting	 the	highest	 rate	globally).	As	stressed	recently	by	 the	Director‐
General	 of	 the	 International	 Labour	 Organization	 (ILO)	 at	 the	 UN	 2016	
Youth	Forum,	“the	trap	of	working	poverty	affects	as	many	as	169	million	
young	people	at	working	age.”2	Such	a	level	of	child	and	youth	deprivation	
                                                   
1		 During	 the	1960s	 and	until	 the	 early	 1970s	 it	 had	 also	been	 very	prominent	 (e.g.,	
McNamara,	1973,	Chenery	et	al.,	1974).	However,	the	oil	crises,	the	external	debt	cri‐
ses	of	developing	 countries,	 the	period	of	 structural	 adjustment,	 and	other	 factors	
moved	it	out	of	the	central	stage.	
2		 See	http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53138#.VtsXa6R	f2xD	
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has not been effectively discussed in the growing international dialogue on 
combating poverty.3 
While there is currently a substantial body of research that anal-
yses child poverty and the difficulties faced by youth in the labor market, 
there are fewer studies focusing on the long-term consequences of growing 
up poor, the close linkages between the two phenomena and the effects of 
early labor market entry on the future career. The contributions to this 
volume aim to evaluate the knowledge on the structural causes of child 
poverty and its short- and long-term consequences; examine the interrela-
tionships between child poverty and the unsatisfactory (sometimes illegal) 
insertion of children and adolescents in the labor market; study the long-
standing effect of youth unemployment and informality; and draw lessons 
and discuss advances and future challenges in policies targeting child pov-
erty and youth unemployment, as well as youth employment precarious-
ness. 
Thus, the aim of the book is to enrich the comparative debate on 
these issues, in theoretical and empirical terms, and to set out the key poli-
cy challenges in effectively addressing child and youth poverty, disengage-
ment, and exclusion. The analyses carried out by the authors attempt to 
constructively link various strands of study, research methods, and disci-
plines to child and youth deprivation—namely, as a violation of human 
rights; as a staggering cost on society, economy, healthcare, and criminal 
justice; and as inability to achieve an adequate level of personal develop-
ment and social integration. They trace the negative impact of poverty and 
disadvantage on the long-term well-being of children, particularly if they 
remain in this situation for a protracted period of time. Inadequate nutri-
tion, homelessness, barriers to accessing education, healthcare, and good 
quality care services create a vicious cycle in which the disadvantages faced 
in the early stages of life significantly limit the possibilities of obtaining a 
decent job that would provide young people with sufficient incomes to 
escape poverty, marginalization, and exclusion.  
                                                   
3  Among the most prominent few working on these issues, Brooks-Gunn, J. and G.J. 
Duncan (1997), UNICEF (2000), Gordon et al. (2003), UNICEF (2007), Minujin and 
Nandy (2012), and Minujin et al. (2014).  
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Child and youth poverty and labor force participation: Main challenges in 
the new era of the Sustainable Development Goals 
A precarious entry into labor market is one of the channels 
through which these socioeconomic difficulties extend into adulthood, 
whether children start work early in their childhood or later on in their 
youth. One particularly problematic component of this vicious cycle is that 
adolescents and young adults living in monetary poor households enter the 
labor market at very early ages driven by the need to contribute to house-
hold incomes. Empirical evidence suggests that child and adolescent labor 
force participation leads to early school leaving, on the one hand, and re-
sults in lower family incomes, on the other.  
Child poverty and child labor 
These results are not contradictory at all. To disentangle these 
seemingly paradoxical statements, both the concept and the incidence of 
child poverty and child labor should be explored. While lack of income is a 
fundamental aspect of poverty for adults, children live and experience 
poverty differently (CCF, 2005). In order to understand child poverty, we 
have to explore the actual deprivations children suffer, independently of 
the parents’ income. These deprivations are related to specific rights, which 
when not fulfilled or satisfied constitute poverty (such as education, health, 
nutrition, etc.). About half of the children in developing countries are poor. 
There is, of course, wide regional variation. The lowest incidence of child 
poverty is found in East Asia while the highest is in South Asia and in sub-
Saharan Africa. The former is roughly a third of the latter. Within countries 
there are large variations too. In Latin America urban child poverty is about 
20 percentage points higher than in rural areas. Nevertheless, in a few 
countries, there is no statistically significant difference between urban and 
rural child poverty, while in others there is a slightly lower incidence in 
rural areas (ECLAC and UNICEF, 2010). 
Consequently, when low household income forces children to go 
out and work in order to increase their family’s earnings, children have 
difficulties attending school. Even if they manage to stay in school,4 they 
                                                   
4  A few years ago it was estimated that about 20% of children in developing countries 
combine schooling with labor (Gibbons et al., 2005). 
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have limited time for studying and homework, which increases the chances 
of repetition and, eventually, dropping out. Thus, although the family in-
come may increase in the short term (perhaps even lifting the household 
out of monetary poverty), it is at the expense of child rights and an increase 
of child poverty (determined by the deprivation of the right to education). 
Moreover, lack of schooling is one of the major impediments to ob-
tain good, well-paying jobs for young adults. As a result, the medium- to 
long-term prospects of household income (in spite of a short spurt when 
children enter the labor force) are limited and lower than average for the 
rest of the population. Thus, child labor implies a double jeopardy for chil-
dren and adolescents: First it robs them of their childhood and the possibil-
ity of schooling in the short term and then it hinders their future potential 
earnings. 
According to the ILO estimates, in 2012 about 170 million children 
worldwide were in child labor (60% of them being boys5). Although this is 
a reduction of about 30% since the turn of the century, this number 
amounts to 11% of the child population as a whole. These are not all the 
children that work6 but only those who are involved in work when they are 
too young (under 12 years of age), in work that is too heavy or onerous for 
them (at ages 12–14 years), or engaged in the worst forms of labor (en-
slaved, prostituted, participating in illegal activities, or victims of trafficking 
and forced recruitment). Half of all child laborers (5–17 years), namely 
about 85 million in absolute terms, work under hazardous conditions for 
their health, safety, and moral development (ILO, 2013: 3–5). About a third 
of child laborers are in sub-Saharan Africa and a significant number of 
them are in hazardous occupations. 
While many children work in manufacturing export industries, 
most of them work in the informal sector. This includes children working in 
the agricultural sector, street-peddling, or household servants. The latter 
not only affects primarily girls but also it takes the form of debt bondage 
and other forms of slavery. 
                                                   
5  Clearly, due to gender discrimination, boys and girls made to work too early in their 
lives tend to be clustered in different sectors and activities. 
6  The distinction between child labor and children who work is presented in the ILO 
Conventions 138 (1973) and 182 (1999). The precursor to Convention 138 (1973) is 
the ILO Minimum Age Convention of 1919.  
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Clearly, not all child labor falls into this category. Nevertheless, 
whether legally or illegally, child laborers are paid less than adult workers. 
This undermines efforts by adults to find well-paying jobs. Thus, a link 
exists between child rights and labor rights. Fully implementing the Decent 
Work Agenda (i.e., labor policies that ensure a minimum living wage, safe 
working environments for men and women, pensions, job security, equal 
pay for equal work for men and women, formal employment, sustainable 
livelihoods, etc.; ILO, 1999) greatly contributes to eliminating child labor. 
Similarly, promoting free and compulsive education7 (which prevents or 
delays children from entering the labor market) and legislation to prohibit 
child labor help to strengthen the bargaining power of unions and adult 
workers.8  
The worldwide youth job crisis  
Global youth unemployment is almost three times higher than un-
employment among prime age workers. Adolescents and young adults of 
poor households constitute a high-risk group, as they face the greatest 
difficulties to get a job. In the developing world, the quality rather than the 
quantity of jobs is the most important challenge for improving labor mar-
ket integration of young people, as the jobs provided to a large proportion 
of youngsters hardly assure them a subsistence income. High entry flows to 
informal jobs that offer low remuneration, the incidence of transitions 
between informal occupations and unemployment, and the absence or low 
coverage of (any available) social protection policies, like unemployment 
benefits or transfer programs to poor households, create a vicious circle 
between low pay, insecurity, and lack of income. 
In both the developed and developing countries, going through 
unemployment spells at a young age can lead to “scarring” effects thus 
producing a long-standing impact on future employment prospects. Early 
school leaving and other intertwined aspects such as gender, race, and 
ethnicity also decisively influence the paths of transition into the labor 
market by adolescents and young adults.  
                                                   
7  This policy also reduces the incidence and depth of child poverty directly by ad-
dressing one of the dimensions (constitutive right) that defines child poverty. 
8  Not surprisingly, the earliest laws attempting to restrict child labour (in the first half 
of the 1800s) where promoted, among others, by trade unions (Cunningham, 1996). 
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The demographic phenomenon known as the “youth bulge” in de-
veloping countries, namely the rising share of persons aged 15 to 24 years 
in the population, is a crucial dimension of the youth employment problem. 
According to UN data,9 more than two-thirds of the world’s one billion 
youth live in developing countries. This demographic characteristic also 
propels the shift toward cities (e.g., in Africa, where a fifth of the world’s 
one billion youth live). As the weak economies of these countries cannot 
create enough jobs for the rapidly increasing youth population, a large 
percentage of youth are unemployed, underemployed, or inactive (see on 
this point Ortiz & Cummins, 2012 and UNICEF, 2014).10  
Even before the global financial turmoil, the worldwide youth un-
employment rate stood at 12.3%. The highest rates were exhibited in the 
Middle-East and North Africa (MENA), but double-digit rates also charac-
terized high-income countries. As Table 1 shows, nearly one in three young 
people in the MENA region are unable to find work, while the gender gap is 
very high as the unemployment rate among women is over 40% (compared 
to about 25% among men; ILO, 2014: 11). With the exception of the MENA 
countries, the youth unemployment rate in the developing regions is not 
very high, compared to some high-income countries (see Figure 1), but job 
precariousness and in-work poverty remain high. Thus, the proportion of 
people who are working but are unable to lift themselves from monetary 
poverty is comparatively large (see Table 1). Moreover, the high concentra-
tion of unemployed (and marginalized) youth in the growing urban centers 
of developing countries (e.g., in the cities of the Middle-East, North Africa 
and sub-Saharan Africa, but also in the cities of Latin America and the Car-
ibbean) creates explosive conditions triggering social unrest, crisis, and 
instability (Ali, 2014). 
                                                   
9  Accessed at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democra 
tic-governance/youthstrategy.html 
10  The ILO estimates that 200 million new jobs will be needed over the next five years, 
in order for emerging and developing economies to keep pace with the growing 
working-age population (ILO, 2014: xx). 
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Table 1: Average youth unemployment rate and the share of the working 
poor (in the total working population) in the world regions (%) 























14.0	 12.7	 13.6	 13.6	 13.6	





























22  PETMESIDOU, DELAMÓNICA, PAPATHEODOROU, AND HENRY-LEE 
 
rise in 2015 and a further slight jump in 2018; ILO, 2015a: 17).11 According 
to the ILO estimates, youth make up 25% of the total working population 
but young people are three times more likely to be unemployed than prime 
age workers. Gender differences are also pronounced: as compared to 
young men, young women are disproportionally affected by unemployment 
across all regions of the world (ibid.: 7). The share of young people in the 
15–29 age group who are neither in employment, education, or training 
(the so-called NEETs) rose in 30 of the 40 countries for which data was 
available in 2013. Two-thirds of youth in developing economies were out of 
work, not studying, or engaged in regular or informal employment. Also, in 
the developing world more than a third of employed youth (aged 15–24) 
struggle to survive on less than PPP-US $2 a day, and about 300 million on 
less than PPP-US $4 per day (UNDP data accessed at http://bit.ly/1Kd 
kY7u; ILO, 2015a: 51). 
Moreover, the economic slowdown in some middle-income and 
developing economies is expected to significantly reduce the pace of im-
provement in terms of the overall inequalities and the global poverty rate. 
After a period of employment growth in a number of middle-income and 
developing regions (Latin America, China, the Russian Federation, and a 
number of Arab countries), the situation is deteriorating. No major im-
provement in terms of employment has been recorded in sub-Saharan 
Africa, while in most of the aforementioned countries “underemployment 
and informal employment are expected to remain stubbornly high over the 
next five years” (ILO, 2015b: 11).12 What is equally worrying is the fact that 
youth joblessness, underemployment, and precarious employment persist 
despite the fact that considerable improvements in average educational 
attainment can be observed among youth cohorts in a number of develop-
ing countries (ibid.). In other words, important as education is, it needs to 
be complemented with economic policies to promote and ensure full em-
ployment. 
                                                   
11  The ILO estimates the highest increases of youth unemployment in the coming years 
in the Middle East and East Asia (ILO, 2015: 19). 
12  In sub-Saharan Africa, more than 40% of young workers are unpaid [UNDP, Empow-
ered Youth Sustainable Future, http://bit.ly/1NgLyLt]  
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Figure 1: Youth unemployment rate in the OECD countries by gender 
(15–24 years), 2014 
 
Source: Figure drawn by the authors on the basis of the OECD data accessed at 
http://stats.oecd.org 
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Figure 2: The NEETs rate (15–29 years), 2014 
 
Source: Figure drawn by the authors on the basis of the OECD data accessed at 
https://data.oecd.org/youthinac/youth-not-in-employment-education-or-training-
neet.htm 
In the countries of the European Union most badly hit by the fi-
nancial crisis (i.e., South Europe and Ireland) youth unemployment has 
reached record high levels (e.g., a little over 50% in Spain among young 
men and women, and even higher among females in Greece). Equally high 
is the number of young people who are not in education, employment, or 
training (15–29 years of age): close to 30% in Greece and a little lower than 
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25% in Spain and Italy. South European countries, together with Ireland 
and some of the countries of the most recent EU enlargements (Cyprus, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania), exhibit comparatively high rates of 
NEETs and also very high poverty rates among young people of the same 
age group (see Figure 3). Among EU countries, we can easily discern a close 
relationship between the rate of youth who are not in education, employ-
ment and/or training, and the poverty and social exclusion risk faced by 
young people. The EU countries depicted in Figure 3 seem to cluster into 
two groups. On the bottom left quadrant are the countries with compara-
tively low rates regarding both of these dimensions of the youth problem 
(the Netherlands and Austria are the countries where the NEET and at-risk-
of-poverty phenomena among youth are the least acute), while the top-
right quadrant comprises the countries with rates well above the EU-28 
average (Greece is at the highest extreme).   
By and large, in the advanced economies structural factors (such 
as the progressive polarization of the labor market resulting in fewer in-
termediate jobs and increasing job flexibilization and precariousness) are 
tending to make school-to-work transitions lengthier and more uncertain 
(Petmesidou and González, 2015). Young people are increasingly trapped 
in nonstandard jobs and opportunities for progression beyond entry level 
are diminishing. As shown by comparative studies (among others, see 
Iacovou and Aassve, 2007; Walther and Pohl, 2005; Ayllón, 2009; Eichhorst 
and Neder, 2014), youth unemployment, disengagement, and poverty can 
have “scarring” effects among the youngsters in the advanced economies 
facing a serious youth job crisis. Moreover, the available literature (see 
among others Bell and Blanchflower, 2009; Sullivan and von Wachter, 
2009) points to health effects even 20 years after the experience of unem-
ployment, while Helgesson et al. (2013) provide evidence of health and 




Figure 3: The severity of the ‘Youth Problem’ among EU countries (as 
indicated by the NEETs rate and the At-Risk-of-Poverty and/or Social 




closely	 linked	 with	 the	 main	 objectives	 of	 the	 development	 perspective,	
namely	the	reduction	of	poverty	and	the	improvement	of	the	quality	of	jobs	
provided,	 as	 large	 groups	 of	 youth	 are	 trapped	 in	 informal	 jobs	with	 in‐
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comes even below subsistence and lack of protection from social, economic, 
and environmental risks.  
Besides the highly negative impacts that poverty, child labor, and 
youth unemployment have on those directly affected by them, these phe-
nomena also entail serious negative social and economic externalities. 
According to a recent estimate by the European Foundation for the Im-
provement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound, 2013), in the EU 
countries youth unemployment causes costs of about 153 billion euros 
annually. They also lead to a higher incidence of youth disengagement and 
higher political and social tensions.  
Hence, developing a long-term strategy to tackle the intergenera-
tional transmission of disadvantages requires new approaches and the 
articulation of a wide and comprehensive set of policies aimed at reducing 
the structural causes of child poverty, promoting sustainable development 
that provides decent and productive jobs, improving education and skills of 
youth, and assuring universal access to basic social services to all citizens. 
The challenge of employment generation was not given much at-
tention in the initial formulation of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Yet it is of central importance for the “North” and the “South.” 
Unfettered globalization, the global financial crisis of 2008–09, and the 
ensuing sovereign debt problems in Europe are serious causes of the sharp 
rise of unemployment, deteriorating working conditions, and increasing 
employment insecurity in various geographical regions. Given the new 
agenda on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for the next 14 years, 
which aims to increase global awareness about poverty, hunger, inequality, 
and the need for sustainable development on a world scale, it seems an 
opportune moment to evaluate the progress made in terms of child poverty 
reduction and the improvement of access to decent labor conditions for 
youth. It is also important to discuss new theoretical approaches on both 
the short- and long-term causes and consequences of child poverty, with a 
particular emphasis on the relationships with labor market integration of 
the young population in developing and developed countries.  
Both groups of countries face interconnected challenges regarding 
child poverty and youth unemployment. The financial turmoil and the en-
suing sovereign debt crisis in several developed countries have dispropor-
tionally hit young men and women, as youth unemployment reached un-
precedented levels. High (and long-term) youth unemployment tends to 
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leave a permanent imprint on individual life course, contributes to the 
transmission of disadvantage to the children raised in the families of young 
people, and leads to a waste of potential human resources. In many devel-
oped countries, the harsh austerity regime put in place intensified poverty 
and disadvantage among children and youth. In this book we included two 
of the worst affected countries by the financial and sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe (Greece and Spain) suffering from high levels of child poverty and 
youth unemployment. We also included a comparative analysis of EU coun-
tries that contrasts neoliberal austerity to redistributive welfare and high-
lights the significant role of universal welfare provision in some European 
countries in reducing child poverty and intergenerational poverty trans-
mission.  
In developing countries the global financial crisis slowed down 
economic growth and job creation, which has also been negatively affected 
by the increasing capital intensity of new investments (ILO, 2012: 37). This 
highly diminishes the employment prospects of young people and leads to 
lost potential for social and economic development that could accrue from 
the so-called “demographic dividend”13 in the developing world. In many 
developing and developed countries, social and economic frustration 
among a significant number of youth who fail to make a successful transi-
tion to a decent work sparked protest movements amidst the global eco-
nomic crisis: the Arab Spring of 2011, the “indignados” and “piazza move-
ments” in Spain and Greece, the students mass protests in Chile against 
inequalities of access to education, but also the “Occupy Wall Street” 
movement in the US and similar movements in many other cities of the 
developed world where young people were prominent.  
The magnitude and severity of child and youth poverty worldwide 
and failure to give to all youth a better start in the labor market necessitate 
the study of these phenomena across geographical regions. This can con-
tribute to highlighting common challenges among countries at different 
levels of development and support the case for coordinated action at the 
global level along the lines of the SDGs, the ILO resolution of 2005 for “an 
                                                   
13  The temporary spike in the share of employment age individuals in the population 
that could lift per capita income (as a larger proportion of people work). However, if 
equity, productive, and macroeconomic policies do not result in well-paying jobs for 
the new entrants to the labor market, the demographic “dividend” may well become 
a “burden.” 
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integrated and coherent approach that combines macroeconomic and mi-
croeconomic interventions and addresses both labor demand and supply 
and the quantity and quality of employment” (ILO, 2005: 4); as well as the 
UN Global Initiative on Decent Jobs for Youth launched in February 2016 at 
the ECOSOC Youth Forum. 
The structure of the book 
The book consists of two parts, covers various geographical re-
gions (Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia), and 
comprises comparative and single-country chapters. The first part includes 
three chapters that focus on child and youth poverty, rights and social pro-
tection, while the second part consists of six chapters dealing with various 
dimensions of the youth employment crisis around the world. Besides 
description and multidisciplinary analysis (ranging from multicountry 
regressions to ethnographic individual interviews), the authors also pro-
vide innovative methodological tools and policies to address these issues.  
The first part starts with an examination of definitional and meth-
odological issues with regard to data analysis and the measurement of child 
poverty. The chapter by Bastos reviews the methods used for measuring 
child poverty in European countries. As she argues, even though the reduc-
tion of poverty is high on the European Commission’s agenda, poverty 
alleviation, with regard to children, remains seriously compromised, which 
puts into question the social dimension of the Europe 2020 Strategy 
(EU2020). Despite the importance of child poverty and the continuing con-
cern about it, there is only partial acknowledgment of this problem. Bastos 
shows that the methods currently used do not permit a detailed and pre-
cise diagnosis of the problem in Europe and other developed countries. She 
critically examines the theoretical models and empirical studies already 
conducted in the European Union in order to highlight the advantages and 
disadvantages of the income-based approach to poverty (a unidimensional 
approach). Then she moves on to discuss the merits and problems associ-
ated with multidimensional frameworks embracing a set of indicators for 
child well-being (in a positive sense) or deprivation (in a negative sense), 
and thereby assessing several different dimensions of child lifestyles and 
living conditions. Finally, she explores the holistic and child rights ap-
proaches that attempt to evaluate children’s livelihood in an overall sense 
through a combination of qualitative and quantitative panel data together 
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with participatory poverty assessments. She concludes on a set of guide-
lines aiming at a better way of measuring child poverty, which reflects the 
reality of growing up in poverty. 
Papanastassiou, Papatheodorou, and Petmesidou focus on child 
poverty and intergenerational poverty transmission in the European Union. 
On the basis of a comparative analysis, the authors trace the channels of the 
reproduction of poverty by examining some major socio-economic charac-
teristics of the family of origin in relationship to the impact of the different 
social protection systems on child poverty and its intergenerational trans-
mission. The authors utilize available comparable microdata for EU coun-
tries. The analysis embraces association statistics, correlation structures, 
and log-linear models in order to acquire empirical estimates on child 
monetary poverty and its intensity, examine poverty spell duration and the 
probability of exit from or reentry into poverty, and assess the magnitude 
of intergenerational mobility. Their main finding is that differences across 
Europe in child poverty and in intergenerational transmission of disad-
vantages are largely attributed to the impact of the social protection system 
that each country has developed. Even though parental background affects 
the offspring’s poverty risk, different welfare state regimes can play an 
equally important role in the reproduction of poverty: in the countries of 
the social-democratic welfare state regime (i.e., the Nordic countries) a 
universal and (still) comparatively generous social protection system sig-
nificantly minimizes the influence of a disadvantageous parental back-
ground on the offspring’s poverty risk.  
Henry-Lee examines child poverty in three Small Island Develop-
ing States (SIDS) in the Caribbean (Haiti, Jamaica, and Barbados). These 
islands have limited productive sectors, small labor markets, insufficient 
skilled labor, and high unemployment rates. Moreover, they are significant-
ly susceptible to economic and environmental shocks. These vulnerabilities 
negatively affect Caribbean children, especially those living in poverty. 
What is striking about two of these small island states is that their high 
human development index (HDI) may not necessarily be associated with 
strong protection and respect for children’s rights. Barbados’s HDI value 
for 2012 is 0.825—in the very high human development category. Jamai-
ca’s HDI value is 0.730—in the high human development category. Haiti’s 
HDI value is 0.456—in the low human development category. Nevertheless, 
children in these SIDS face similar challenges and threats. 
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Analysis of secondary data reveals that rights of children living in 
poverty in these SIDS are highly compromised. Weak institutional ar-
rangements and poor access to good-quality basic social services under-
mine child rights. Some groups of children are even more susceptible to 
economic and environmental shocks: children with disabilities, those living 
and working on the streets, and children affected by and infected with 
HIV/AIDS. Unless, there is a special global policy focus and action on the 
vulnerabilities of SIDS, children in these islands will remain at-risk of hav-
ing their rights violated. Unless social investment is increased and made 
more equitable, and there is commitment by both private and public insti-
tutions, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the SDGs will remain 
“toothless” instruments, which have not advanced the rights of the children 
in poverty. 
In the second part of the book, the chapter by Minujín, Born, Lom-
bardía, and Delamónica analyzes the nexus (or lack thereof) between edu-
cation and employment for adolescents and youngsters (A&Y) in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The situation of those A&Y at risk in these 
areas and, consequently, vulnerable to social exclusion is quantified and 
described. The chapter begins by exploring the situation of A&Y who are 
not in education, employment, or training (NEETs). However, the authors 
find the NEET category wanting and propose an alternative. Many A&Y are 
clearly outside the education system as well as excluded from the labor 
market. This is the category known as NEETs. However, unlike the image 
commonly portrayed describing NEETs as dangerous young men, most of 
the NEETs are young women. They come mainly from the poorest families. 
They devote most of their time to raising children (their own or those of 
others) and to household chores. Nevertheless, there are differences within 
this group according to class. 
Consequently, in order to understand more accurately the inter-
face between education and work, a measure of Vulnerability in Education 
and Labor (VEL) is introduced. This measure goes beyond a simple classifi-
cation based on whether or not A&Y participate in school and the labor 
market by capturing the highest level of formal education achieved and the 
type of labor market engagement (unemployed, informally employed, and 
formally employed). The percentage of A&Y with high vulnerability in edu-
cation and labor is twice as high as the proportion of NEETs. Within coun-
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tries there are variations based on wealth/income quintiles and the level of 
education of the parents. 
Garrido, Gutiérrez, and Guillén examine the youth employment 
problem in Spain, which suffers from one of the most staggering unem-
ployment rates among young people in Europe. The authors single out two 
outstanding traits of the Spanish labor market, namely: “the low quality of 
school to work transitions” and “the high intensity of the insider/outsider 
dualism in the labor market.” Starting from this point, their analysis em-
braces three major issues: (1) The high incidence of long-term unemploy-
ment among the low-qualified youth, compared to young people with high-
er levels of educational attainment; (2) the pattern of temporary employ-
ment as the channel of incorporation of young people into the labor mar-
ket, which has been prevalent for about three decades in Spain and has not 
been modified during the recession; and (3) the rapidly increasing poverty 
risk among young people over the last few years. The examination of these 
issues throws new light on the phenomenon of a dual labor market in Spain 
(where a group of “insiders” enjoy—more or less—secure jobs and suffi-
cient social insurance coverage, while a number of “outsiders” work on 
temporary and precarious jobs and lack adequate social insurance cover-
age). The analysis brings to the fore a major trait, that of “biographical 
dualism,” which links the temporary pattern of incorporation into the labor 
market with the age dimension.  
After a brief examination of the Spanish case in a comparative con-
text of youth employment regimes, the authors discuss the high and in-
creasing gap of employment outcomes by educational level. Then the anal-
ysis moves on to the “temporary pattern” of incorporation into the labor 
market and the age distribution of the workforce. This is followed by a brief 
discussion of the increasing incidence of poverty among young people. 
The following chapter focuses on the youth labor market in 
Greece. Dedoussopoulos and Papachristopoulou start their analysis with a 
brief review of the main theoretical currents guiding youth labor market 
studies. They also provide an account of significant macro-tendencies on 
the basis of a number of indices for Greek society over the period 1983–
2013. The authors argue that the use of a single index, that is, unemploy-
ment rate, does not capture fully the social consequences of youth unem-
ployment. Thus they opt for a range of indicators that can help us construct 
a composite index of the youth job crisis such as: the youth participation 
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and employment rates; the unemployment rate; the ratio of youth unem-
ployment rate to the unemployment rate of primary age workers; the share 
of youth unemployment to total unemployment; the rate of youth unem-
ployment to youth population; the scholarization index, that is, the rate of 
youngsters in formal education to the youth population; and the rate of 
youngsters who are neither in education, employment, or training. The 
indicators are disaggregated by gender and a cohort analysis is carried out. 
The chapter by Adam deals with social entrepreneurship and 
youth unemployment. The author attempts to assess the extent to which 
social economy activities and social entrepreneurship can be effective 
strategies against unemployment and social exclusion with particular ref-
erence to youngsters. This is a view promoted by various national and 
international organizations. Adam sets out to examine how and under what 
conditions these expectations can become reality by focusing on Greece, 
with some parallel reference to Latin American examples. After a brief 
review of the definitions of “social economy” and “social entrepreneurship,” 
with an emphasis on the differences between the European and the Latin 
American traditions, the analysis focuses on Greece. The author traces the 
development of social enterprise on the basis of the available data from the 
social economy registry and critically examines recent legislation on pro-
moting the social economy and the ensuing strategic plan formulated by 
the government. The author argues that a series of deficien-
cies/inconsistencies in policy implementation following the new legal 
framework have prevented social enterprises from delivering on their 
promises. By drawing upon the Latin American experience, the last part 
provides some insights on policies for the promotion of the so-called “soli-
darity economy” (i.e., cooperatives, mutual-benefit societies, social enter-
prises, and other similar economic efforts).  
Schenk, Blaauw, and Viljoen focus on youth in the informal econ-
omy of South Africa. The country exhibits a record high youth unemploy-
ment rate. For many young unemployed persons with low education, waste 
picking on the streets and the landfill sites, and/or day laboring are the 
main options to earn a living. These are described by the authors as “sur-
vivalist” behaviors providing subsistence to disadvantaged youth. The 
analysis draws upon a case study conducted by the authors over a period of 
10 years. The study combined a variety of quantitative (surveys) and quali-
tative data collection methods such as observations, ethnography, and 
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individual interviews, with the aim to examine the socioeconomic profile of 
these two groups of young people in the informal economy (waste pickers 
and day laborers). Emphasis is given to the barriers of entry into the formal 
economy for these groups of youngsters, linked with the absence of a policy 
framework for dealing with such high youth unemployment in South Africa. 
The authors argue that a multidisciplinary and multisectoral approach is 
needed for tackling this complex issue of multiple disadvantages among 
unemployed youngsters, so as to improve skills and facilitate integration 
into the formal labor market, as well as to strengthen the psycho-social 
well-being of youth and, consequently, of society. 
The issue of precarious, informal work among the young is exam-
ined also with regard to young Chinese migrant workers. Fang provides an 
ethnographic account of the life-course and work conditions of this group 
of Chinese youth, who, as she argues, epitomizes job precariousness and 
permanent mobility of youth. The author describes the changing life course 
of Chinese young migrant workers as a condition of becoming ”independ-
ent, yet not grown up,” and explains why these dual characteristics of ado-
lescence are important for understanding young people’s perceptions of 
social norms and of their own positioning in their social and work milieu. 
Leaving home in rural areas in order to become workers in the factory 
makes adolescents develop a sense of “becoming independent” from rural 
society, associated with backwardness and low quality of life. However, 
they soon realize that it is hard to “achieve adulthood” in the destination 
coastal cities due to the restraints imposed by the Chinese “hukou system” 
(household registry system), which does not allow them to settle perma-
nently and get full membership in the urban Chinese context. This causes 
an incomplete transition to adulthood and urban life. The paradoxical char-
acteristic is that labor demand by the party-state controlled factories trig-
gers rural to urban migration by adolescents and, thus, an early transition 
to “adulthood,” on the one hand; yet, on the other hand, they are barred 
from receiving citizens’ rights and achieve full independence from the pa-
ternalistic authority pattern in their family of origin and the support of 
their family and rural community. The author concludes on the need to lift 
the barriers imposed by the hukou system on migrant workers and develop 
a social protection system that makes citizen rights fully accessible by 
them.  
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In the Conclusion the editors wrap up and reflect upon the major 
methodological innovations and empirical findings of the analysis under-
taken in the two parts of the book. The emphasis is on how national and 
international anti-poverty agendas (e.g., the SDG agenda, the specific agen-
das of UN institutions like those of UNICEF and ILO, as well as the EU2020 
Strategy and the ones of many national governments) can adequately (and, 
in a realistic policy-wise way) fit children’s rights and child/youth poverty 
alleviation goals and youth labor market integration. They make a brief 
synthesis of the major findings regarding the structural causes of child 
poverty and its short- and long-term consequences within and across the 
countries examined in the chapters. This is followed by brief remarks on 
the interrelationships between cumulative disadvantage through child-
hood, adolescence, and early adulthood ages, on the one hand, and poor 
incorporation of youth into the labor market, as well as rapidly rising youth 
disengagement and exclusion, on the other. The rich and diverse set of 
policies to eliminate child poverty, youth unemployment, informality and 
labor precariousness, and social exclusion gathered throughout the book 
are briefly summed up.  
The contributions to this volume bring evidence to bear upon a 
major paradox between the endeavors of the international development 
community to formulate a post-2015 global sustainable development 
agenda with an overarching poverty eradication goal, on the one hand, and 
a global consensus on austerity, on the other, that has hit hardest disadvan-
taged children and youth. In the light of this, the contributions highlight the 
challenges confronting a range of stakeholders in an international anti-
poverty pact. Of utmost importance is the need for global development 
initiatives to tackle, in an integrated way, the major channels of intergener-
ational poverty transmission in both the developing and developed coun-
tries. This includes new proposals and ratification of old ones. Among the 
latter are improving access to and quality of education, addressing gender 
inequality, and promoting formal/decent work. From the former we can 
identify the issues related to encouraging equity across a vast array of di-
mensions, strengthening social protection for all families and children, and 
promoting child/adolescent participation in the decisions that affect their 
lives (including public policies and social entrepreneurship). 
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PART I:  
CHILD AND YOUTH POVERTY, 
RIGHTS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
 
41 
A REVIEW OF CHILD POVERTY APPROACHES:  
The European Union Experience 
Amélia Bastos 
Poverty causes lifelong damage to children’s minds and 
bodies, turning them into adults who perpetuate the cycle of pov-
erty by transmitting it to their children. This is why poverty re-
duction must begin with the protection and the realization of the 
human rights of children. Investments in children are the best 
guarantee for achieving equitable and sustainable human devel-
opment. (UNICEF, 2000 : V)  
Child poverty is still a major issue within the European Union, de-
spite the efforts that have been made to tackle it. The statistics of EURO-
STAT show that in the European Union around one in every four children is 
poor (according to the measurement whose methodology is described later 
in the chapter). This highlights the scale of child poverty within the Euro-
pean Union and suggests that there is an obvious reason for social concern 
about the future of these children. Moreover, it is broadly acknowledged 
that the experience of poverty is long-lasting, leading to consequences that 
may last until adulthood (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997; Ridge, 2004, 
2011; Fernandes et al., 2012). 
Populations also pay a significant price for child poverty in terms 
of reduced productivity, lower levels of health as well as of education 
achievement, increased welfare costs and unemployment, higher costs of 
social protection and justice, and threats to social cohesion (UNICEF, 
2012).1 Moreover, as children depend on adults, they are not responsible 
for their living conditions. Therefore, child poverty is also a question of 
social justice. Finally, eliminating child poverty is an important step in the 
process of tackling the problem of poverty more generally (Minujín et al., 
2006). It should also be mentioned that despite the relation between chil-
dren and adults child poverty differs from adult poverty in its specificities, 
                                                   
1  For a detailed analysis of these costs, see Griggs and Walker (2008). 
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manifestations, causes, and consequences (Minujín et al., 2006; Delamóni-
ca, 2014). The lack of visibility of children within the poverty debate has 
negative consequences on polices designed to eradicate the problem and 
also on the development of a holistic approach to tackle it that includes 
children and their families (Minujín et al., 2006).  
To get beyond a static picture of poverty, it is important to investi-
gate poverty spell duration for children as well as patterns of exit from and 
entry into poverty, and poverty intensity. These elements may produce 
different short-term and long-term impacts. Children who spend a long 
time in poverty are currently worse off than those who have just experi-
enced short spells. Transitory routes in and out of poverty are considered 
to have fewer consequences than long-term spells. The intensity of poverty 
also matters, as long-term spells of moderate poverty are considered to 
have a less adverse impact than short-term spells of severe poverty. Finally, 
it is worth mentioning that the nature of the routes to poverty is also im-
portant for policy design purposes. With low turnover rates (i.e., entries 
and exits from poverty), there is a relatively stable group of poor children, 
whereas in the case of high turnover rates, the changes in the composition 
of the poor call for the continuous adjustment of policies. 
The use of panel data has broadened the study of the poverty cau-
sality process. Cappellari and Jenkins (2002) refer to the dynamic approach 
to poverty: “If one takes the dynamic perspective, then the salient research 
questions change from ‘who is most likely to be poor at the moment?’ to 
‘who is most likely to remain poor and who is most at risk of becoming 
poor?’ The dynamic approach complements the conventional perspective 
that is provided by cross-sectional analysis and attempts to provide a basis 
for assessing what triggers child poverty movements into, and out of pov-
erty”(2002: C60). Although it is widely accepted that it is important to 
develop strategies against child poverty, our knowledge about it is not very 
advanced. Indeed, the statistics on the subject are currently aimed at quan-
tifying child poverty rates for all children and, appropriately, disaggregat-
ing according to specific criteria, such as family structure, parents’ em-
ployment, and location, among others. Moreover, while the situation of 
persistently poor children is fairly well acknowledged, information about 
the processes that underlie the routes into and out of poverty is far from 
known.  
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There is a need to design effective social policies to alleviate child 
poverty. However, in order to ensure the efficiency of such policies, to ac-
curately diagnose the problem, and to be able to understand the process 
that underlies it, it is important to possess knowledge of child poverty and 
its features. The methodological framework used to define child poverty is 
a key factor in this context. It is widely accepted that the concepts and 
measurements used play a crucial role in the process of analysis (Ben-
Arieh, 2000). Moreover, a workable methodological framework is also an 
important tool for policy purposes, as it facilitates a rigorous and detailed 
identification of the problem. However, there is a lack of consensus within 
the academic community about methodological aspects, such as:  
(1) The definition of poverty—unidimensional or multidimensional  
(2) The unit of measurement—the household or the child 
(3) The dimensions and indicators to be considered—selection criteria, 
quantitative or qualitative, age-specific ones or the same for all chil-
dren  
(4) The methods used to construct aggregate measurements to assess 
how children are faring—simple counting measurements or complex 
indices, weighted or not 
(5) Data requirements 
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the analysis of the 
methods used to analyze child poverty and extract lessons learned from it 
to improve and adapt the currently applied approaches for the context of 
the European Union. The text is organized as follows: After this introducto-
ry section, the second section presents the different methodological ap-
proaches currently used to analyze child poverty in Europe. In the third 
section an appraisal of their advantages and disadvantages is carried out. 
The conclusions are to be found in the last section, along with their implica-
tions for future design methods. 
Methodological frameworks 
Empirical studies about the association between household in-
come and children’s well-being have been producing results with very 
varied outcomes. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997) conducted their re-
search with American children. They found that family income primarily 
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affects children’s development and achievements but not their mental and 
physical health. Mayer (1997) found that family income influences most of 
children’s outcomes to some extent, due to the fact that social policies 
guarantee the satisfaction of core basic necessities. Recent studies of Euro-
pean children, such as those of the European Commission (2012), Ajzen-
stadt and Gal (2010), or the Tarki Social Research Institute and Applica 
consortium (2010), have analyzed the effect of family income on children’s 
well-being, and also on their economic and social success as adults. Despite 
the fact that the importance of family income on children’s well-being was 
pointed out in these studies, they also denote that income is not the sole 
determinant. 
Despite its limitations, income (or consumption) has been com-
monly used for the analysis of poverty, especially in the case of poverty 
dynamics. With regard to child poverty, there are basically two theories 
that explain the relationship between household resources and children’s 
well-being.2  
The economic or investment theory considers that income directly 
affects a child’s well-being. Despite the importance of parents’ economic 
resources, the models constructed upon this theory predict that children’s 
outcomes also depend on other factors, rather than only parents’ invest-
ment, some of these being genetic characteristics, educational achieve-
ments, and particular abilities. In poor families, family income is found to 
play an important role in children’s outcomes, as endowments passed on to 
children by better-off families depend more on parents’ decisions about 
how to invest in their children, rather than on disposable income. In theory, 
social transfers could equalize opportunities for all children, but in prac-
tice, parents’ choice regarding their expenses is the key determinant. 
Therefore, social transfers may be needed but may not be sufficient in 
promoting opportunity standardization for children.  
The literature on poverty commonly assumes that all household 
members share equally the family resources. However, intra-household 
allocations may ameliorate or sacrifice children’s living conditions. Some 
adults may choose to invest their scarce resources in their children’s fu-
ture. Also, a gender bias in favor of male children may occur (Cockburn et 
al., 2009). Neglecting the distributional resource model within the house-
                                                   
2  For a detailed analysis of these theories, see Mayer (1997). 
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hold leads to measurement and identification errors. Cockburn et al. 
(2009) conclude that nearly one-third of children are wrongly classified in 
terms of poverty, when the equal share hypothesis is assumed. 
The non-economic theory, or “good-parent theory,” states that 
children’s outcomes depend firstly on parents’ profile characteristics, 
namely their personality and parenting style. Therefore, income con-
straints only indirectly reduce children’s outcomes because they decrease 
the level of interactions between parents and their children. Moreover, low 
income is commonly associated with values and behaviors that encompass 
a type of culture of poverty that does not lead to economic and social suc-
cess. In this context, increasing family income is not a route for escaping 
poverty, as poverty is more a consequence of life style and attitudes, than 
an outcome of income scarcity. Changing this culture and its inherent atti-
tudes and values is the most effective way to reduce poverty and income 
transfers are not needed at all. 
Thus, the definition of poverty is crucial to the research on this is-
sue. The multidimensional nature of the problem introduces a complexity 
to its definition, which has been widely discussed within the academic 
literature.3 With specific regard to child poverty, different analytical ap-
proaches have been applied in an effort to capture those child-specific 
characteristics that contribute to conceptualizing child well-being, with 
identification and aggregation choices proving to be key issues that con-
strain their effectiveness (Pollard and Lee, 2003; Minujin et al. 2006), is-
sues that are detailed further in this section. Despite their content, these 
approaches are driven by a trade-off between the simple and the practical, 
and the complex and the informative. Moreover, all such approaches in-
volve value judgment, whether theoretically and/or empirically justified. In 
developing such approaches, one has to take into account the constraints 
posed by the scope of availability of statistical data on children in order to 
guarantee feasibility and reliability. 
A range of approaches have been designed and developed to cap-
ture the complexity of child poverty-related phenomena. The main ap-
proaches are analyzed by considering the monetary-based measurement, 
                                                   
3  For a comprehensive discussion on this issue see, for example, Neubourg et al. 
(2014); UNICEF (2013); Alkire and Roche (2012); Notten and Roelen (2011); and 
Bradshaw et al. (2007). 
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multidimensional methods, the holistic perspective, the child rights frame-
work, and the combined one applied by the European Union.  
The Monetary-based approach 
The income issue firstly brings to attention the need to define the 
concept of poverty to be used. Beyond this definition, the analysis of the 
problem of poverty needs to identify which factors are associated with it—
preferably the ones that have a causal relation with monetary poverty. In 
the early 2000s, studies such as that of Bradbury et al. (2001) provided 
some information about the association between monetary poverty and 
factors such as age, employment status, family composition and education 
level, at the individual level. Cappellari and Jenkins (2002) continued this 
analysis by modeling poverty transitions, noting/emphasizing the im-
portance of dealing with problems such as heterogeneity, state depend-
ence, initial conditions and attrition. More recently, authors such as Callens 
et al. (2005) and Brady et al. (2009) have showed that macro factors such 
as family benefits having an important effect on monetary poverty odds 
(that is, the probabilities of being poor /non poor). There is an increasing 
interest in developing an aggregate measurement of poverty which encom-
passes individual income profile along time (Gradín and Cantó, 2012). 
These are some of the causes and/or consequences of child poverty. 
Based upon the observation of family income, this method applies 
the hypothesis that household material resources have a strong influence 
on present and future child well-being (Bradbury and Jantti, 2001; Oxley et 
al., 2001 and UNICEF, 2005 apply this method). This is the approach to 
child poverty which was applied in the majority of the studies carried out 
in the 1990s. 
The identification mechanism is focused on household income (or 
consumption) and is constructed upon the definition of a cut-off point—the 
poverty line. This procedure identifies children living in poor households 
and considers that, given the importance of family resources on children’s 
living standards, these children are also poor.  The poverty line threshold 
may be absolute, or relative. In the first case, its value should guarantee 
that the household has the ability to purchase a basket of goods and ser-
vices that are considered to be essential (Corak, 2006). In the second case, 
the relative character of the poverty line is derived from the fact that the 
cut-off point is calculated based on the national standard of living. Its value 
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could be set at, for instance, 50% or 60% of the median income per equiva-
lent adult, which implies the use of equivalence scales. This is in fact a ques-
tionable method (Minujin et al., 2006) as it does not take into account chil-
dren’s specific needs.4  
Data requirements for this framework involve using microdata on 
income or consumption. At the EU level, the Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) is the main data set used. This is an annual survey 
that includes information about the income and living conditions of house-
holds and individuals. However, the information included is not child spe-
cific, which constitutes a limitation with regard to the context of child pov-
erty analysis. 
Despite the fact that the child is the unit of investigation, and 
therefore that the child should be the unit of analysis, the household is 
adopted as the unit of measurement, in keeping with data availability5. 
Building on the work of Foster et al. (1984), within this approach the inci-
dence, intensity, and severity of child poverty can be estimated. In addition, 
a dynamic perspective, using indicators such as turnover statistics, the 
longitudinal classification of the poor, and the analysis of the duration of 
poverty spells, can be applied (Arranz and Cantó, 2010; Bane and Ellwood, 
1986). These are important indicators for monitoring the percentage of 
children in monetary poor households. Furthermore, they are amenable to 
international comparisons, which is one of the main advantages of this 
approach.  
The monetary-based approach is a one-dimensional method, and 
therefore it relies only on the information of a single variable to analyze 
poverty. In the context of child poverty, this fact has important implica-
tions, which are related to (1) the information derived from household 
income or consumption about child well-being, (2) the hypothesis of equal-
                                                   
4  According to EUROSTAT (2015b): “This indicator does not measure wealth or pov-
erty, but low income in comparison to other residents in that country, which does 
not necessarily imply a low standard of living” (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/stati 
sticsexplained/index.php/Glossary:Atriskofpoverty_rate). 
5  Despite the importance of a genuinely child-focused analysis, some authors consider 
that the household should be the unit of analysis, as basic children’s needs are pro-
vided by the family. In addition, for these authors, the intra-household distribution 
of resources is adequately represented by equivalence scales (Corak, 2005), a ques-
tionable proposition (see also the section on the EU approach). 
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ly shared resources within the household, (3) the parental living project, 
(4) the unit of analysis/measurement considered, and (5) reference to 
nonmarket-based goods. Next, these implications are examined in detail: 
1. With regard to income/consumption, it is worth analyzing the 
limitations associated with its use as a resource variable. The first 
problem arises with the reliability of data on income, as commonly 
these data underreport earnings. Moreover, households’ resources are 
determined not only by current income but also by home ownership 
and house values, family solidarity, and savings are not captured by 
income at a point in time. In the context of child poverty, despite the 
importance of family monetary availability, which has already been 
analyzed, children’s well-being is also conditioned by other factors 
related to housing, leisure, and emotional support, which are neglected 
by this methodology.  
2. The hypothesis of equally shared resources within the household is not 
a consensual issue among academics (Jenkins, 2000). It assumes that all 
members of the family share fortunes and misfortunes equally (Alkire 
and Roche, 2012). This approach assumes the household to be a black 
box, within which incoming resources are equally shared among 
household members (Pahl, 1983). This is in fact a strong hypothesis, as 
children do not participate in resource allocation and are therefore 
dependent on their parents’ management of resources. An in-depth 
analysis of household resources would require complementary micro-
level data, in order to disclose the complexity within the black box. 
3. Parental project6 and capacity are important conditioners of children’s 
well-being, which cannot be evaluated through income. The current 
living conditions of children will play an important role in the future, as 
they include options about such aspects as school attainment, leisure 
activities, and health care, for example. Beyond the material conditions, 
these aspects are also derived from parents’ choices in allocating their 
disposable resources. Moreover, they are also conditioned by parents’ 
                                                   
6  That is, family organization and functioning, and parental plans with regard to chil-
dren. 
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parental capacity to contribute to the positive development of their 
children (Cockburn et al., 2009). 
4. To analyze child poverty the natural unit of analysis is the child. This 
calls for the investigation of children-related well-being issues, which 
are in nature different from those of adults. However, the monetary-
based approach considers the household as the unit of measurement. 
The results obtained in terms of child poverty came directly from 
household disaggregation. Therefore, these results do not differentiate 
the factors that condition children’s well-being from the other members 
of the family. 
5.  Moreover, income is assumed as the sole determinant of children’s 
well-being. This is a strong hypothesis as in fact, their well-being is also 
determined by nonmarket-based goods, such as health and education 
services, leisure equipment, safety environment, and others that are 
commanded by the public sector in accordance with the infant and 
youth policy pursued.7 
For these reasons, a methodology that goes beyond income/con-
sumption is needed. Several methods doing this are discussed in the next 
subsection. 
Multidimensional methods 
Academics have long stressed that as poverty is a multifaceted 
problem, it needs to be analyzed through a multidimensional approach 
(Gordon and Townsend, 2000; Nolan, 2001; Corak, 2005; Gordon et al., 
2006a, 2006b; and Bradshaw et al., 2007 are among those advocating this 
approach). This is particularly true for children, as a child-focused ap-
proach seeks to capture the specific features of child poverty. Furthermore, 
the concept of children’s well-being implicitly involves respect for the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, see next subsection), which thus 
effectively calls for a multidimensional approach to analyzing child poverty. 
From a macro perspective, child poverty index measurements are 
aggregate statistics that combine multiple information, and they can there-
                                                   
7  For a more detailed analysis of these limitations, see for example, Minujin and Nandy 
(2012) and Minujin et al. (2006). 
50   AMÉLIA BASTOS 
 
fore be considered a multidimensional method. However, it should be not-
ed that these measurements are not derived from micro-data sets. Conse-
quently, they do not allow the identification of poor children. The Human 
Poverty Index (UNDP, 2007) is an example of such measurement. For a 
selected group of high-income OECD countries, which covers the European 
Union, it includes information on four domains, considered as essential 
elements of human life: health, education, standard of living, and social 
exclusion. 
The Multidimensional Poverty Index (UNDP, 2010)8 is also a mac-
ro index. It follows the Human Poverty Index but it measures deprivation 
trough household surveys. Therefore, it includes an identification proce-
dure, given by the number of deprivations experienced. It includes the 
same domains as the Human Poverty Index and is constructed upon the 
observation of 10 indicators.9  
In order to identify individual poor children, Corak (2005, 2006) 
put forward some guidelines for contextualizing child poverty analysis. 
After consideration that these approaches have to be multidimensional, 
this author suggested a headcount poverty rate similar to the correspond-
ing indicator in the monetary-based method. However, he goes further by 
complementing this indicator with other measurements as a means of in-
ternalizing other dimensions of child poverty.  
Bradshaw et al. (2007) suggested a child well-being index to com-
paratively evaluate the situation of children across the EU member states. 
It consists of eight clusters of well-being: material situation, housing, 
health, subjective well-being, education, children’s relationships, and risk 
and safety. The statistical techniques involved are quite sophisticated and 
this method requires micro-data that consider the child as the unit of ob-
servation and measurement. 
The framework adopted by the multidimensional methods incor-
porates definitions of indicators for well-being (in a positive sense) or dep-
rivation (in a negative sense), and thereby evaluates several different di-
mensions of child lifestyles and living conditions. However, there is no 
                                                   
8  For a detailed description, see Alkire and Santos (2010). 
9  The Multidimensional Poverty Index is the product of two numbers: the percentage 
of income poor individuals and the average intensity of deprivation captured by the 
areas in which individuals are deprived. 
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actual consensus about the best set of indicators. In fact, measuring all the 
dimensions for well-being proves to be very difficult, if not impossible. 
However, it is worth noting that for poverty analysis, there has to be a se-
lection of the dimensions associated with material deprivations that consti-
tute rights violations.  
Within the multidimensional approach, measurements vary from 
simple count measures (Nolan, 2001), to more complex formulae (Brad-
shaw et al., 2007). Various methods have been tested to setting weights in 
multidimensional indices. These methods include data-driven weights (e.g., 
frequency-based and regression-based weights) and normative-based 
weights. For instance, using Fuzzy Set Theory, Bastos and Machado (2009) 
propose an index that aggregates micro-data information on income and 
living conditions through the use of unequal weights. The weighting proce-
dure employed gives more importance to the indicators in which depriva-
tion is not widespread, pointing out items for which nonpossession means 
a strong feeling of deprivation.10  
However, given that the more complex the measurements, the less 
useful the outputs (UNICEF, 2005), this results in a trade-off between the 
information gathered and the interpretation provided. Accurate and relia-
ble data at the individual child level is an important constraint for these 
methods. Moreover, as children’s well-being depends on different factors in 
accordance with their changing ages, gauging the most appropriate range 
of indicators proves to be difficult. However, combining deprivations for 
different age groups is simple and straightforward (Delamónica, 2014). 
Clearly, the indicators used in developing countries should be adapted for 
the European context (while the dimensions should be the same). One such 
set of indicators has been offered by UNICEF (2012), which among its 14 
indicators includes: at least one meal a day with meat, chicken, or fish (or a 
vegetarian equivalent); books suitable for the child’s age and knowledge 
level (not including school books); outdoor leisure equipment (bicycle, 
roller-skates, etc.); a quiet place with enough room and light to do home-
work; and some new clothes (i.e., not all second-hand). All of them have 
equal weight. However, if they were clustered in dimensions related to 
rights (see next section; e.g., those related to food and nutrition, education 
                                                   
10  For a discussion on the various methods of setting weights, see for example, DeCanq 
and Lugo (2008). 
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and learning, leisure and recreation, etc.), the dimensions would have equal 
weight but indicators within each dimension could be weighted in order to 
give more salience to the indicators in which deprivation is not wide-
spread, which would highlight items for which insufficiency of access/en-
joyment (or complete lack of it) denotes more deprivation. 
The holistic framework and the child’s rights approach 
Holistic framework 
This approach comprises methodologies that inclusively evaluate 
children’s livelihood in an overall sense, through a combination of qualita-
tive and quantitative data, together with participatory poverty assessments 
(e.g., Christian Children’s Fund, 2005). The application of longitudinal data 
enables the calculation of poverty trajectories and therefore sheds light on 
the causes and consequences of child poverty.  
Among these causes/consequences, the holistic framework identi-
fies the importance of the effects of parents’ socioeconomic status, occupa-
tion, and resources on young adult outcomes. The holistic approach pro-
vides a wide range of information that directly or indirectly affects child 
poverty. 
A particular application of this method11 uses an identification 
process that is based on six child-specific outcomes: nutritional status, 
physical morbidity, mental morbidity, life skills (literacy, work, etc.), devel-
opment level for age, and subjective perception of well-being and future life 
opportunities.  
The participatory component is very important for this approach. 
In fact, data on issues such as subjective perception of well-being and fu-
ture life opportunities are driven from children’s answers to the questions 
asked by the interviewers who routinely collect this information. Children’s 
voices are an important source of information within this approach, point-
ing the focus on the child rather than on the family. Despite the potential 
problems with the accuracy of this type of subjective data, their content is 
important to understanding the actual feelings of children of their present 
living conditions and their expectations on the future. 
                                                   
11  The Young Lives project (2015), www.younglives.org.uk 
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In fact, the principal advantage of this approach lies with the type 
of information that is collected to enable a diagnosis of child poverty. This 
information includes outcomes, inputs, social policy issues, and facts that 
are related to child poverty as a means of dismembering the process that 
governs children’s impoverishment. It uses factual and subjective data that 
originate from a variety of sources. 
A major disadvantage of this methodology is the large amount of 
data that is required. By the same token, the analytical complexity of incor-
porating different sources of information, compounded by the lack of syn-
thetic indicators, makes this methodology difficult to apply and dissemi-
nate. However, it has the merit of pointing out the importance of longitudi-
nal data in the analysis of child poverty, as well as the use of a wide set of 
information for capturing how children live and their experience of being 
in poverty. In addition, this information may be complemented by the mi-
cro-data from household surveys. 
The child’s rights approach 
The United Nation’s CRC, which was established in 1989, is the 
most widely ratified human rights convention (only two countries have not 
ratified it). It is a normative framework that advocates a set of human 
rights for children in a wide range of domains, which are intended to cover 
all the relevant areas of their lives. This approach is child-centered and can 
thus be considered to be holistic, as it takes into consideration the child as 
a whole, giving attention to all aspects of children’s lives.  
The rights included in the CRC are guided by four general princi-
ples: the first concerns nondiscrimination, irrespective of race, color, gen-
der, language, religion, political, ethnic, social origin, disability, or other 
status; the second considers that all actions developed for children should 
be guided by a child’s best interest; the third establishes the obligation to 
ensure a child’s survival and development; and finally, the fourth principle 
is to protect children’s views and opinion in all issues that are related to 
them. 
Countries that ratify the convention (State Parties) should periodi-
cally report to the Committee of the Rights of the Child on their progress 
toward fulfilling child’s rights. Data requirements for these reports cover a 
wide range of aspects, in order to assure the complete verification of all 
rights contemplated in CRC. However, it is worth noting that within poverty 
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analysis, it is important to select the rights associated with poverty, not all 
possible rights violations. For instance, in spite of the importance of rights 
such as religion expression or nongender discrimination for example, their 
fulfillment does not guarantee nonpoverty situations nor does their viola-
tion entail poverty.  
A measure based on the CRC would define child poverty as multi-
dimensional.  
Following the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human 
Rights (OHCHR, 2004), two types of rights can be differentiated: those that 
constitute poverty, that is, those which make a person poor just because 
these rights are not fulfilled (e.g., health, education, housing, etc.) and in-
strumental rights, that is, those that can help to reduce poverty but which 
do not define who is poor when the rights are unfulfilled, such as voting or 
the right to express opinions freely.  
In addition, the CRC aims to guarantee the empowerment of chil-
dren to face their challenges and to have the healthy development to which 
they have the right. It involves the examination of living standards, as the 
multidimensional methods, but it goes beyond it. The emphasis on the 
empowerment of the poor claims for the introduction of instrumental 
rights (e.g., civil and political rights) in the poverty analysis, complement-
ing aspects that are out of the scope of living conditions. Furthermore, 
these rights ensure that the social participation of individuals is considered 
in all aspects of their lives. 
The recent European Commission recommendations on invest-
ment in children (European Commission, 2013) highlight the importance of 
tackling child poverty and explicitly suggest that the problem of child pov-
erty be addressed from a children’s rights approach, which emphasizes the 
social character of combating child poverty. Moreover, the European Union 
considers that poverty reduction and human rights are two integrated 
parts of the same project. Thus, the EU approach is explored in the follow-
ing subsection. 
The EU approach 
The Recommendation of the European Union launched on Febru-
ary 2013 (European Commission, 2013) points out the importance of tack-
ling child poverty not only because of its scale and immediate consequenc-
es but also as a means of reducing the more general problem of poverty. It 
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suggests a strategy to empower children and to alleviate them from the 
effects of the economic crisis. This recommendation is in line with the Eu-
rope 2020 strategic social plan and more specifically with one of its inte-
grated objectives—to lift 20 million persons out of poverty and/or social 
exclusion.  
Recognizing the importance of adopting a multidimensional ap-
proach to poverty, the concept of poverty or social exclusion is central in 
the monitoring process of the Europe 2020 Strategy. EU-SILC constitutes 
the dataset used to collect the statistical information for monitoring and 
comparative analysis.  
According to the definition of EUROSTAT, the population living at-
risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion (AROPE) is identified as being included 
in at least one of the following categories12: 
1. People at-risk-of-poverty after social transfers—people 
living in a household with an equivalized disposable in-
come13 below the poverty line, set at 60% of the national 
median equivalized disposable income (after social trans-
fers). This is an application of the standard monetary 
poverty definition. 
2. Severely materially deprived people—people who are 
strongly constrained in their living conditions, experienc-
ing at least 4 out of 9 aspects of deprivation.14 The analy-
sis of material deprivation conducted combines the 
methods discussed within the multidimensional approach 
to poverty presented in the previous point. 
3. People living in households with very low work intensi-
ty—people aged 0–59 (excluding students) living in a 
                                                   
12  For a detailed presentation of this indicator, see EUROSTAT (2015). 
13  The OECD-modified scale is used to take into account differences in household size 
and composition. This scale considers a weight of 1.0 for the first adult in the house-
hold, 0.5 for the sequent members aged 14 and over and 0.3 for those aged less than 
14. 
14  To analyze material deprivation EUROSTAT considers the following 9 indicators of 
deprivation: people cannot afford to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; to keep 
their home adequately warm; to face unexpected expenses; to eat meat or proteins 
every second day; to go on weekly holiday away from home; to buy a color television 
set; to buy a washing machine; to buy a car; and to buy a telephone. 
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household where the adults worked less than 20% of 
their work potential time during the past year. This class 
intends to take into account the effects of one of the most 
important determinant of poverty, employment. 
In the context of child poverty, the direct application of this 
framework may bias the results we discussed earlier. In fact, the child is the 
statistical unit of analysis but the household is the unit of measurement. In 
order to avoid this potential bias EUROSTAT suggested a set of indicators 
to review the material deprivation component of AROPE among children in 
2015 (European Commission, 2012).15  
The indicators suggested include information about the household 
where the child lives and specific children items. The proposal is to include:  
1. Household: Replace worn-out furniture (enforced lack) 
2. Household: Arrears 
3. Household: Computer and internet (enforced lack) 
4. Household: Home adequately warm (enforced lack) 
5. Household: Car (enforced lack) 
6. Child: Some new clothes (enforced lack)  
7. Child: Two pairs of shoes (enforced lack)  
8. Child: Fresh fruits and vegetables daily (enforced lack)  
9. Child: Meat, chicken, or fish daily (enforced lack)  
10. Child: Suitable books (enforced lack)  
11. Child: Outdoor leisure equipment (enforced lack)  
12. Child: Indoor games (enforced lack) 
13. Child: Place to do homework  
14. Child: Leisure activities (enforced lack)  
15. Child: Celebrations (enforced lack)  
16. Child: Invite friends (enforced lack)  
17. Child: School trips (enforced lack)  
18. Child: Holiday (enforced lack)  
                                                   
15  The ad-hoc module of EU-SILC 2009 wave intended to complete the information 
about material deprivation and already included some children-specific indicators. 
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The detailed discussion of this methodology is out of the scope of 
this chapter. However, we would like to give note for the following issues 
that may potentially compromise its effectiveness in the analysis of child 
poverty: the information is gathered from the adult respondent, and there-
fore children’s voices are out of this framework; it is assumed that if at least 
one child in the household lacks one of the items considered this also ap-
plies to the other children in that household; these indicators apply indif-
ferently to children aged 1–15; and finally, the aggregation method sug-
gested is a simple counting scheme, which does not take into account the 
relative character of deprivation. However, it should be mentioned that 
these are robust and statistically validated indicators, specifically designed 
for children. Their systematic application will certainly contribute to better 
monitoring child poverty in the European Union. 
Besides this framework and in order to help member states to im-
plement the 2013 European Recommendation, the European Commission 
launched the European Platform for Investing in Children (EPIC).16 This is 
an online platform that provides information about policymaking for chil-
dren and their families aimed at strengthening their capacities to face the 
consequences of the current economic crisis in Europe and, in particular, to 
tackle child poverty. The platform includes a list of indicators developed 
around the three key pillars included in the 2013 European Recommenda-
tion: access to adequate resources, access to affordable quality services and 
children's right to participate. 
Discussion of the principal findings: Contrasting the approaches 
Child poverty approaches assume different forms in their efforts 
to capture exactly how children live and what poverty means to them. 
These approaches differ in terms of scope and in their units of analysis. The 
identification and aggregation framework produce different measure-
ments.  
Five issues summarize the most important content of child pov-
erty approaches: 
1. The definition of child poverty and identification of poor children: 
Defining well-being or poverty is one of the first points of divergence 
                                                   
16  For a detailed presentation of EPIC, see http://europa.eu/epic/. 
58   AMÉLIA BASTOS 
 
among the approaches currently used to analyze and evaluate child 
poverty. The use of a single indicator, such as income (or 
consumption), may bias the identification process. Besides its own 
limitation as a resource variable, it is not child centered. The 
identification process is crucial in mapping child poverty, and this 
process should therefore be able to capture child specificities in terms 
of current living conditions. 
Despite the simplicity of the identification procedure used in the 
monetary-based approach, this method does not capture all relevant 
inter-country differences, an example being those that are related to 
the community and social provision of goods related to school, health, 
and leisure. In rich countries, families are the main provider for 
children, and therefore income may be a good resource variable. 
However, even in these countries, the social system features the 
services offered, as well as their quality, are potential sources of mis-
identification of poor (and nonpoor) children. Thus, simultaneously 
analyzing various dimensions provides a more realistic and complete 
analysis of child deprivation and poverty. 
2. The unit of analysis: It does not make sense to try to estimate child 
poverty without understanding what happens specifically to children. 
Thus, the unit of analysis should be the child. However, this does not 
imply that children live in a vacuum. While the unit of analysis is 
definitely the child, and child-specific indicators should be used (see 
the next point), household indicators could and should also be used 
(e.g., housing indicators representing the living conditions of 
children).  
3. The dimensions and indicators to be used: The choice of indicators is 
a crucial element for multidimensional methods. Obviously, the 
identification methods employed by multidimensional approaches 
depend on the selected dimensions and indicators. In spite of 
differences in the choice of indicators (and the rationale behind the 
choices) among the approaches, there is quite a good deal of 
convergence on the dimensions and the main indicators to be used.  
Caution should be taken when using subjective information, as this 
type of data may not be reliable. In order to avoid these problems, it is 
very important to pay attention to the interview techniques 
employed. When considered alongside confirmatory analysis tools, 
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these informal conversations may be an interesting option, despite 
the fact that they are time consuming.  
A more reliable guide for choosing dimensions is provided by the 
child rights approach and the concomitant concept of constitutive 
rights (i.e., those that are related to material deprivation17). Although 
the dimensions are the same for all children, the way their rights are 
satisfied is different at different life stages. For example, the 
periodicity and type of health services required by babies and 
teenagers to fulfill their right to health is very different. The same is 
true in terms of the right to education or nutrition. 
4. The methods used: The aggregation method used in the construction 
of multidimensional child poverty measurements or indicators also 
varies across approaches. After the identification of children with a 
deficit in one or more dimensions, the next step is to aggregate this 
information into a poverty measurement. A summary statistic is a 
very important tool for comparative purposes in terms of time and 
place, as well as being a valuable input for policy designs.  
The measurements designed by Foster et al. (1984) within the 
monetary-based approach to provide information about the incidence, 
intensity, and severity of monetary poverty can be adapted to 
measure the incidence, depth, and severity of child poverty within the 
multidimensional approaches (see e.g., Minujin and Delamónica, 
2007; Bastos and Machado, 2009).  
Normalization, aggregation and weighting techniques are important 
issues for multidimensional measurements. Most of the approaches 
mentioned previously use equal weights for domains/dimensions. 
This is appropriate due to the fact that, according to the CRC, all rights 
are equally important.18 As each dimension corresponds to a 
particular right constitutive of poverty, they should not be weighted. 
This is, for instance, the approach taken by Alkire and Roche (2012). 
The holistic child poverty assessment often uses more than one 
measurement, as well as qualitative data, as a means of capturing the 
                                                   
17  As opposed to other rights which, although not less important, are not associated to 
lack of resources such as the right to free expression, avoiding violence, birth regis-
tration or freedom of religion. 
18  As mentioned above, indicators within each dimension could be weighted. 
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various dimensions of child poverty, namely its causes, consequences, 
and perceptions. Despite the potential difficulty in dealing with 
qualitative data (in terms of adding to/incorporating with 
quantitative data), their informative content is an important input to 
the diagnosis of the problem and also for policy design purposes. 
5. Data requirements: Data requirements are an important constraint 
for child poverty approaches. The monetary-based approach assumes 
that the income or consumption pattern of individuals and 
households is known, information that is generally gathered at a 
national level. The EU-SILC is the main source of information in the 
European Union, which was launched by EUROSTAT in 2004. It is 
published annually, and is also an important tool for multidimensional 
assessments. Its 2009 ad-hoc module details information about 
children’s living conditions, which is then used to formulate a child-
centered analysis for that specific year.  
In the case of the multidimensional methods, the range of domains 
determines the information that needs to be collected. Moreover, the 
collection of data for areas such as social interaction or poverty 
perception may be difficult, as well as costly.  
The holistic methods have strong data requirements at a national and 
local level. The use of qualitative data may be a difficult exercise. The 
Young Lives Project integrates the information given by quantitative 
and qualitative variables. The first ones are intended to assess living 
standards in the domains of education, health, childcare, and child 
work. The qualitative information aims to capture the perception of 
well-being and life opportunities directly from children, emphasizing 
the importance of participatory methods. The dynamic character of 
the information used to identify the casual process that is behind 
impoverishment is one of the strengths of this method. This is also 
one of its disadvantages as it is based upon longitudinal data gathered 
within a time window of 15 years and, thus, is only available for a 
handful of countries.  
For a dynamic analysis of poverty, the commonly used statistics that 
are often calculated in terms of monetary poverty are turnover rate, 
poverty spells’ duration analysis, and the longitudinal classification of 
poverty trajectories (namely entries into and exit from poverty). 
EUROSTAT has available data for these estimates for adults. Similar 
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analysis can give important information about child poverty. 
Moreover, the EU-SILC could provide data for dynamic analysis of 
multidimensional poverty. 
Concluding remarks 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter aims to highlight the prin-
cipal characteristics of the currently used child poverty approaches. The 
identification of the problems and limitations listed above may constitute 
an important step to improving such approaches and applying them in the 
context of European countries. 
As expansive and comprehensive as the EUROSTAT estimation of 
child poverty is, and in spite of the presence of the term “Social Exclusion,” 
the measurement is focused on resources and material deprivation, not 
other problems like violence, abuse, unhappiness, voting rights, or racial 
discrimination. In other words, it is not an overall measure of well-being or 
all bad things that can happen to children. It deals, as it should, specifically 
with “lacks,” that is, deprivations and poverty. In order to improve on cur-
rent efforts to measure child poverty in the European Union, five guidelines 
are suggested: 
 Multidimensional definition of child poverty: Estimations and 
analyses should integrate the range of dimensions/domains/rights 
that constitute child poverty. Appropriately, this is the approach used 
by EUROSTAT. 
 Unit of analysis: As the child is the central unit of observation in child 
poverty analyses, the assessments should be child focused. Despite 
the importance of the family and household in the child’s everyday 
life, even the integration of the family’s conditions in the analysis 
should be carried out through indicators that could measure the 
impact of these conditions on children and therefore, child poverty 
assessments should avoid the inclusion of data that are not related to 
children’s well-being. Again, combining child-specific and household 
data is the appropriate approach and it is the one used by EUROSTAT. 
 The dimensions and type of indicators: child poverty measurement 
should preferably be based on quantifiable variables, in order to 
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guarantee objectivity and precision, which is the approach taken by 
EUROSTAT. In addition, quantifiable variables facilitate comparisons 
and also the monitoring of problems, in terms of time and space. The 
dimensions should be selected to represent the constitutive rights of 
poverty (the dimensions of child poverty). Moreover, the dimensions 
should be clearly specified in terms of rights and indicators should be 
grouped in clusters. Furthermore, EUROSTAT could make further 
efforts to differentiate indicators for different age groups (e.g. early 
childhood, middle childhood, and adolescents). As mentioned earlier, 
child-specific and household indicators should both be included to 
estimate child poverty. Concerning the indicators related to the 
family, it is proposed to collect information about family composition, 
parents’ education level, parents’ professional occupation, and also 
their type of participation in the labor market as these elements are 
crucial determinants of children’s lives in the short and long run. In 
terms of the indicators that evaluate children’s living standards and 
perspectives, it is suggested that these indicators should be added to 
the current EUROSTAT list: children’s health (level of development, 
medical attainment, lifestyle, and access to appropriate services) and 
children’s education attendance (grade repetition and school failure). 
 Methods: Currently, EUROSTAT considers three elements in the 
measurement of poverty, one of which consists of a multidimensional 
analysis of deprivations. In both cases (i.e., when combining the three 
elements and when combining the dimensions) no weights are given. 
Following a human rights approach and the CRC, this would be the 
most advisable way to proceed for the estimation of child poverty 
because all child rights are equally valuable. However, if various 
indicators were clustered together, weights could be used for 
indicators within each domain/dimension.  
 Data employed: Child poverty measurements should be based on data 
comparable across countries and time. The accuracy of the methods 
used to collect information, the comparative character of the data in 
terms of time and space, the precise definition and characteristics of 
the variables included in the data set are crucial issues, thus the 
importance of the work by the European Commission (2012) to 
establish the suitability, validity, reliability and additivity of 
A REVIEW OF CHILD POVERTY APPROACHES   63 
 
indicators. Taking into account the nature of child poverty and its 
long-lasting consequences, it is important to consider longitudinal 
information alongside cross-section data. The dynamic perspective is 
important for gaining knowledge about the impoverishment process 
that is crucial for the analysis of multi-dimensional child poverty. 
We recognize that there are no perfect methods to analyze socio-
economic problems and in particular, child poverty. Choices stem from 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each specific framework, 
subject to the availability of data, and taking into account the main analyti-
cal goals. However, the importance of children in our lives and societies 
calls for the construction and improvement of the methods of analysis, in 
order to ensure the provision of rigorous, actual, and pertinent information 
about children’s living conditions and, consequently, about child poverty. 
The collection of the information referred is difficult and costly. 
Moreover, for the analysis (not for the measurement) of child poverty, it is 
important to obtain the full picture in terms of the experience and feelings 
as well as the perception of causes, constraints, characteristics, and conse-
quences of child poverty. Consequently, the quantitative measurement 
would be well-served by a qualitative analysis complementing the diagno-
sis of child poverty and informing the design of effective social policies to 
tackle and eliminate it. 
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CHILD POVERTY AND INTERGENERATIONAL POVERTY 
TRANSMISSION IN THE EU: What is the impact of social 
protection policies and institutions? 
Stefanos Papanastasiou, Christos Papatheodorou, and Maria Petmesidou 
In March 2006, the European Council asked member states to take 
measures to rapidly and significantly reduce child poverty, giving all chil-
dren equal opportunities, regardless of their social background. Since then, 
child poverty reduction has been placed high on the EU policy agenda and 
rhetoric, but no significant progress has been made on this policy priority 
yet. Moreover, the Great Recession and the way the majority of the EU 
countries have responded to it, mainly through fiscal discipline and labor 
market deregulation, have further exacerbated poverty that greatly affect-
ed families with children (Petmesidou, 2013; Papatheodorou, 2014). Con-
sequently, children are up against a significantly higher poverty risk than 
the average figure for the total population (Papatheodorou and Dafermos, 
2010; Vilaplana-Lopez, 2013). 
What are the repercussions of growing up poor? Poverty that is 
lived in childhood can seriously undermine an individual’s well-being and 
socioeconomic status. Poor children are less likely to have good health, fare 
well in school, find a decent job, and achieve their full potential later in life, 
while they are more likely to become boxed in a poverty trap lasting many 
years or even throughout their life course (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997; 
Corcoran, 2001). As the 2008 economic crisis and the subsequent weak 
recovery are pushing more families with children into socioeconomically 
vulnerable and precarious positions, dealing with the causes and effects of 
child poverty becomes highly critical. The latter is crucial because it is seen 
as the basic means to intercept the intergenerational poverty transmission. 
This concept is meant to convey that the parental disadvantage is passed 
on to children and the relative intractability of poverty accounts for the 
reproduction of a vicious cycle of poverty across generations (Papatheo-
dorou and Papanastasiou, 2010b). 
Child poverty and adult poverty are two sides of the same coin. 
Still, the differentiation of child poverty from adult poverty in terms of EU 
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policy priorities leads to an implicit distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary poverty. In that sense, children are generally considered to be 
the involuntary poor, while adults and consequently parents acquire the 
status of the voluntary poor. This is leading to the reemergence of the old, 
but precarious, idea of the undeserving versus the deserving poor (Papa-
theodorou and Dafermos, 2010). Such an idea affects the public and politi-
cal discussion over the appropriate policy responses to combating poverty, 
thereby prioritizing enabling policies (i.e., education, training, and lifelong 
learning) instead of decommodifying ones (i.e., social transfers). Yet, empir-
ical research has shown that the social protection system and the corre-
sponding transfers are basic determinants of poverty and of the impact of 
the family of origin on the reproduction of poverty (Papatheodorou and 
Papanastasiou, 2010a; Papatheodorou and Papanastasiou, 2010b; Dafer-
mos and Papatheodorou, 2013). Thus, this chapter provides a comparative 
analysis of various aspects (i.e., incidence, determinants, transmission) of 
child poverty in the EU-15 countries (or simple, “the EU-15”) from a social 
policy perspective. 
The chapter is structured as follows: In the next two sections, we 
discuss critical conceptual, operational, causal, and political dimensions of 
child poverty and briefly present the data and the methodology of the anal-
ysis. Main empirical findings and descriptive statistics on child poverty in 
the EU countries are discussed in the following section. Then we present an 
empirical analysis on the intergenerational poverty transmission and the 
impact of the social protection system in mitigating the influence of the 
family of origin on children’s future outcomes and attainments. In the con-
clusion we summarize our main findings and make some policy recom-
mendations. 
Conceptual and theoretical aspects of child poverty 
A number of alternative definitions have been put forward for as-
sessing and measuring child poverty. For instance, the UNICEF’s (2005) 
definition conceptualizes child poverty as a multifaceted capability depri-
vation—in Amartya Sen’s tradition—in which there is a dearth of funda-
mental human freedom and/or of fulfillment of basic needs (Sen, 1992). 
Most often, operationalizing child poverty goes beyond income and con-
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sumption measures—like the AROPE1 indicator in Eurostat (2012), which 
is defined as the share of children in at least one of the following three 
conditions: a) at risk of poverty, b) in a situation of severe material depri-
vation, or c) living in a household with a very low work intensity.2 However 
in practice, EU countries have opted for a relative child poverty threshold 
based on a certain percentage of the median income in each country.  
Lately, the popularity and the prevalence of the term “social exclu-
sion” has been diminishing as a conceptual tool to comprehend poverty-
related issues,3 whereas it is acknowledged that poverty should be viewed 
with reference to the power structure under capitalism (Bracking, 2003). 
In this context, Murray (2002) argues that a structural or relational view of 
poverty leads to an understanding of the production and reproduction of 
poverty that is driven by inequalities of power. Therefore, Murray (2002) 
puts forward the notion of adverse or differential incorporation into the 
state, the market, and society in general—a term that he deems more ap-
propriate than the conventionally prevalent one of social exclusion. Adverse 
or differential incorporation conceptualizes poverty as a dynamic, diversi-
fied, and stratified category of individuals and groups that are adversely 
and differentially incorporated into processes of neoliberal globalization. 
On the same critical line of thinking, Hariss-White (2005) argues 
that although it is possible to mitigate poverty through social transfers, it is 
rather impossible to eradicate the root causes of poverty that are endemic 
to capitalism. On the contrary, poverty is continually being created and 
recreated under the structures and institutions of capitalism. The view-
point of child poverty that centers on a structural or relational dimension is 
                                                   
1  The At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion indicator has been proclaimed as the lead-
ing indicator for monitoring the EU strategy on child poverty, deprivation and social 
exclusion up to the hallmark year of 2020. 
2  Children at risk of poverty who live in households with an equivalized disposable 
income below 60% of the corresponding national median income. Severe material 
deprivation refers to someone’s inability to afford at least four out of nine main 
goods and services related to economic strain and durables. Persons are considered 
living in households with very low work intensity if they are aged 0–59 and the 
working age members in the household worked less than 20% of their potential dur-
ing the past year. 
3  According to Kahn and Kamerman (2002: 27), the term “social exclusion” captures 
“the inequalities in basic living; family economic participation; housing; education; 
public space; social participation; as well as the subjective experience of social ex-
clusion.” 
70   PAPANASTASIOU, PAPATHEODOROU, AND PETMESIDOU 
 
embraced in this chapter, as it is acknowledged that the power relation-
ships that are embedded in institutions within capitalism (e.g., family, 
school, workplace, church, community, etc.) perpetuate poverty.4 What is 
important is that viewing child poverty from a structural or relational 
standpoint can help understand the primacy of socioeconomic and political 
factors in perpetuating poverty, which are often neglected by mainstream 
social research, such as the welfare state, the labor market, the political 
decision-making, the social stratification patterns, to name but a few. 
The main theoretical explanations about the causes of child pov-
erty can be classified into two broad categories: social causation and social 
selection (Conger & Donnellan, 2007). The social causation theories ascribe 
poverty to the socioeconomic and political institutions and structures of 
capitalism.5 More specifically, the primary causes of poverty lie in the scar-
city of institutional opportunities, the retrenchment of the welfare state, 
the expansion of particularly low-paying jobs in capitalist societies, etc. 
According to this view, there is no window of opportunity for the poor 
segments of the world population within neoliberal globalization whatso-
ever, insofar as adverse or differential incorporation is steadily becoming 
the norm for the less well-off and less privileged.  
On the other hand, the social selection theories ascribe poverty to 
individual characteristics, such as health, skillfulness, cleverness, motiva-
tion, etc. The main argument is that children born in poor families will lag 
behind in terms of skills and achieve fewer things in life, largely because of 
poor genetic and environmental endowments from the family and the 
broader community they live in. Nevertheless, the evidence supporting this 
argument is inconclusive and imprecise as there is a large amount of con-
founding factors in the association between poverty and individual traits. 
More importantly though, it cultivates the conviction that the individual is 
responsible for its poverty, by not being activated enough to acquire the 
necessary means of living in the knowledge economy of the 21st century. In 
                                                   
4  As Foucault (1991; emphasis added) puts it, “power is everywhere, that is, power is 
diffused rather than concentrated and embodied in discursive rather than coercive 
practices, creating, thus, layers of hierarchies in every aspect of human life.” 
5  For instance, Myrdal (1962) had been an influential author who theorized about the 
accumulated disadvantage of the poor, as a result of structural causes, such as the 
lack of redistributive policies, structural unemployment, and social discrimination.  
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other terms, social selection theories have been labeled as blame-the-
victim theories due to the scapegoating of the poor. 
From a policy perspective, the prevalent socioeconomic paradigm 
that entails economic liberalization, labor market deregulation, and activa-
tion measures fails to recognize the policies of global regulation and redis-
tribution, which are needed to tackle the processes within capitalism that 
create and sustain poverty (Bracking, 2003). In contrast, there is a wide-
spread belief that the old welfare state provisions are incapable of dealing 
with the new social risks (hence their labeling as passive policies, which 
has a negative connotation), while the new workfare and activation poli-
cies—or social investment—that have increasingly gained ground in wel-
fare reform are viewed as the most adequate policy responses (Pet-
mesidou, 2014). 
The concept of social investment has been salient over recent 
years in the EU and its member states’ rhetoric. However, in practice, social 
investment has taken diversified forms in the different welfare state re-
gimes in the European Union. Drawing upon the welfare state typology 
adjusted for families, women, and children, which was put forward by 
Esping-Andersen (2002), we can distinguish between: a) familialistic poli-
cies in the countries of the conservative welfare state regime (i.e., tradi-
tional family, low female employment, and less public investment in chil-
dren); b) state interventions in the countries of the social-democratic wel-
fare state regime (promoting gender equality, child well-being, female 
employment and the harmonization of work and family life), and c) market 
solutions in the countries of the liberal welfare state regime (leading to 
high female employment but also work/family tensions). As in the coun-
tries of a liberal welfare regime, low family support by the welfare state 
also characterizes South European societies. However, contrary to the for-
mer regime, there is a prevalent gender division of paid and unpaid work in 
South Europe and care for children largely depends upon extended family 
and kin networks (Engster and Stensöta, 2011).6 
                                                   
6  There is an extensive literature on the gender dimension of welfare state regimes 
and how different family policy arrangement among them significantly affects chil-
dren’s well-being. Three dimensions of family policy are important in this respect, 
namely services, benefits, and time (i.e., duration and generosity of parental leave); 
see, among others, Kahn and Kamerman, 1994; Korpi, 2000; Pfenning and Bahle, 
2000; Venturini, 2008; Thévenon and Neyer, 2014.  
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On a broader scale, social investment becomes the vehicle of a 
wide restructuring of the welfare state in order to meet the new challenges 
and risks of modern capitalist societies. The restructuring trajectory is 
closely associated with the dispensation of decommodifying policies that 
are substituted by enabling policies, at the heart of which lie the cognitive 
and human capital development, so that the individuals can cope with the 
individualized social risks in a proactive manner (Petmesidou, 2014). 
Nonetheless, social investment signifies a turning point in the welfare func-
tion of modern societies, insofar as there is a shift from the collective to the 
individual responsibility in sustaining basic living standards. This is a di-
rect outcome of the predominance of neoliberalism across the globe, which 
favors the minimal state, the minimum social safety nets, and the human 
capital perspective, despite the augmenting social risks arising from the 
liberalization and deregulation of socioeconomic processes. 
Data and methodology 
The analysis utilizes micro-data from the EU Survey on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).7 Under the recognition that the parental 
socioeconomic status has many influences on the poverty risk of individu-
als from childhood to adulthood, Eurostat carried out the EU-SILC module 
on the intergenerational transmission of poverty in 2005, and in 2011 this 
module was repeated to allow an analysis of the evolution of the results. 
The 2011 module includes 21 variables; all of them refer to the period 
when the respondents were around 14 years of age and the information is 
provided for respondents aged 25–59, that is, those with a year of birth 
between 1951 and 1985 (Eurostat, 2012). 
This chapter employs child poverty as a response variable, that is, 
children living in households with an equivalized disposable income below 
60% of the corresponding national median income. The total disposable 
income of a household is calculated by adding the income received by all 
household members plus the income received at household level. The total 
disposable household income is equivalized in order to take into account 
differences in household size and composition. The equivalized income 
ascribed to each household member is computed by dividing the total dis-
                                                   
7  Access to EU-SILC UDB is provided according to contracts EU-SILC/2011/27 with 
Democritus University of Thrace. 
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posable income of the household by the equivalization factor. We employ 
the OECD-modified equivalence scale, which is broadly used by Eurostat in 
relevant studies. This scale assigns a weight of 1.0 to the first adult of the 
household, 0.5 to each additional adult and 0.3 to each child (Hagenaars et 
al., 1994).   
In investigating child poverty and its intergenerational transmis-
sion, we employ plots, association tests, correlation structures, and log-
linear analysis. The aim is to paint a more complete picture of child poverty 
by investigating important aspects such as incidence, determinants, trans-
mission, etc. The comparative orientation of the text is satisfied by incorpo-
rating into the analysis the EU-15 countries. What is more, these EU coun-
tries are classified into four welfare clusters following Esping-Andersen’s 
(1992) typology and the relevant academic debate on the welfare state of 
the South European countries (Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 
1997; Papatheodorou and Petmesidou, 2004, 2005). 
The primary focus on the welfare state as a socioeconomic deter-
minant of child poverty runs through the empirical analysis. In this respect, 
it is acknowledged that the social protection system plays a pivotal role in 
social welfare as well as in shaping social stratification patterns. These, in 
turn, are responsible for the poverty trajectories that are created largely by 
inequalities in the distribution of power and resources among social strata 
in capitalism. Therefore, the welfare state is viewed as a central explanato-
ry variable of the cross-country variability in the figures of poverty and 
inequality (Dafermos and Papatheodorou, 2013; Papatheodorou, 2014). In 
effect, the main objective of this chapter is to assess the cross-country vari-
ability in child poverty that in the main is accounted for by differences in 
the welfare state institutions and policies throughout the EU-15. 
The main working hypothesis underlying our analysis can be de-
lineated as follows: The welfare state institutions and policies are basic 
determinants of child poverty, inasmuch as they affect the welfare status of 
families both directly and indirectly (see Figure 1). These policies either 
affect the family’s financial situation and, in turn, the children’s well-being 
through transfers, wages, services, etc. or affect the children’s well-being 
through services (i.e., healthcare, childcare, welfare, etc.). Moreover, they 
may act as moderators on the association between the family’s financial 
situation and the offspring’s well-being, for instance, by altering the 
strength of this association.  
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Figure 1: The causal model of the welfare state effect on an offspring’s 
well-being 
Empirical findings on child poverty 
We begin our analysis by depicting in Figure 2 the overall poverty 
and child poverty rates across the EU-15. In most countries, it is evident 
that children face a significantly higher poverty risk than the average figure 
for the total population. Notable exceptions are Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden—the most representative countries of the social-democratic wel-
fare regime. Hence, the numbers in Figure 2 have sparked off a lively debate 
on the social situation of children in the European Union as well as on the 
appropriate policy responses to mitigate child poverty. Child poverty rates 
are particularly high in the countries South European and the liberal wel-
fare state regimes and particularly low in the countries of the social-
democratic welfare regime. This finding provides a rough indication that 
the countries of the social-democratic welfare state regime, are more effi-
cient in reducing poverty among families with children. 
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is	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 social	 transfers	may	 account	 for	 the	 variability	 in	
child	 poverty	 rates	 among	 the	welfare	 clusters	 in	 the	 EU‐15.8	 After	 pen‐
sions,	 child	 poverty	 is	 significantly	 reduced	 in	 South	 European	 countries.	
By	contrast,	after	total	social	transfers,	there	appears	to	be	a	sizable	reduc‐
tion	in	child	poverty	in	the	remaining	EU‐15	countries.	Thus,	child	poverty	
is	mainly	 reduced	 through	 pension	 receipts	 of	 the	 adult	members	 of	 the	
household	in	the	countries	of	the	South	European	welfare	model,9	while	it	
is	vastly	reduced	 through	other	social	 transfers	 in	countries	of	 the	social‐
democratic,	the	conservative,	and	the	liberal	welfare	model.	
                                                   








Figure 3: Child poverty before and after social transfers, EU-15 (1995–




ed	 in	Figure	4,	which	provides	a	 fairly	 tight	 correlation	 structure	of	 child	
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Figure 4: Child poverty and total social expenditure (% of GDP), EU-15 
(1995–2013 average values) 
 
Source: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database) 
The degree of variability of child poverty across the EU-15 that is 
explained by the welfare state institutions and policies becomes even more 
noticeable and large, if we plot child poverty against social expenditure 
after having subtracted the old age and survivor pensions (Figure 5). The 
coefficient of determination (R2) reads 0.82, a figure that denotes a great 
interpretability of the variability of child poverty rates across the EU-15 by 
social expenditure, except pensions (i.e., various social benefits and provi-
sions). In other words, social expenditure in cash and in kind (except pen-
sions) could alone explain almost 88% of the variability of child poverty 
across the EU countries. To a large extent, this reflects the variability of 
benefits and service provisions to families among the EU-15 countries.  
The Nordic countries stand out as having the lowest child poverty 
rates and the highest rate of social spending on benefits (other than pen-
sions) and service provision. As other studies have shown (Korpi, 2000; 
Kangas and Palme 2000; Ferrarini, 2006; Venturini, 2008; Bäckman and 
Ferrarini, 2010; Engster and Stensöta, 2011), the Nordic countries illus-
trate a pattern of institutional arrangements exhibiting the lowest inequali-
ty in care use among income groups (a childcare place is guaranteed as a 
social right) in the European Union. Comprehensive services are comple-
mented by generous parental leaves and direct transfers to the family. 
Thus, a family/work balance is achieved that is highly supportive to work-
ing parents. Women-friendly policies account for the comparatively high 
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rate of working mothers and the condition of dual earners in the family is 
one more factor that positively impacts children’s well-being.  
Figure 5: Child poverty and social expenditure excluding pensions, EU-
15 (1995–2013 average values) 
 
Source: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database) 
In some of the countries of the conservative welfare state regime 
(e.g., Germany and Austria), family policies tend to support a gendered 
division of paid and unpaid labor (family benefits are of medium generosi-
ty, and there is low availability of care services and tax deductions for a 
dependent spouse to support traditional family structures).10 The countries 
with a liberal welfare state regime (United Kingdom and Ireland) are char-
acterized by a residual support to families provided through means-testing. 
Meager support characterizes the South European countries and this has 
further been reduced during the economic crisis.11 Overall, the best per-
                                                   
10  France and Belgium come closer to the Nordic countries in terms of the generosity of 
family allowances and a developed network of social services. However, compared 
to the latter countries, incomes fall significantly during parental leave and there are 
also notable inequalities of access to care services (Richardson and Bradshaw, 
2014).  
11  In Portugal, family and children support was reduced by about 30% in 2010 and 
2011 and eligibility criteria were tightened. In Spain, a baby cheque provision for 





child	benefits,	 care	 services,	 and	 tax	 concessions	 that	 are	not	 strictly	 tar‐
geted	to	low‐income	families.		
By	 contrast,	 the	 prevalent	 rhetoric	 over	 the	 beneficial	 effect	 of	
economic	growth	on	overall	poverty	and,	as	a	consequence,	on	child	pov‐
erty	 is	 not	 corroborated	 by	 the	 data	 when	we	 plot	 child	 poverty	 against	
GDP	based	on	PPS	per	capita	(see	Figure	6;	Luxembourg	was	left	out	of	the	
analysis	 as	 an	 outlier).	 The	 coefficient	 of	 determination	 (R2)	 reads	 0.34	
which	 is	 a	 rather	 moderate	 predictive	 capacity	 of	 GDP	 concerning	 child	
poverty	 rates.	 This	 finding	 puts	 into	 doubt	 the	 argument	 of	 pro‐poor	
growth	that	drives	EU	societies	toward	a	neoliberal	pathway.	In	contrast,	a	
strategy	 to	 reinforce	 the	mechanisms	by	which	 the	welfare	 state	 impacts	
upon	people’s	lives	seems	to	be	desideratum	in	the	age	of	the	Great	Reces‐
sion.	




                                                                                                           
as	abolished	 in	2010	and	 this	was	accompanied	by	a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 child	
benefits	 (Janta	 and	Henham	2014).	 In	Greece,	 in	 2012,	 provisions	 to	 families	with	




Intergenerational poverty transmission and social protection systems 
We	expand	our	analysis	on	child	poverty	by	 investigating	 the	 in‐




15	welfare	 clusters.	We	 have	 run	 likelihood	 ratio	 tests	 of	 the	 association	
between	the	father’s	occupation	and	the	offspring’s	poverty	risk	in	all	wel‐
fare	 regimes	 respectively.	 The	 results	 indicate	 that	 there	 is	 a	 statistically	
significant	 association	 in	 all	 welfare	 clusters	 except	 for	 the	 social‐




South	 European	 welfare	 regime,	 while	 the	 conservative	 and	 the	 liberal	
welfare	regime	lie	somewhere	in	between	based	on	that	criterion.		
















association	 between	 the	 categorical	 variables	 of	 interest.	 The	 analysis	 is	




democratic	 welfare	 state–type	 and	 1.93	 in	 the	 welfare	 state–type	 of	 the	
South	 European	 countries.	 In	 other	 words,	 in	 South‐European	 countries	
those	 children	with	 a	 father	 in	manual	work	 are	 93%	more	 likely	 to	 fall	
below	the	poverty	line	compared	with	those	with	a	father	in	higher	skilled	
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nonmanual work. On the contrary, in the social democratic regime, this 
figure is only 6%. The average figures in countries with a liberal and a con-
servative welfare regime are 42% and 51%, respectively. Undoubtedly, the 
countries of the social-democratic welfare state type present a remarkably 
low odds ratio, implying that the effect of the father’s occupation (x) on the 
adults’ poverty risk (y) is virtually marginal (assuming plausible causality 
of x on y).  
Table 2: Odds ratio of poverty risk for offspring with a father in manual 
work against those with a father in higher skilled nonmanual work 





Source: Authors’ estimates based on EU-SILC 2011 UDB 
Furthering the analysis, we consider the associations and interac-
tions between the welfare state, the family background (proxied by the 
father’s occupation and education), and the offspring’s education and pov-
erty risk. In preliminary analyses, we considered the aforementioned asso-
ciations, including the mother’s occupation and education, as factors of 
child poverty. However, both variables were dropped out from the statisti-
cal model due to the accumulated effect with other parental traits (Papa-
theodorou, 1997). The statistical model that is used to investigate the 
aforementioned associations and interactions is a general log-linear model, 
which is a specialized case of Generalized Linear Models for Poisson dis-
tributed data. The choice of the log-linear model is justified upon the cate-
gorical nature of the variables of interest, for which the conditional associa-
tion is considered by taking the natural logarithm of the cell frequencies 
within a five-way contingency table. The five-way contingency table is 
formulated by the following variables:  
 Child poverty (P): 1 = poor and 2 = nonpoor (i = 1, 2) 
 Welfare regime (W): 1 = social-democratic, 2 = liberal, 3 = conserva-
tive-corporatist and 4 = South European (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
 Father’s occupation (O): 1 = higher-skilled nonmanual, 2 = lower-
skilled nonmanual and 3 = manual (k = 1, 2, 3) 
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 Father’s education (FE): 1 = low, 2 = medium, and 3 = high (l = 1, 2, 3) 
 Child’s education (CE): 1 = low, 2 = medium and 3 = high (m = 1, 2, 3) 
We present the saturated model that includes all possible effects of the 
aforementioned variables:  
(1) 
where each vector represents, respectively, 
 = the natural log of the expected cell frequency of the cases for 
cell ijklm in the contingency table 
µ = the grand mean of the log of the expected frequencies  
λ = the effects that the variables have on the cell frequencies  
P, W, O, FE, CE = the variables of interest 
i, j, k, l, m = the categories within the variables of interest. 
The overall goodness-of-fit of the model is assessed by comparing 
the expected frequencies to the observed frequencies. We make use of the 
likelihood ratio to test the fit of the model, which follows a chi-square dis-
tribution and the degrees of freedom equal the number of lambda parame-
ters set equal to zero. We run separate tests of the hypothesis that K-Way 
and higher-order effects are zero. The results indicate that a suitable model 
to represent the data will encompass no higher than three-order interac-
tion terms. The next step is to test the lower-order terms by employing the 
partial associations (i.e., the differences between the two likelihood ratio 
statistics for the models with and without the tested effect). 
The purpose of the log-linear analysis is to determine the most 
parsimonious (nested) model that provides a good fit of the data. In the 
pursuit of parsimony, it appeared that the variables of the father’s educa-
tion and of the children’s education, which had been kicked into the log-
linear model to allow us to assess some of the human capital theory’s ar-
guments on the effect of education, do not have any statistically significant 
association with the offspring’s poverty risk. Thus, the nested model that 
fits the data well with a likelihood ratio value of 7.464 at 0.825 significance 
level takes the following form: 
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 (2) 
Table 3: Lambda parameters for the log-linear model 
Lambda Parameter Estimate Std. Error Sig. 
Constant 10.063 0.007 0.000 
[P = 1] –1.368 0.014 0.000 
[W = 1] –2.216 0.021 0.000 
[W = 2] –0.254 0.010 0.000 
[W = 3] –1.561 0.016 0.000 
[0 = 1] –1.411 0.015 0.000 
[0 = 2] –1.061 0.013 0.000 
[P = 1] * [W = 1] –1.233 0.056 0.000 
[P = 1] * [W = 2] –0.442 0.055 0.000 
[P = 1] * [W = 3] –0.551 0.025 0.000 
[P = 1] * [O = 1] –0.694 0.036 0.000 
[P = 1] * [O = 2] –0.453 0.038 0.000 
[W = 1] * [O = 1] 0.803 0.025 0.000 
[W = 1] * [O = 2] 0.060 0.035 0.085 
[W = 2] * [O = 1] 0.774 0.033 0.000 
[W = 2] * [O = 2] 0.036 0.048 0.446 
[W = 3] * [O = 1] 0.543 0.018 0.000 
[W = 3] * [O = 2] 0.043 0.022 0.054 
[P = 1] * [W = 1] * [O = 1] 0.566 0.092 0.000 
[P = 1] * [W = 1] * [O = 2] 0.173 0.138 0.211 
[P = 1] * [W = 2] * [O = 1] 0.340 0.096 0.000 
[P = 1] * [W = 2] * [O = 2] 0.289 0.134 0.031 
[P = 1] * [W = 3] * [O = 1] 0.160 0.054 0.003 
[P = 1] * [W = 3] * [O = 2] 0.029 0.066 0.660 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on EU-SILC 2011 UDB 
Table 3 shows that parental background affects the offspring’s 
poverty risk but to a differing extent among the four welfare state regimes. 
Based on calculations of the combined effects of the main and the interac-
tion terms, it appears that the lowest influence that the parental back-
ground has on an offspring’s poverty risk is in the countries of the social-
democratic welfare state regime, independently from the remaining pa-
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rameters.12 Undeniably, the universal and still generous social protection 
system of the countries representing the social-democratic welfare state 
regime comes as the most effective in mitigating the intergenerational 
poverty transmission.  
What is more, Table 3 shows that there is a moderating effect of 
the welfare state on the association between the family background and the 
children’s poverty risk (as indicated by the statistically significant three-
way interaction terms). This means that the welfare state can alter the 
strength of the association by empowering less well-off families and their 
children so that they can attain better future outcomes. This finding signi-
fies the importance of the welfare state in mitigating the intergenerational 
poverty transmission in all EU-15 welfare clusters. Thus, a reorientation 
toward welfare state provisions, in cash and in kind, is necessitated in or-
der to intercept social inheritance and level the playing field for disadvan-
taged children and adolescents. 
Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to assess child poverty and its inter-
generational transmission in the EU-15 countries from a social policy per-
spective. The most robust findings can be summarized as follows: Child 
poverty is particularly high in South European and Anglo-Saxon countries, 
while it is particularly low in Nordic countries. In the analysis, we identified 
a link between social protection systems and child poverty rates in the EU-
15. More specifically, social transfers (i.e., various welfare, family, unem-
ployment, and other benefits in cash—except pensions) appear to greatly 
predict the variability of child poverty rates across the EU-15. In the Nordic 
countries, generous and less strongly targeted social transfers greatly re-
duce child poverty. In contrast, in South European countries the impact of 
this category of social transfers on child poverty is rather low. This is due 
to meager welfare and other social transfers (except pensions), mostly 
provided through means-testing. Pensions predominate in social transfers 
(particularly in Italy and Greece) and given the prominent role of family 
and kin as providers of welfare, pensions tend to have a noticeable impact 
                                                   
12  The lambda parameters are the logarithms of the odds for the main effects and odds 
ratios for the interactions of the estimated frequencies.  
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on child poverty. Continental European states stand in between the Nordic 
and South European countries in terms of the efficacy of social transfers 
(except pensions) in reducing child poverty. Redistribution is comparative-
ly limited in the countries of the liberal regime (United Kingdom and Ire-
land) due to the low generosity of social transfers and extensive reliance on 
means-testing and market-oriented models of family policy. 
In our analysis, we also examined the link between social spending 
(on cash benefits—except pensions—and service provision) and child 
poverty. This better captures the combined effect of income transfers and 
services to families. A robust relationship is found that indicates the overall 
positive effect of a high total generosity of family policies on child poverty 
in the Nordic countries (supporting dual-earner transfers and extensive 
social services to families). Complemented by generous parental leave 
schemes (with earnings-related benefits), this welfare state regime 
achieves a family-work balance that encourages female employment. This 
constitutes an additional source of income in the family that further con-
tributes to the reduction of child poverty. The lowest efficacy of social 
spending in reducing child poverty is exhibited by South European coun-
tries due to scarce social services and very modest family benefits. Conti-
nental European countries (notably Germany and Austria) exhibit medium 
generosity of benefits to families and limited service provision conducive to 
traditional gender divisions of labor. The efficacy of family policy arrange-
ments in reducing poverty remains modest. The United Kingdom and Ire-
land opt for a residual strategy of social support to families targeted at the 
very poor households. This has no significant positive impact on child pov-
erty reduction. In a nutshell, the variation in child poverty across Europe is 
largely attributed to the impact of the social protection system that each 
country has developed. By contrast, economic growth as approximated by 
GDP seems to have smaller interpretative ability of the variability of child 
poverty.  
The intensity of the intergenerational poverty transmission among 
welfare clusters was also empirically investigated and our analysis further 
corroborates the previously mentioned findings. The EU countries of the 
social-democratic welfare state regime seem to have gone a long way in 
mitigating the influence of the family of origin on children’s current and 
future welfare. The analysis has shown that the social protection system 
plays a crucial role in reversing the intergenerational transmission of pov-
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erty. This is contrary to what some human capital proponents believe when 
it comes to the importance of education for future socioeconomic outcomes 
and attainments. In effect, more universal and citizenship-based social 
provisions appear to be an adequate response to the continuing crisis that 
threatens to destabilize the societal structures of modern EU countries. 
Generous and universal public spending on family benefits and social ser-
vices supporting families with children from the early childhood years and 
throughout childhood can have a substantial social return, as costly inter-
ventions in the future due to an extensive intergenerational transmission of 
poverty will be avoided. Even under conditions of fiscal consolidation in 
Europe, family support budgets should take priority and reforms should 
opt for a combination of benefits, services, paid leave for parents (as well as 
working time arrangements facilitating a family/work balance) that en-
hance equalizing coverage in a most cost-effective manner. 
Finally, the findings of our analysis are also crucial in respect to 
policy transferability to developing countries. As the available literature 
shows (e.g., Grant et al., 2011: 97–102), North to South welfare policy 
transfer is subject to a wide range of constraints, such as the nature of pov-
erty in the developing world (absolute or relative) and how this affects 
intergenerational transmission, the role of the state and the political con-
text, and very limited resources due to low levels of domestic tax and diffi-
culties in raising aid budgets for funding universal social security systems. 
Nevertheless, lessons drawn from the developed countries in respect to the 
positive impact of universal schemes (universal child support schemes and 
free access to health and welfare services) in intercepting the intergenera-
tional transmission of poverty, as opposed to strictly conditional schemes, 
are highly relevant even at an early stage in the development of social pro-
tection. 
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CHILD POVERTY, CHILD RIGHTS IN SMALL ISLAND 
DEVELOPING STATES (SIDS): The Case of the Caribbean 
Aldrie Henry-Lee 
In 2014, we celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC). In 2015, we reached the deadline for the 
fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which established 
defined targets for quality of life of children. Now we have committed our-
selves to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Of the three countries 
under discussion, Haiti was the first to ratify the CRC on June 8, 1990. Bar-
bados ratified the CRC on October 9, 1990 and Jamaica on May 14, 1991. 
The CRC calls for adequate provision and protection of all children and 
underscores the right of children to participate in policy decisions that 
affect them. But are all children afforded these rights? The answer is no and 
especially not the children living in poverty. 
Children living in poverty in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 
are particularly at risk. This is because the countries in which they live are 
extremely vulnerable to global and international shocks. This chapter ar-
gues that SIDS cannot end child poverty because they are themselves 
trapped in a vicious cycle of high levels of poverty and inequality and grap-
pling indebtedness. Unless the vulnerability of SIDS is reduced, elimination 
of child poverty will continue to be elusive. 
This reluctance to tackle child poverty head-on, internationally, 
regionally, and locally is disturbing as it is well known that investment in 
children will bring about the best returns of investments. While many in-
ternational commitments, for example, MDG and A World Fit for Children 
continue to promise much to our children, barriers at the macro, meso 
(institutional), and micro levels impede progress in the fight against pov-
erty. 
This chapter examines child poverty in three Caribbean countries. 
These countries were especially selected because they record various lev-
els of human development and national poverty. National monetary pov-
erty rates in Barbados, Jamaica, and Haiti are recorded as 9.3%, 19.9%, and 
56% (Table 3). Barbados and Jamaica record high human development, 
while Haiti records low human development. 
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Research Questions 
 What are the dimensions of child poverty in the Caribbean? 
 What are the determinants of child poverty in the Caribbean? 
 What are some of the recommendations for the reduction of child 
poverty? 
These questions will be answered using secondary data (e.g., pov-
erty assessment reports, research on poverty in the Caribbean, etc.) and 
available data sets from the three countries. The extent to which the char-
acteristics of SIDS impede the reduction of child poverty will also be exam-
ined. 
SIDS: The Case of the Caribbean 
According to UNDESA (United Nations Department of Social and 
Economic Affairs [2014]), the Caribbean forms part of the group of coun-
tries called Small Island Developing States. Some of the main characteris-
tics of SIDS include limited productive sectors and heavy reliance on im-
ports; significant susceptibility to economic and environmental shocks; 
small labor markets, compounded by limited skilled labor, high unemploy-
ment and an impending large increase in the size of the elderly population, 
and tourism as a driving force of the economy (Williams et al., 2013:9). 
While all developing countries are vulnerable, SIDS experience high levels 
of vulnerability of their natural, economic, and social systems to external 
shocks. The intrinsic characteristics of SIDS—such as small size, insularity, 
vulnerability to demand- and supply-side shocks, a narrow resource base, 
high population densities, and indirect impacts of global environmental 
factors—impact negatively on the well-being of the populations living in 
SIDS. These three countries under discussion in this chapter exhibit the 
characteristics of SIDS.  
In spite of the high levels of vulnerability, some SIDS record high 
levels of human development. In fact, all the Caribbean countries except 
Haiti (low human development) have UNDP high human development 
indicators (HDI). Barbados’s HDI value for 2013 is 0.776—in the high hu-




gory—positions	 the	 country	 at	 the	 96th	 position.2	 Haiti’s	 HDI	 value	 is	
0.471—in	 the	 low	 human	 development	 category—with	 a	 position	 of	 168.	
Haiti	is	one	of	the	poorest	and	least‐developed	countries	in	the	world,	and	
there	are	many	grave	social	and	economic	problems	in	the	country.		
Table 1: Socioeconomic data for selected Caribbean countries 
Indicator	 Barbados Jamaica Haiti
NonincomeHDIvaluea 0.776	 0.715 0.471
HDIranka	 59	 96 168
Surface	area	(square	kilometers)b 430	 10,991 27,750













Unemployment	rate 11.61	 14.92 40.68
Youth	unemployment	rate 303	 37.74 17.49
Homicide	rate5	 11.36	 41.27 6.9
	
Source:	
a		 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14‐report‐en‐1.pdf	 (retrieved	 September	 10,	
2015).	
b	 	http://unstats.un.org/unsd/pocketbook/WSPB2014.pdf	(retrieved	September	10,	2015).	
c		 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/022013b.pdf(retrieved	 September	 10,	
2015).	
1		The	Barbados	Ministry	of	Labour	Website	–	https://labor.gov.bb/	
2		STATIN	 Labor	 Force	 Press	 Release‐	 “The	 LaborForce	 in	 October	 2013”.	 Retrieved	 from	
http://statinja.gov.jm/PressReleases/pressreleaselaborforce.aspx	
3		The	Barbados	Ministry	of	Labor	Website	–	https://labor.gov.bb/	
4		STATIN	 Labor	 Force	 Press	 Release‐	 “The	 LaborForce	 in	 October	 2013”.	 Retrieved	 from	
http://statinja.gov.jm/PressReleases/pressreleaselaborforce.aspx	(youth	aged	14‐24)	







                                                   
1		 UNDP	(2013a)	
2		 UNDP	(2013b)	
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Table 1 presents some selected socioeconomic data for the three 
countries. According to the World Bank classification (2014), Barbados 
with a GDP per capita of US$16,004 is deemed as a “high income” country; 
Haiti with US$706.5 is “low income”; and Jamaica with US$5343 is “upper 
middle income.” Some of the characteristics of SIDS become evident. These 
countries have not experienced significant growth rates recently with only 
Haiti recording a growth rate of 2.8 due to international aid and support. 
High levels of indebtedness cripple economic growth (Table 1). Unem-
ployment rates are high, with Haiti recording the highest at 40.6%. Youth 
unemployment is also very high with Barbados recording the highest at 
30.4%, reflecting limited productivity by the youthful population. Jamai-
cans live in a violent environment with a homicide rate of 41.2%. The other 
social and economic challenges of these SIDS will be examined in the sec-
tion on determinants of child poverty. 
Children in the Caribbean Context 
Children form a significant proportion of the populations of these 
SIDS. In Barbados, children aged 0–14 years make up 18.9% of the popula-
tion. In Jamaica, children account for 27.1% while in Haiti children aged 0–
14 years form up to 35% of the population (Table 2). 
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Table 2: Some child-related data for selected Caribbean countries 
Indicator	 Barbados Jamaica Haiti
Population	in	2013	(estimated,	000)a 285 2	784 10.317
%	of	population	aged	0–14	yearsa	(2011) 18.9 27.1 35
Life	expectancyc	 75 75 63
Fertility	ratea	 1.8 2.3 3.1
Under	5	mortality	rate	(per	1000	live	births)b 2012	 18 17 76
Under	5	mortality	rankb 100 80 31




Measles	immunization	(%	of	1‐year‐olds)e 90 94 65
Low	birth	weight	babies	%	of	births	(2011)f 12 11 232
Prevalence	of	HIV,	total	%	of	population	ages	15–49a	 0.9 1.8 2.0
Enrollment	at	primary	Schools	(2011)g 105 90.1 57
Percentage	of	repeaters	(primary)i 0.00j 3.21 Na
Survival	rates	to	grade	5h 94 88 34
Percentage	of	repeaters	(secondary)i 0.00j 1.19 Na





















Barbados	 is	 the	only	 country	 in	which	100%	of	 all	 births	 are	 at‐
tended	by	skilled	health	personnel.	In	Haiti,	only	37%	of	births	are	attend‐
ed	 by	 skilled	 personnel.	 Haiti	 also	 records	 the	 highest	 proportion	 of	 its	
children	 born	 with	 low	 birth	 weight	 (23%),	 with	 Jamaica	 and	 Barbados	
recording	about	11%	and	12%,	respectively.	Maternal	mortality	rates	vary	
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from 380 per 100,000 in Haiti to 52 per 100,000 in Barbados. Immuniza-
tion of children against measles is highest in Jamaica (94%) and lowest in 
Haiti (65%). 
Haiti has the lowest primary school enrolment at 57% and Barba-
dos the highest at 105%. Survival rates to grade 5 are fairly high in Barba-
dos and Jamaica except for Haiti where only 34% of all children survive to 
grade 5 (Table 2). Again, primary to secondary school transition rates are 
high in Barbados and Jamaica. In 2014, it was reported that 17% of the 
eligible cohort in Haiti was not attending primary school.3  
The data indicate that except for Haiti, children have high levels of 
immunization, enjoy fairly good access to primary school education, most 
of them transition to secondary school, and most of them can expect to live 
to at least 70 years. These data compare reasonably well with global indica-
tors for children and that is possibly why, except for Haiti, Barbados, and 
Jamaica record high levels of human development. 
However, these macro data mask the vulnerabilities of the poorest 
children in these countries who do not have adequate access to basic social 
services, even in Barbados. As we will see in the section on child poverty, 
the situation of children in Haiti worsened since the 2010 earthquake. The 
rights of children who live in poverty in these countries are violated every 
day. In the next section, we will begin to examine poverty in these coun-
tries. 
Poverty in the Caribbean 
The experience of poverty usually includes deprivation, lack of ac-
cess to basic social services, social exclusion, vulnerability, and unsustaina-
bility of livelihood. Amartya Sen in Sen (1999:3) defines poverty as capabil-
ity failure. He goes beyond the issue of income to include issue of depriva-
tion in health and education and lack of freedoms that are intrinsically 
good. Skirbekk and St. Clair (2000) believe that the first stage to sustained 
development is the freedom from poverty. According to Sen (1999:3) “de-
velopment requires the removal of major sources of un-freedom: poverty 
as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic so-
cial deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over 
                                                   
3  Education Policy and Data Centre (2014). 
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activity	 of	 repressive	 states.”	 In	 the	 1997	 Human	 Development	 Report	
(UNDP,	1997),	poverty	 is	described	as	a	 lack	of	access	 to	 choices	and	op‐





ties	 are	 reduced,	 national	 poverty	 and	 child	 poverty	 will	 remain	 at	 high	
levels.	The	issue	of	poverty	and	its	impact	on	these	small	populations	need	
to	 be	 given	 serious	 policy	 attention.	 Sustained	 development	 will	 not	 be	
obtained	if	large	proportions	of	the	productive	sector	remain	impoverished	
and	their	basic	human	rights	compromised.	











Anguillaa	 2009 US$6055 5.8 n.a. 1.06 0.24
Antigua/	
Barbudab	
2006	 US$2366	 18.3	 n.a.	 6.63	 3.75	
Bahamasc	 2001 US$2863 9.3 5.1 n.a. n.a.
Barbadosd	 2010 US$3931 19.3	 15.0 6.0 3.2
Belizee	 2009 US$1700 33.5	 n.a. 11 n.a.
Brit	Virgin	Isf	 2008 US$633 22.0	 16.0 4.1 n.a.
Dominicag	 2009 US$2307 28.8	 22.8 8.6 4.0
Grenadah	 2008 US$2164 37.7	 n.a. 10.13 4.03
Guyanai		 1999 n.a. 35.0	 n.a. 12.4 n.a.
Haitij	 2004 n.a. 56 n.a. 31 n.a.




23.7/15.9	 14.8/10.1	 2.5/2.72	 0.89/1.0	
St.Luciam	 2006 US$1905 25.1	 28.8 9.0 4.1
St.	Vin/Grenn	 2008 US$2045 30.2	 20.8 7.5 3.0
Trin/Tobagoo	 2005 US$483 16.7	 11.0 4.6 1.9
Turks/Caicosp	 2012 US$2463 21.6	 15.9 4.0 n.a.
	
                                                   
4		 Calculated	using	the	BOJ	2012	exchange	rate	of	$93.01‐	
	 http://www.boj.org.jm/foreign_exchange/fx_historical_rates.php	
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Sources: 
Note: All Poverty line figures are quoted in their current US dollar equivalent. 




c  http://www.cepal.org/celade/noticias/paginas/9/46849/Bahamas.pdf 
d  http://www.caribank.org/uploads/2012/12/Barbados-CALC-Volume-1-MainReport-FI 
NAL-Dec-2012.pdf 
e  http://www.caribank.org/uploads/2012/12/Belize-2009-Report-Vol1.pdf and 
http://www.pnpbelize.org/2009-poverty-assessment.pdf 
f  http://www.paho.org/saludenlasamericas/index.php?gid=119&option=com_docman&t 




h  http://www.gov.gd/egov/docs/reports/Grenada_CPA_Vol_1_Main_Report_Submitted.pdf 
I  https://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2002/guy/01/052302.pdf 
j  http://fafo.no/~fafo/media/com_netsukii/755.pdf 
k  Planning Institute of Jamaica 2012 Survey of Living Conditions (Kingston: Planning Institute 
of Jamaica) 
l  http://www.caribank.org/uploads/2012/03/St.-Kitts-and-Nevis-CPA-Vol.-2-St.-Kitts-Fin 
al-Report.pdf, http://www.caribank.org/uploads/2012/03/St._Kitts_Nevis_Final_Report2 
001.pdf 
 and http://www.caribank.org/uploads/publications-reports/economics-statistics/count 
ry-poverty-assessment-reports/St.+Kitts+and+Nevis+CPA+-+Vol.+3+Nevis+Final+Repor 
t.pdf 
m  http://www.caribank.org/uploads/2012/03/SLUCPAMainReport.pdf and 
http://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/docs/AssessmentOfPovertyInStLucia/Assessment_of_Poverty_i
n_St_Lucia_Volume_3_Quantitative_Assessment_of_Poverty.pdf 
n  http://www.stats.gov.vc/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=gxP733Q3EZk%3D&tabid=60 
o  http://www.cepal.org/portofspain/noticias/paginas/0/40340/41_SLC_Analysis_of_the_ 
Trinidad_and_Tobago_Survey_of_Living_Conditions.pdf 
p  https://www.caribank.org/uploads/2014/09/TCI_CPA-2012-Volume-1.pdf 
Note: 
All Poverty line figures are quoted in their current US dollar equivalent 
n.a - not available 
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Table 4: Some of the Main Characteristics of Household Poverty in the 
Caribbean 
Indicator Characteristics 
Household composition Poor households are characterized with a significant 
percentage of female heads of households and a 
large number of dependents (children and the elder-
ly); 
Poor households have more members than nonpoor 
households; 
Poor households contained different generations of 
persons, thus indicating some degree of intergenera-
tional poverty; 
The incidence of poverty among the elderly (60 
years and over) tends to be high; 
In some countries, child poverty is significantly 
more than the national average  
Residential A larger proportion of households in the rural areas 
live below the poverty line than those in the urban 
areas 
Housing conditions Poor households are subject to poor housing condi-
tions with overcrowding being a problem and re-
stricted access to public utilities; 
Squatting is a common feature among the poor in 
larger countries leading to environmental challenges 
Human capital and labor market 
issues 
The human capital (education and training) base of 
the poor is quite low; 
Labor market issues The unemployment rate is highest among members 
of poor household 
Poor household tend to participate more in the 
secondary or informal labor market (employment in 
low-paying jobs partly reflects the low human capi-
tal base of the poor, that is, the working poor); 
The poor tend to be employed in elementary occu-
pations, rural small-scale enterprises and in a range 
of informal sector activities; 
When poverty is concentrated in identifiable com-
munities, there is evidence of stigmatization which 
results in discrimination in employment and labor 
market segmentation 
The poor have been greatly affected by the seasonal-
ity of production in the region (agriculture, tourism, 
construction) and external shocks such as increase 
in prices and declining export sale 
 
Source: Adapted from Downes (2010, pp. 4–5) 
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Caribbean countries suffer from high levels of poverty and ine-
quality. The proportion of persons living below the poverty line in the Car-
ibbean ranged from 56% in Haiti to 9.3% in Bahamas while Jamaica rec-
orded 19.9% (Table 3). In Haiti, the average income of the monetary poor 
would have to increase by 31% to allow them to be at the poverty line 
while in Barbados it would have to be increased by 6% to reach the coun-
try’s poverty line. 
Most of the data on poverty is derived from country poverty as-
sessments (CPA). These CPAs provide statistics on the proportion of 
households or individuals who live below an estimated national poverty 
line (the headcount index). The CPAs also estimate the depth or severity of 
national poverty. The Foster-Greer Thorbecke (FGT) P2 measures the se-
verity of poverty, and the poverty gap measures the depth of poverty 
(World Bank, 2005b).  The poverty gap measures the distance of the poor 
to the poverty line. The intensity or severity of poverty measured by the 
FGTP2 can be thought of as the sum of two components: an amount due to 
the poverty gap and an amount due to the inequality of the poor (World 
Bank, 2005b). 
The assessment of poverty in the Caribbean can be done based on 
household composition; residence; housing conditions, human capital, and 
labor market issues (Table 4). Monetary poverty is mainly a rural phenom-
enon, with those living with income below the poverty line having a low 
human capital base and limited access to decent paying jobs in the labor 
market. Poor households generally live in poor housing conditions. Poverty 
of the adult population is intricately related to poverty of children in the 
SIDS. In the next section we will discuss the dimensions of child poverty. 
Dimensions of child poverty  
The UN General Assembly defines child poverty as: 
Children living in poverty are deprived of nutrition, wa-
ter and sanitation facilities, access to basic health-care services, 
shelter, education, participation and protection, and that while a 
severe lack of goods and services hurts every human being, it is 
most threatening and harmful to children, leaving them unable to 
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enjoy their rights, to reach their full potential and to participate 
as full members of the society. (UNICEF Press Centre, 2007) 
This multidimensional nature of child poverty links very well with 
the definitions of poverty offered in the previous section: child poverty like 
adult poverty is a situation in which a child lacks opportunities, whose 
choices are limited, and whose rights are denied. The UN recognized that 
child poverty is about more than just a financial deprivation but also entails 
a denial of a range of rights laid out in the UN CRC. Each deprivation that a 
child suffers exacerbates the effects of others and when two or more depri-
vations coincide, the effect can be catastrophic for those children (UNICEF, 
2004). 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, a total of 70 million children, 
that is, two in five children, are poor (ECLAC, 2013). In this section, we 
examine the multidimensional nature of child poverty in Haiti. Jamaica has 
an annual survey of living conditions and therefore would have time-series 
data on children living in monetary poor households. Barbados has rela-
tively less data.  
In Barbados, the poverty assessment report stated that persons 
under 15 years of age are overrepresented in poor households with 29.2% 
of the indigent poor falling in that age category (Sir Arthur Lewis Institute 
of Social and Economic Studies, 2012:29). The qualitative data analyzed in 
the most recent country poverty assessment in Barbados revealed that 
poverty among children was clearly associated with the intergenerational 
poverty of their parents and families. The characteristics of their poverty 
and social exclusion were reported as follows: 
 Poor health and diet, hunger 
 Poor living conditions in homes 
 Irregular school attendance or attrition 
 Family neglect, abuse, and violence 
 Psychological effects of loneliness and sadness (Barbados 
Country Assessment of Living Conditions 2010, Volume 1, 
2012, 2010b: 11) 
In 2012, the annual Survey of Living Conditions in Jamaica (Table 
5a), records that the overall percentage of children living in monetary poor 
households is 25%; this underscores the continued increase in this rate 





tan	 areas	 recorded	 the	 highest	 proportion	 of	 children	 living	 in	 poverty	
(26.1%)	and	poor	households	reported	 larger	household	sizes	(Table	5b).	
Using	the	criteria	for	severe	deprivation	employed	in	the	Bristol	and	Lon‐
don	 School	 of	 Economics	 Global	 Child	 Poverty	 Study	 and	 data	 from	 the	
2009	survey	of	 living	conditions,	 the	most	severe	deprivation	of	 Jamaican	
children	was	estimated	for	health,	(9%),	followed	by	water	(5%).	No	Jamai‐
can	 child	was	 reported	 to	 be	 severely	 deprived	 of	 education,	 and	 only	 a	
marginal	1%	was	severely	deprived	of	sanitation	(Witter	2009).		
Table 5a: Poverty prevalence by age group, 2004–2012 
Age	Group	 2004	(%) 2007	(%) 2009	(%) 2010	(%) 2012	(%)
0–17	years	 20.6 12.0 20.4	 21.9 25.0
18–35	years	 14.7 8.9 13.3	 15.4 19.4
36–59	years	 14.0 7.8 14.0	 14.4 16.5
60	years	and	
over	
15.2	 10.2	 17.1	 15.9	 14.6	
Total	 16.9 9.9 16.5	 17.6 19.9
Source:	JSLC	2012	data	set	











Poor	households	 5.4	persons	(n = 871)
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families returning to find that their children have been given away for 
adoption. 
Poor children usually live in poor sanitary conditions. In Jamaica, 
64% of poorest quintile of households in Jamaica are using pit latrines with 
a slab cover; 30% have no drinking water available on their premises; more 
than half of all (Haitian) children (54%, 2.1 million) were severely shelter 
deprived (Gordon and Nandy, 2007:11). Being severely deprived means 
that their homes were made from mud, or severely overcrowded, with 
more than five persons per room. 
The importance of early child development to long-term health 
and productivity has long been established. In Jamaica, only 54.7% of chil-
dren under the age of 5 are living in households that have at least 3 chil-
dren’s books present (UNICEF, 2011). This falls to 30% for 10 or more 
books. Children in the richest households are twice as likely to have 3 or 
more children’s books as those in the poorest. Fathers in the richest house-
holds are more engaged: children in the poorest households are 3 times 
less likely to have their father engaged in activities that support learning. 
The percentages of children aged 3-–5 years who are developmentally on 
track for dedicated domains show wealth differentials: 79.1 for the poorest 
quintile and 97.1 for the richest quintile (UNICEF, 2011). 
Child poverty affects access to secondary education. In Jamaica, 
children in the poorer households are less likely to attend secondary school 
(87.6%), (UNICEF, 2011). Overall 91.5% of children ages 12–16 are attend-
ing secondary school. In the poorest households, attendance rate was 
87.6% with rural areas attendance rate at 89.5%. Among the children in 
the poorest quintile, 88.2% of them were only educated to the primary 
level and there are concerns about high levels of drop out, absenteeism, 
violence in schools, and literacy/numeracy skills (UNICEF, 2011). 
The 2013 MDG Report: Haiti states that the country has steadily 
boosted net enrolment rate in primary education from 47% in 1993 to 88% 
in 2011, achieving equal participation of boys and girls in education (MDG 
2). However, 4 out of 10 people in Haiti cannot read or write (Verner, 2008: 
49) and 20% of children suffer from malnutrition (Verner, 2008: 24).  
Early pregnancy impacts negatively on the life chances of adoles-
cents—especially those with limited education. In Jamaica, girls in the 
poorest households are 10 times more likely to have a child before the age 
of 18 than those in the richest quintile. The birth rate among adolescents 
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who have no education or only primary level (17.7%) is more than twice 
the rate of adolescents who have a tertiary education—8.7% (UNICEF, 
2011).  
Violence against children is a serious health issue. In 2010 in Bar-
bados, there were 846 cases of child abuse reported to the Child Care 
Board. Of these, 72 (44%) were due to neglect, 191 (22.8%) to physical 
abuse, 185 (21.9%) to sexual abuse, and 95 (11.2%) to emotional abuse. In 
the Caribbean, the law permits corporal punishment and parents can legal-
ly apply physical punishment. 
In Jamaica, children in the poorest households are 8 times more 
likely to be involved in child labor than those in the richest households 
(UNICEF, 2011). As seen in the earlier section, there is a high prevalence of 
violence in Jamaica. Figures from the Statistics Department of the Jamaica 
Constabulary Force (JCF) indicate that since January 2013 and May 2014, 
60 children were murdered and 99 were shot and injured.5  
Haiti is a source, transit, and destination country for human traf-
ficking. Haiti has also become known for its use of restaveks, that is, child 
laborers. These restaveks are often unpaid, denied education, and physical-
ly and sexually abused. Child advocates in Haiti warn that a number of 
unaccompanied minors remaining in camps after the 2010 earthquake are 
vulnerable to this form of forced labor or to trafficking. Much of Haiti child 
trafficking involves girls, from low-income households sent to live with 
other families in the hope they will be cared for in exchange for performing 
light chores.6 Restaveks make up a large proportion of Haiti's population of 
street children, who are forced into prostitution, begging, and street crime 
by violent gangs.7 The data reveal that children living in poverty are usually 
children whose parents are themselves faced with several challenges daily. 
Children unable to fend for themselves suffer the impact of poverty to a 
greater extent. 
                                                   
5  http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/60-children-murdered--99-shot-and-injur 
ed-in-past-16-months 
6  Human Rights Watch (2012). 
7  CIA Fact Book 2016. 
https://books.google.com.jm/books?iforced%20into%20prostitution%2C%20. Ac-
cessed July 28, 2016 
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Determinants of child poverty in SIDS 
What are the causes of child poverty? The Social Selection Theory 
(Huston et al., 1994) states that children born into poor families are disad-
vantaged because they have parents who have lower levels of human capi-
tal. The children themselves will, in turn, have relatively poor intellectual 
and social skills as a result of both family and environmental influences 
provided by their parents. Social Causation Theory states that economic 
and social institutions and structures offer opportunities and barriers that 
lead to poverty or affluence (Huston et al., 1994). Poorer persons have less 
availability of jobs paying high wages to escape poverty. 
Bradshaw (2006) outlines some other theories of poverty: (1) in-
dividual deficiencies, (2) cultural belief systems that support subcultures in 
poverty, (3) political-economic distortions, (4) geographical disparities, or 
(5) cumulative and circumstantial origins. The Individualistic Theories 
(e.g., Herrnstein and Murray, 1994 and Rainwater, 1970) blame the indi-
viduals for their conditions. These theories have been criticized for their 
myopic view of poverty and their lack of understanding of the impact of the 
conditions that the children find themselves. Cultural theories state that 
poverty has roots in the “Culture of Poverty.” While not blaming the indi-
vidual for their individual attributes, they believe that poverty is created by 
the transmission over generations of a set of beliefs, values, and skills that 
are socially generated (Bradshaw 2006:8). Cultural theories believe that 
individuals are not necessarily to be blamed because they are victims of 
their dysfunctional subculture or culture. 
Once the culture of poverty has come into existence it 
tends to perpetuate itself. By the time slum children are six or 
seven they have usually absorbed the basic attitudes and values 
of their subculture. Thereafter, they are psychologically unready 
to take full advantage of changing conditions or improving oppor-
tunities that may develop in their lifetime. (Scientific American, 
October 1966 quoted in Ryan, 1976: 120) 
The concern about the cultural theories is what causes and consti-
tutes the subculture of poverty (Bradshaw, 2006: 9).  
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The third group of poverty explanations outlines the aspects of 
economic, political, and social systems that cause people to have limited 
opportunities and resources with which to achieve income and well-being. 
The geographical theories of poverty call attention to the fact that people, 
institutions, and cultures in certain areas lack the objective resources 
needed to generate well-being and income, and that they lack the power to 
claim redistribution. Some writers speak about the geography of poverty 
being a spatial expression of the capitalist system (Shaw, 1996:29). 
The final set of theories (Cumulative and Cyclical Interdependen-
cies theories) combine the individual and structural theories and propose 
that individual and their communities are caught in a spiral of opportunity 
and problems, and that once problems dominate they close other opportu-
nities and create a cumulative set of problems that make any effective re-
sponse nearly impossible (Bradshaw, 2006:16). Bradshaw (2006:14) looks 
explicitly at individual situations and community resources as mutually 
dependent, with a faltering economy, for example, creating individuals who 
lack resources to participate in the economy, rendering their economic 
survival more difficult. 
None of these theories/studies comprehensively explain the exist-
ence of child poverty in the Caribbean. Child poverty in the Caribbean has 
its roots in global and local spheres. Perhaps the Cumulative and Cyclical 
Interdependencies theories come closest in explaining the complexity of 
the poverty situation in the Caribbean. We now examine determinants of 
poverty at the macro level, meso (institutional), and micro levels. 
At the macro level, high indicators of human development did not 
shelter any of the islands from manifesting the characteristics of SIDs. The 
three islands illustrate the vulnerability of SIDs: they are very susceptible 
to external shocks, given their small physical size and populations, SIDs 
rely heavily on imports and have limited domestic production and a larger 
percent of their GDPS is spent on imports, Caribbean SIDs average between 
45% and 65% expenditure of GDP on imports, and significant amounts of 
the imports are focuses on food and fuel. For example, Haiti imports 52% of 
its food, including over 80% of its rice (World Bank, 2013a). This has impli-
cations for social protection responses as food expenditures comprise a 
much higher share of income for the poor compared to other income 
groups. As a result, SIDS in general and specifically poor households in SIDs 
face high exposure to global food price variability. 
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In SIDs, export earnings are mostly derived from primary com-
modities. These commodities no longer benefit from economies of scale 
and competitive pricing now that preferential trade agreements have ex-
pired. For example, the agreement between the African Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) Group of States and the European Union (EU) has had a very 
negative impact on poverty levels in the SIDS. The loss of competitiveness 
has resulted in increased unemployment. The heavy reliance on primary 
commodities and the trends in global trade present significant macro-level 
vulnerabilities that impact the levels of child poverty. When earnings from 
trade decrease, public poverty increases. 
Public poverty manifests in high debt-to-GDP ratio as shown earli-
er in Table 1. Most of the countries’ revenue is spent on paying debt. Little 
is left for investment in basic social services. Access to good basic social 
services is important in the fight against poverty. High levels of inequality 
(measured by the Gini coefficient) indicate that the disparity between the 
income of the poor and the rich is very wide. The Gini coefficients for Bar-
bados, Jamaica, and Haiti were 0.47, 0.38, and 0.59 respectively.8 
Natural disasters are unpredictable and cause huge financial and 
human loss when they occur. For example, the earthquake in Haiti cost 
122% of GDP (Cavallo et al., 2010). In poverty-stricken countries, natural 
disasters can stall the implementation of the poverty-reduction agenda and 
ultimately affect the general wellbeing of children. 
At the meso level, there are some institutional weaknesses that 
negatively affect the delivery of social services to the poor. In their study of 
Social Protection in SIDS with focus on the Caribbean, Williams et al. 
(2013: 2) found that many groups are underserved, there is duplication of 
efforts, and evidence of inefficiency and the systems show limited respon-
siveness to shocks. Globally, countries generally spend a mean of 1.9% of 
GDP on Social Safety Nets (SSNs). The average for Latin America and the 
Caribbean was 1.3% (Williams et al., 2013). A World Bank study found that 
many SSN programs in the Caribbean are characterized by problems of 
limited coverage, weak targeting, and ineffective mechanisms for determin-
ing eligibility (World Bank, 2005).  
                                                   
8  Gini coefficients for Barbados and Jamaica from their country poverty assessment 
report and Haiti from the World Bank (2014). 
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In Barbados, there are public assistance programs that provide 
support to the needy and indigent. In Jamaica, The Programme of Ad-
vancement through Health and Education (PATH), a conditional cash trans-
fer (CCT) program funded by the government through support from the 
World Bank has become the main social assistance program, which has 
over 400,000 registered beneficiaries as of 2014. In Haiti, an Integrated 
Social Protection Mechanism has been established. This delivers social 
services directly to families through household development agents 
(HDAs). They work with at least 100 households (World Bank, 2013b). The 
HDAs utilize a three-pronged strategy to: (1) raise awareness and increase 
knowledge of health, nutrition, hygiene, and sanitation practices; (2) pro-
vide a package of basic commodities and services; and (3) where possible, 
refer families to relevant social services (World Bank, 2013b).  
Household and individual characteristics can cause child poverty. 
Poverty studies in the Caribbean highlight four factors that cause monetary 
poverty in the region: unemployment, large families and single parenting, 
lack of education and/or skills, and low pay (Frank, 2007; Downes, 2010: 
6). These features impact a child’s well-being. Witter et al. (2009: 84) state 
that households with children are more likely to be poor than households 
with no children. The probability of being poor is much higher for rural 
households and their members than for their urban counterparts. These 
factors reflect human capital formation—labor market and demographic 
explanations for poverty in the Caribbean (Downes, 2010: 6). 
As stated before, research has shown that high levels of poverty 
are caused by high levels of unemployment. Unemployment rates are high 
in the Caribbean. Unemployed heads of households cannot adequately 
provide for their children. Unemployment rates vary from 11.5% in Barba-
dos to 40.6% in Haiti; Jamaica’s unemployment rate is 13.4.9  
Generally the poor receive poor services, and the services are not 
always available (World Bank, 2004). Table 6 summarizes some of the 
main deficiencies of the social assistance programs. These include inade-
quate value of the benefit, limited coverage, and inadequate staff. Weak 
social policy environment with low accountability, limited social dialogue, 
and democratic and participatory governance make it difficult for effective 
and efficient delivery to the poor to take place (Henry-Lee, 2002). 
                                                   
9  Rates are for March 2014 from ieconomics.com (accessed October 11, 2014). 
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Table 6: Selected poverty reduction programs in the three countries 
Country  Program Targets Observations 
Barbados  o Public assistance 
o School feeding program 
o Housing welfare 
program 
o Skills training program 
o The needy and 
indigent—some 
recent efforts at 
gender-based 
targeting 
o The elderly and the 
disabled  
o School children 
o Youth  
o Limited due to 
insufficiency of 












largely limited to 
low skill areas 
Jamaica o PATH 
o SIF 
o Macro Investment 
Development Agency 
o Self-Start Fund 
o Food Stamp Program 
o Public Assistance and 
School Feeding Program 
o Special Training and 
Empowerment program 
o Revitalization of Inner 
City 
o Minimum Wage 
Legislation 
o Children, lactating 
mothers, elderly 
o Unemployed youth, 
the aged, women, 
the disabled 
o Human resource 







o Rural communities, 
small and 
microenterprises 
o Children under 6 
yrs and pregnant 
and lactating 
mothers, the 
elderly, poor, single 
member 
households 
o Needy students 
o Bussiness devt, in 
urban communities 
o Some successful 
geographical 
targeting 
o Inadequate value 
of benefit 
o Operations limited 
by low purchasing 
power of food 
stamps and low 
lending limits for 
enterprise dev. 
o Neglect of low-
income 
households not in 
target groups 
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Haiti o Universal education 
o Improving the supply 





o Minimum wage 
o Equal access to 
education 
o Better productivity 
from workers and a 
healthier labor 
force 
o Repair the damages 
caused by decades 
of deforestation  
o Most children are 
not enrolled in 
either private or 
public schools 
o Drinking water 
supply in most 
areas tend to be 






a. Downes, S. A. 2010. “Poverty and its Reduction in the Small Developing Countries of the 
Caribbean.” 
b. Haiti: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
While there is universal access to school at the primary level and 
access to secondary schools is fairly high, there are indications that the 
quality of education is questionable in Jamaica and Haiti. In Jamaica, 70% of 
the labor force is uncertified (Downes 2010: 8). In Haiti, while there is 
increased access to secondary school, more than 60% of 24 year olds have 
still not completed grade 9. All this has implications for the alleviation of 
poverty in these countries. 
Of course, employment and relief from poverty are not mutually 
exclusive (Brown, 1995) and there is the phenomenon of the “working 
poor.” Their low wages and unsatisfactory working conditions do not alle-
viate their poverty. The poor can also be found working in the informal 
sector. This sector is composed of those who have no recourse but to be 
(self-)employed outside of the mechanisms that defend their rights to de-
cent work and a minimum standard of living (and whose employers pay no 
taxes and/or do not respect minimum safety, environmental and other 
standards and regulations) as well as some people who are associated with 
illegal activities. The intricate link between these informal activities and 
crime has been well established.  
The coping strategies of the poor themselves can further entrench 
their various vulnerabilities. Coping strategies used by the poor include: to 
forego basic needs; to increase or maintain existing levels of debts; using 
savings or assets; to seek help from relatives or friends; or to seek extra 
work or hustle and pray (Anderson, 2001: 49). Another coping strategy 
that promotes intergenerational poverty is the cutbacks on education. Sixty 
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percent of poor households reported that they would not send their chil-
dren to school when they experienced financial difficulty (Anderson, 2001: 
49). 
All these factors at the macro, meso, and micro levels determine 
the levels of child poverty in SIDS. Reduction in child poverty would neces-
sitate the implementation of strategies at all three levels. 
The Way Forward 
High HDIs mask the true vulnerability of children in SIDS. Not-
withstanding the level of human development of the countries, children 
face the same challenges (even though at different levels). As the world 
prepares for the developmental agenda beyond 2015, there needs to be 
increased focus on the vulnerability of SIDS to secure their sustainable 
development. It is only through sustainable development that will a signifi-
cant reduction in child poverty will be obtained. As we end 2015, the “MDG 
8: Global Partnership for Development” has not been fully realized and 
there needs to be improvement in the responsiveness to economic and 
environmental shocks of SIDS. There have been few achievements in the 
Programme of Action for Sustainable Development of SIDS since its adop-
tion in 1994. Advocates for this initiative also ask that the resources be 
used with greater efficiency and equity. 
Table 6 lists some of the main programs in the countries under 
discussion. However, there are proposals for the improvement of social 
protection programs in SIDS. For example, Williams et al. (2013:3) suggests 
the following: (1) harmonize SP systems and policies across the region to 
better respond to increased regional mobility; (2) consolidate SP programs 
within countries to improve efficiency; (3) foster key human capital im-
provements among the poor to break inter-generational transmission of 
poverty; (4) improve monitoring and evaluation systems and data collec-
tion capacity to facilitate more responsive SP programs; and (5) increase 
partnerships with civil society and private sector. Williams et al(2013:2) 
also called for improved efficiency and effectiveness of social safety net 
programs, in particular cash transfer programs; tailoring labor market 
interventions to respond to constraints faced in the SIDS context; and re-
forming social insurance schemes, particularly pension schemes, to address 
current deficiencies and ensure readiness to respond to impending ageing. 
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At the meso (institutional) level, the UNICEF/UNDP 20/20 initia-
tive should be instituted. This initiative advocates that developing coun-
tries allocate, on average, 20% of the local budget and 20% of official de-
velopment assistance (ODA) to these basic social services.  
As advocated by the Programme of Action for Sustainable Devel-
opment of SIDS at the micro level, there must be a promotion of human 
resources development programs, including education, training, and skills 
development. Strategies should be put in place to ensure that more stu-
dents are certified and reduce the number of students who graduate with-
out a certificate. Given the high rates of unemployment, labor market op-
portunities need to be provided to reduce these high rates.  
For the children themselves, social investment in all groups of 
children (i.e., an approach based on equity) is key in breaking the cycle of 
poverty. Children need good quality early childhood education to secure a 
firm foundation in their academic pursuits. Nutrition programs at schools 
will ensure that children are not hungry while trying to learn. Affordable 
and accessible good quality care for all children, even those in the most 
rural areas, must be a priority. There are some children whose parents 
confront several challenges (e.g., drugs, imprisonment, and abuse) and they 
need multiple well-targeted interventions to reduce the deleterious effects 
of all these challenges. The children who receive less policy attention (e.g., 
children with disabilities, street children, children infected with and affect-
ed by HIV/AIDS) should be targeted to reduce their vulnerabilities and lift 
them out of poverty. Only then would we be able to see a sustained reduc-
tion in child poverty. 
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UNPACKING THE NEETs OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN: Methodological challenges and surprising 
results* 
Alberto Minujín, Diego Born, María Laura Lombardía, and Enrique Delamó-
nica 
The situation, issues, expectations, and dangers faced and imag-
ined by adolescents and youngsters (A&Y) have gained recognition and 
prominence among academics as well as in the public policy agenda in the 
last decades (Breakwell, 1982; Bridgeland et al., 2006; UNICEF, 2011). 
While there is recognition of their potential as drivers of social change 
there is also a growing concern about specific social problems particularly 
affecting this age group, in particular adolescent girls and young women 
(Chen, 2011; Cusworth et al., 2009; ILO, 2012; OECD, 2010; Perisic et al., 
2012). 
Thus, a category—NEETs, or not in education, employment or 
training—has emerged and occupied a central place in political, journal-
istic, and academic debates (Bynner and Parsons, 2002; Furlong, 2006, 
2007; Bendit and Hahn-Bleibtreu, 2008; ; Eurofound, 2011). However, this 
is a complex category that hides (and misses) various phenomena—some 
more acute than other ones. For instance, a youngster who works in ex-
tremely unsafe conditions, at an informal job, and is exploited by being paid 
below the minimum wage (or the level required to subsist) would not be 
considered a NEET—whether the youngster is attending school or not. 
Moreover, the unemployed are not counted in the NEET category either, 
given 
                                                   
* This chapter is based on a study that some of the authors carried out for the Region-
al Office of UNICEF for Latin America and the Caribbean, Análisis cuantitativo de la 
situación de los adolescentes y los jóvenes en América Latina y el Caribe en base a 
encuestas recientes. We want to thank Luz Angela Melo, Vicente Teran, Francisco Be-
navides, Joaquin Gonzalez, and all the regional advisors for their comments and col-
laborations. 
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the standard definition, which causes confusion among the lay audience.1 
In addition, almost four out of five NEETs are females. Their back-
ground is usually rural, from the lowest quintiles of wealth distribution, 
and daughters of parents with little formal education. Most of their time is 
used caring for children (theirs or those of others). Gender stereotypes 
confuse the picture. Thus, an adolescent girl who instead of attending 
school spends 10 to 12 hours a day caring for a child would be considered a 
NEET while an adolescent boy who is not attending school but works at an 
informal job for 4 to 6 hours a day would be considered gainfully employed 
and thus not a NEET.  
The main purpose of this chapter, after reviewing recent trends, 
achievements, and challenges in education and youth employment, at-
tempts to unpack the NEET category, in particular among adolescents. This 
is done, on the one hand, by exploring the quantitative evidence on NEETs 
for 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries and, on the other hand, by 
introducing a new measurement of adolescent and youth vulnerability. We 
call this measurement VEL (Vulnerability in Education and Labor) as it 
incorporates the highest level of formal education achieved and the type of 
labor market engagement (unemployed, informally employed, and formally 
employed) of adolescents and youngsters. Thus, this measure goes beyond 
a simple (dichotomous) classification based on whether or not A&Y partic-
ipate in school and the labor market, presenting a more nuanced and com-
plete depiction of the problems faced by A&Y. The percentage of A&Y with 
high vulnerability in education and labor is twice as high (almost 30%) 
than the proportion of NEETs (almost 15%2). We also describe subregional 
and country-by-country differences. 
Analytical framework and data sources 
There is consensus about the importance of identifying adoles-
cence as an important transitional period in the lifecycle. It is a period of 
                                                   
1 Although in this case employed and unemployed have been distinguished, in most 
analyses of this kind adolescents and youngsters are classified as active or inactive, 
not separating among the former whether they are working or unemployed.  
2 This estimate is slightly lower than the one reported by Espejo and Espindola 
(2015). Their estimate includes an older age group (up until 29 years of age) and is 
for a more recent year (2012).  
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physical and emotional development (UNICEF, 2002). However, its limits 
are imprecise. There is no exact age or moment when a child becomes an 
adolescent or an adolescent becomes a youngster. This is due to the social 
constructions (some translated into legislation) framing the various as-
pects of the life and experience of A&Y. These various aspects or dimen-
sions are related to, for instance, the minimum age for voting, driving, par-
ticipating in the military, consuming alcohol, getting married, working, 
facing criminal charges, or signing contracts. Moreover, even within the 
same country, it is often the case that the minimum age is different for 
these activities and there is no standard rule to be applied internationally 
(UNICEF, 2011).  
In this chapter, while recognizing the limits imposed by these con-
siderations, the A&Y population will be categorized in three distinct, age-
based groups. This approach enables the construction of data, facilitates 
their analysis, allows inter-country comparisons, and highlights the situa-
tion of different age groups within the A&Y. 
According to the United Nations, the period between ages 15 and 
24 is considered “youth.” Consequently, this category includes the adoles-
cent period, which ranges between 10 and 19 years of age (UNICEF, 2011). 
For the descriptive and analytical purposes of this chapter, A&Y will be 
divided in three groups covering five years each: the early part of adoles-
cence (between ages 10 and 14), the latter part of adolescence (between 15 
and 19 years old), and youth (between 20 and 24 years of age). 
Using these definitions, there are about 163 million A&Y (between 
10 and 24 years old) in Latin America. This group constitutes 27.5% of the 
total population of the region. About two-thirds of them (close to 115 mil-
lion) are adolescents between 10 and 18 years old. 
The age groups belong also to different stages of the lifecycle. Ac-
cording to the Convention of the Rights of the Child (and as a result of its 
translation to national statues under most national legislation in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, employment of children in the early part of 
adolescence is outlawed.3 For the latter part of adolescence the national 
legislation is more diverse. Employment of adolescent in hazardous activi-
ties is mostly deemed illegal. Even when working is not outlawed, it should 
                                                   
3 Thus, the 10–14 years age group is not part of the analysis of the labor market, 
NEETs, and VEL. 
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contribute to the growth and development of the child and not interfere 
with education (and also leisure) time and activities. The age of 18 is usual-
ly the age of maturity, consequently no legislation forbids or restricts em-
ployment for youth nor are they covered by even the most expansive legis-
lation on the gratuity and mandatory years of schooling (which in the best 
cases covers up to the end of secondary school, i.e., until children are 17 or 
18 years old). 
Figure 1 captures schematically this situation. The horizontal axis 
measures time (ages between 10 and 24), while the vertical axis measures 
the distribution of A&Y by type of activity (only in school, only working, 
both, or NEETs). While the vast majority of children aged 10–14 years are 
in school (as they should), a few them are also or only working. A few of 
them are excluded both of school and the labor market. This groups start to 
increase as children age (of course, it need not be the same children, as 
they can cross in and out from one category to another one and back). Also, 
as they grow older, the likelihood of exiting the school system increases 
and the insertion in the labor market (attending school or not) increases. 
Both of these processes accelerate in the late adolescence. For youngsters 
(ages 20–24) the opportunities to attend school (i.e., a university, the supe-
rior or third level of formal education) are drastically reduced and the 
majority of them are inserted in the labor market. Gender has a fundamen-
tal imprint in this process. While the majority of A&Y who participate in the 
labor market are males, the vast majority of NEETs are female (Figure 2), 
as we describe empirically later in the chapter (showing that part of this 
imbalance is due to categories and classifications that may need revision).  
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Figure 1: Age distribution of the education–labor relationship through 
the life cycle 
While	these	figures	show	the	all‐important	employment	and	edu‐
cation	aspects	of	A&Y	(and	the	gender	 inequities	 therein),	 it	must	also	be	
remembered	 that	both	 adolescence	and	youth	are	 categories	 that	 are	not	
only	 (or	mainly)	defined	by	age	but	by	 fluid	and	changing	social	 relation‐
ships.	As	it	was	mentioned	earlier,	as	most	A&Y	transit	from	school	to	work	
and	other	go	in	and	out	of	them	(in	an	entwining	of	individual	and	collec‐
tive	 stories	 and	 trajectories),	 other	 aspects	 related	 to	 their	 identity	 and	
their	 social	 standing	 are	 also	 being	 shaped,	 transformed	 and	 determined	
during	these	years	(Lister,	2006;	Llobet	and	Minujin,	2011).	One	of	these	is	




ca.	 Besides	 these	 personal	 and	 family‐based	 dimensions,	 there	 are	wider	
                                                   








cies	 aimed	 and	helping,	 supporting,	 empowering,	 and	 emancipating	 them	
(Montes	and	Sendón,	2006;	Bustelo,	2007).	





For	 this	 study	 we	 used	 a	 standardized	 database	 with	 national	
household	survey	(HSS)	from	most	of	the	Latin	American	countries.	These	
surveys	are	carried	out	by	the	respective	national	statistical	offices	to	regu‐
larly	 monitor	 the	 standard	 of	 living	 of	 the	 population	 with	 a	 particular	
emphasis	 on	 labor	 market	 conditions.	 We	 used	 the	 homogenous	 micro‐
datasets	 prepared	 by	 SITEAL/UNESCO	 (Sistema	 de	 Información	 de	 Ten‐
dencias	 Educativas	 en	América	 Latina/United	Nations	 Educational,	 Scien‐
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School attendance and completion 
In this section, the outcomes in terms of schooling for A&Y are de-
scribed. The data cover 18 countries with comparable information. These 
18 countries represent 150 (out of the 163) million A&Y in the region.5 
Medium-term trends 
Figure 3 shows the progress in terms of literacy rates and second-
ary school completion according to an individual’s age for the region as 
whole.6 These trends portray a clear historical process of expansion of the 
school system. Secondly, this process has been more inclusive of women 
than men. 
Illiteracy rates have declined pari passu with the expansion and 
completion of schooling. Thus, while one-third of people in their 80s are 
illiterate, this rate is less than 5% for those in their 20s and less than 2% 
for teenagers. Concomitantly, only about 20% of the persons above 60 
years old have completed secondary education in contrast with people in 
their 20s, among whom 55% completed their secondary studies.  
                                                   
5 The countries included in this study are: Argentina (urban), 2010; Bolivia, 2007; 
Brazil, 2009; Chile, 2009; Colombia, 2010; Costa Rica, 2009; Dominican Republic, 
2009; Ecuador, 2009; El Salvador, 2009; Guatemala, 2010; Honduras, 2009; Mexico, 
2008; Nicaragua, 2005; Panama, 2009; Paraguay, 2009; Peru, 2009; Uruguay, 2009; 
and Venezuela, 2009. 
6 Assuming that a person aged between 17 and 20 years should have finished second-
ary school, whoever was 50 years old in 2010 gives information about secondary 
school completion about 30 years ago, that is, approximately in 1980. 
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Figure 3: Illiteracy and secondary school completion by age and gender 
HHS, circa 2009 
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
Current situation: School attendance 
One out of six (16.2%) A&Y between the ages of 10 and 19 who 
have not completed their middle school are not currently attending any 
type of formal schooling.7 As expected the situation is worse among 15–19-
year-old adolescents than among 10–14-year- old ones. As shown in Figure 
4 and male A&Y in rural areas, those coming from poorer families, and 
those whose parents have little or no formal education are the most affect-
ed. 
                                                   
7 Espejo and Espindola (2015) estimate secondary school dropout at 15.5%. 
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Figure 4: Out-of-school adolescents by age, sex, parents’ education, and 
household income. countries with HHS, circa 2009 
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
Slightly more than 20% of rural A&Y do not attend school. In con-
trast, less than 15% of urban A&Y fail to attend school. The gender differ-
ences are small, with a slight disadvantage against boys (who do not attend 
school at a rate of 17% compared to 15.3% for girls8). 
A major determinant of school attendance seems to be the parents’ 
education. A&Y whose parents have little or no formal education are eight 
times more likely to fail to go to school than children whose parents have 
finished secondary school. There are also income differentials but not as 
high as those exhibited by parents’ level of education. 
School attendance by country can be observed in Figure 5. In Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mexico, and El Salvador, more than 20% of 
the A&Y are not attending school. At the other end of the spectrum, less 
                                                   
8 All differences among countries or groups within countries highlighted in the text 
are statistically significant (confidence intervals are not presented throughout the 
chapter in order to facilitate reading). Nevertheless, it is important to remember that 
as household surveys have an average of 400,000 observations, confidence intervals 
around national estimates are very narrow (in general, a small fraction of 1%). 
When large sub-national groups, as the ones presented in this chapter (e.g., ur-
ban/rural, male/female, etc.), are used the confidence intervals are still less than a 
percentage point above and below the point estimate. If simultaneous stratification 
were used (e.g., geographic location and level of education), the confidence intervals 
would be higher. However, simultaneous stratifications are not analyzed in this 
chapter. 
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than 13% of A&Y are not attending school in Chile, Peru, Dominican Repub-
lic, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela. 
Figure 5: Out-of-school adolescents and repetition; countries with HHS, 
circa 2009 
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
School achievement among 20—24–year-old youngsters 
In all countries in the region, by age 20 all students should have 
finished their secondary education. However, region-wide, almost half of 
youngsters between ages 20 and 24 have not completed their middle 
schooling9 and more than 70% of them never started their post-secondary 
education (Figure 6). In other words, among those who completed middle 
(secondary) school and could have continued on to a university or college, 
half dropped out of the formal school system.  
While girls are a little better off (almost 48% of boys fail to finish 
middle school compared to 42% of girls), there are still too many of them 
out of school. The differential in terms of location is more pronounced. 
Youngsters in rural areas complete their middle (secondary) school at half 
the rate of urban youngsters.  
                                                   
9  Espejo and Espindola (2015) report similar estimates. 
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Income differentials are even starker. Among youngsters from the 
poorest quintile, not completing middle (secondary) school reaches a rate 
of 70%, but it is less than 20% for youngsters in the richest quintile. This 
50-percentage-point gap results in the poorest youngsters being three and 
half times more likely not to finish middle school than the richest young-
sters. 
The situation is worse for youngsters whose parents have little or 
no formal education. Barely more than 1 in 10 of them finishes middle 
(secondary) school. Youngsters whose parents completed secondary edu-
cation or higher finish middle school at a rate of almost 95%. Moreover, 
less than 2% of youngsters whose parents have little or no formal educa-
tion move on to attend post-secondary schooling compared to 80% of 
youngsters whose parents completed secondary education or higher.10  
                                                   
10  In all Central American countries (except in Panama) more than half of youngsters 
20–24 years old have not completed their middle (secondary) schooling. In Nicara-
gua and Honduras this is the case for 70% of youngsters while in Guatemala for the 
figure is 80%. Clearly, given these rates, more than 80% of youngsters have never at-
tended a college or university. At the other extreme, Chile and Peru can be found 
with “only” 20% and 30% of youngsters who have not completed their middle (sec-
ondary) schooling. However, even in these “better off” countries, more than 50% of 
youngsters have never attended a university or college.  
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Figure 6: Youngsters (20–24 years old) who have not finished secondary 
schooling and who have never enrolled in tertiary education by geo-
graphic location, sex, parents’ education, and household income. coun-
tries with HHS, circa 2009  
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
While the gender differences in school attention and completion 
(for the different age segments of the A&Y group) is minimal, it is clear that 
there are shortcomings in rural areas, which are related to low amount of 
investment in education (compounded by its uneven and unfair geographic 
distribution) and availability of schools. A high correlation would be ex-
pected between low household income and low level of education among 
the adults in the household (which could be evidenced by the similar levels 
of school attendance and achievement of A&Y from households in the bot-
tom quintile and in households where the parents have not completed 
primary education). Both low parental levels of education and low income 
are concentrated in rural areas. All of this implies the poorest, rural A&Y 
have few opportunities for schooling. Thus, an integrated set of policies 
comprising of investment in schools (and their proper staffing), scholar-
ships, and other incentives are needed. In addition, policies geared toward 
bridging the cultural and digital divides, allowing (forbidding exclusion of) 
adolescents who are pregnant or mothers from attending school, incorpo-
rating gender considerations school curricula, providing nontraditional 
schooling options of high quality, promoting inclusion of indigenous and 
afro-descendant adolescents, and aligning the type and content of educa-
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tion with employment skills will also contribute to enhance education out-
comes, reduce drop outs, and bring back out-of-school children into the 
education system (Guerrero et al., 2006; Lopez, 2011; Aikman and Rao, 
2012; Sunkel and Trucco 2012; IIPE-UNESCO, 2012; Rico and Trucco, 2014; 
ECLAC, OIJ and IMJUVE, 2014).  
Labor market 
Youngsters and adults11 
Among the 18 countries for which comparable data are available, 
the participation rate12 of A&Y is 54%.13 This is considerably lower than 
among adults (25–60 years old) who participate at a rate of 78%. In addi-
tion, the probabilities of finding a job are lower for A&Y and, if they do find 
employment, it is under worse conditions than among adults. 
Consequently, unemployment rate14 among A&Y almost triples the 
rate of adults (14.9% and 5.2%, respectively). Among the employed, infor-
mality15 reaches 61.3% among A&Y and 44.2% among adults (Figure 7). 
The highest participation rate for A&Y is found in Brazil (62.7%), 
where, partly as a consequence of this, the gap in participation rates be-
tween A&Y and adults is the smallest. Brazil also exhibits the highest un-
employment rate for A&Y in the region. Mexico enjoys the lowest unem-
ployment among its A&Y population. However, these A&Y have the highest 
rate of informality in the region. 
                                                   
11 As mentioned earlier, children under 15 years of age are not supposed to be work-
ing. Consequently, they are not included in the labor market analysis. 
12 The proportion of persons between 15 and 24 years of age participating in the labor 
market whether employed, underemployed, or unemployed (i.e., actively looking for 
a job). 
13 For the slightly larger and older group analyzed by Espejo and Espindola (2015), 
they report basically the same figure (50%). 
14 The proportion of persons between 15 and 24 years of age participating in the labor 
market who are actively looking for a job. 
15 The proportion of persons between 15 and 24 years of age employed without a 
contract, workers in a family business without a fixed wage, and other similar cate-
gories of workers. It also includes the self-employed who have not completed their 
secondary education. For the cases in which there was no information about the 
type (or lack of) contract, those workers who had not finished their secondary 
school studies were considered informal workers. All of this clearly points to an in-
complete agenda on labor rights and decent work in the region. 
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Figure 7: Labor market participation rate, unemployment rate, and par-
ticipation in informal labor rate; adult and youngsters differences; coun-
tries with HHS, circa 2009  
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
Differences among adolescents and youngsters 
The characteristics of the labor market participation for each 
country are presented in Figure 8. The heterogeneity is evident. Paraguay, 
Peru and Brazil have the highest participation rates (above 60%), while 
Chile and Dominican Republic present the lowest levels, closely followed by 
Argentina and Venezuela. 
The unemployment rate among A&Y is highest in Chile and Co-
lombia (exceeding 25%). In some Central American countries, such as Nica-
ragua and Guatemala, it is less than 5%. 
Informality among A&Y is highest in Guatemala (87%) and Para-
guay (85%). Nevertheless, there many countries where informality sur-
passes 70% (Ecuador, Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico, Dominican Republic, 
and Bolivia).  
In Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, low unemployment rates 
are combined with high informality. This means that while A&Y can easily 
find a job, it is almost impossible for them to obtain formal employment. 
The situation is reversed in Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay where informali-
ty is lower but unemployment is higher. 
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Figure 8: Employment conditions of Y&A; countries with HHS, circa 2009  
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
The socioeconomic characteristics of A&Y labor market participa-
tion are summarized in Figure 9. It can be observed that rural A&Y usually 
have higher participation rates than urban A&Y. Nevertheless, this situa-
tion is not the same in every country. For instance, in Bolivia, the participa-
tion rate of rural A&Y is 72% higher than among urban A&Y, but in Chile 
urban A&Y participate in the labor market at a higher rate than rural A&Y. 
While unemployment is higher among urban A&Y (17%) than among rural 
ones (7%), informality is worse among rural A&Y.  
The participation rate of adolescents between 15 and 19 years old 
(39.4%) is about half of that among youngsters between the ages of 20 and 
24 years (69.9%). However, among the younger group, unemployment and 
informality are higher. The unemployment rate for the younger group is 
about 30% higher. In Brazil and Mexico, it is 50% higher. Similarly, the rate 
of informality among 15–19-year-old adolescents is almost 60% higher 
than among 20–24-year-old youngsters. 
The participation rate of female A&Y is significantly lower than for 
male A&Y. However, female A&Y suffer higher unemployment than male 
ones. For instance in Honduras and Nicaragua, it is double than of male 
A&Y. 
A&Y whose parents have little or no formal education participate 
at higher rates in the labor market than those whose parents completed 
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secondary or higher levels of education. Unemployment is higher among 
A&Y whose parents completed secondary or higher levels of education, 
with wide variations across countries. Among those A&Y whose parents 
have little or no formal education, informal employment reaches 60%, 
whereas it is 40% among A&Y whose parents completed secondary or 
higher levels of education. Chile, Costa Rica, and Panama show the highest 
disparity in these indicators. 
Labor market participation among the richest A&Y is higher 
(54.4%) than among the poorest A&Y (45.6%). Unemployment among A&Y 
from the richest households (9.6%) is less than half that of A&Y from the 
poorest households (22.3%). In a similar vein, informality among A&Y from 
the poorest families reaches 89.5%, which is more than double the infor-
mality rate of 42.8% among A&Y from the richest families. In Dominican 
Republic, Chile, and Venezuela, unemployment for A&Y from the poorest 
quintiles is four times higher than for A&Y from the richest quintile. Uru-
guay, Costa Rica, and Panama exhibit four-fold differences in terms of in-
formality between the poorest and richest A&Y.  
To summarize, in spite of the variety of experiences and situations 
across countries in terms of labor market participation rates, unemploy-
ment, and informality, a few clear patterns emerge. A&Y are less active in 
the labor market than adults. This is expected as some of these A&Y are too 
young to be lawfully employed in many of these countries.16 However, 
when they are employed they are usually hired informally. In addition, 
female A&Y have lower participation rates than male ones. A&Y from rela-
tively richer households or with better-educated parents enjoy better 
working conditions.  
All of this speaks of the need for, on the one hand, macroeconomic 
policies to promote full employment and, on the other hand, stronger regu-
lation of labor markets to eliminate informality. These could be coupled 
with special training programs, efforts to match training with employment 
prospects (especially in terms of rural contexts and rural to urban migra-
tion), establishing internship programs, special programs to promote “first 
job” without undermining labor rights of contributions to social security 
(e.g., a higher share of government contributions in the earlier years of 
                                                   
16 Or can only be hired for some jobs under special circumstances depending on their age. 
For instance, at no age can they engage in hazardous jobs or activities that prevent 
them from attending school. The ages at which they can work in non-hazardous jobs 
that allow them to study, as was mentioned above, varies from country to country. 
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employment), and recognizing (in particular for social security and pension 
purposes) nonpaid housekeeping work and in the care economy (Finnegan, 
2006; Jacinto, 2008; Jacinto and Zangani, 2009; ILO, 2013; Soto et al., 
2015). 
Figure 9: Labor market participation rate, unemployment rate, and par-
ticipation in informal labor rate by geographic location, age, sex, sec-
ondary school completion, parents’ education, and household income; 
countries with HHS, circa 2009  
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Education and employment 
NEETs 
I must be with Agustin [her son] and take care of my 
mother. I can't leave them alone. 
–Daniela P. (21), pregnant at the age of 19.17 
Most NEETs are female.18 Contrary to the stereotypical image por-
trayed by the media (and some academics) of a bunch of drunk or drugged 
youngsters wasting life away or preparing for their next crime, 8 out of 10 
NEETs are adolescent girls or young women doing household chores and 
taking care of children. This is partly the result of the sexual division of 
labor, whereas constrains women to the reproductive and care activities 
while men are the only ones supposed to earn income by joining the labor 
market.19 
However, domestic work is hidden under the NEET category. A 
young woman who stays at home to take care of children (either her own 
or younger siblings or cousins) so that her husband or brothers can go to 
work (even if at informal jobs) is considered “doing nothing.” Thus, she is 
classified as a NEET. Thus, it is important to distinguish young women who 
make a conscious choice to take time off to take care of their babies, after 
completing their formal studies, from adolescent girls who cannot afford to 
                                                   
17 From the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio, Friday, October 3, 2014 
18 According to Espejo and Espindola (2015), they represent 73.5% of all NEETs (be-
tween 15 and 29 years of age) in the region. 
19 About 40% of male NEETs live in households where at least one member is under 10 
years old. This proportion is the same for the other categories. However, among fe-
male NEETs, this proportion is 70%. This proportion is not only higher than for male 
NEETs but also for women in the other categories (about 50%). Further supporting 
the point made earlier regarding the male-dominated sexual division of labor, it is 
useful to note that while almost 9% of male A&Y are considered “head of household,” 
only less than 4% female A&Y are classified as head of household. In contrast, almost 
15% of women are classified as spouse, while less than 1% of males are considered 
as spouse. Furthermore, half of the women considered spouse are neither working 
nor studying. 
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continue and finish their studies or have to drop out of them due to early, 
unplanned, or undesired pregnancies (or other reasons). Although, obvi-
ously, aspects of a male-dominated society are present in both scenarios, 
the situations (and the degrees of freedom and empowerment) of women 
are starkly different in each case. In Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 
the percentage of female A&Y who are classified as NEETs exceeds 35%, 
while in Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay it is about 15%. Moreover, the highest 
relative gap between female and male NEETs occurs in Guatemala (almost 
13 female NEETs per male one), Mexico (7.5 female NEETs per male one), 
and Paraguay (more than 6 female NEETs per male one). In addition, while 
in Guatemala, more than 90% of NEETs are female, in Chile and Dominican 
Republic female A&Y represent about two-thirds of all NEETs.  
The distribution of A&Y according to their schooling and labor sit-
uation (and their combinations) in the 18 countries with comparable in-
formation is presented in Figure 10. Region-wide, almost one-third (31%) 
of the A&Y are dedicated only to their studies. While less than 3 % of A&Y 
are studying and looking for work, almost 15% are simultaneously working 
and attending school.20 These three groups account for almost half of A&Y. 
Another third (32.8%) is only working. While almost 6% is not working but 
looking for employment, there are 15% of A&Y who are not in education, 
neither employed nor in training—the NEETs.21 
In Mexico, the NEETs account for 18% of all A&Y and in the Carib-
bean countries for which there is information, they represent slightly more 
than 20% of A&Y. As in Spanish-speaking South America, the proportion of 
A&Y who are only studying is above the regional average the “space” for 
NEETs is relatively small. Similarly, in Brazil, where more A&Y either just 
work or both study and work, there is also “less room” for NEETs than in 
Mexico or the Caribbean.   
In Chile, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Venezuela, and Costa Ri-
ca, about 40% of A&Y only study and are not participating in the labor 
market. Nevertheless, the percentage of NEETs in the A&Y population 
                                                   
20 As we are highlighting the situation of adolescents, our estimates for those who are 
only studying or studying and working are slightly higher than the ones by Espejo 
and Espindola (2015) whose sample includes youngsters up to age 29. 
21 Various ILO reports make reference to the growing concern about NEETs. More 
recently, the category has been expanded to include those looking for a job 
(NLEETs). 
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ranges from 19% (Dominican Republic), above the regional average, to 
13.7% (Costa Rica), below the regional average. 
The highest incidence of NEETs is found in Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador. In all of these countries NEETs represent more 
than 22% of all A&Y. The lowest incidence occur in Ecuador, Uruguay, Par-
aguay, Peru, and Bolivia. 
Figure 10. Youngsters, employment situation, and schooling; countries 
with HHS, circa 2009  
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
As mentioned in the previous section, school attendance is lower 
(while labor market participation is higher) in rural than in urban areas. In 
Figure 11, it can be observed that only a bit more than 20% of rural A&Y 
use their time only to study, compared to a third of A&Y in urban areas.  
As expected, there are age differences with the A&Y category. 
Among adolescents 15–19 years old, those who are only attending school 
reaches almost 50%, while just over 12% of the 20–24-year-olds only 
study. In almost a mirror image, the labor market participation rate for the 
first group is 18% and almost 50% in the second group. In terms of NEETs, 
they represent 12% of the first group and 18% of the second one. 
Among the A&Y who are not attending school, more than 40% are 
employed. However, less than one in four adolescent girl or young woman 
who is not attending school is employed. Female NEETs constitute almost a 
quarter of all female A&Y (23.6%). This value is four times the rate of male 
NEETs (6.2%): In Figure 12, it can be seen that, with different intensity, this 
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situation is repeated among all the countries. The incidence of NEETs 
among adolescent girls and young women is even higher in rural areas, 
among the poorest families, and for those whose parents have little or no 
formal education.  
A&Y from households where the parents have little or no formal 
education attend school at a rate that is half of those whose parents have 
completed secondary or higher education. Their participation rate in the 
labor market is also lower, as it was discussed in the previous section. The 
proportion of NEETs among A&Y whose parents have little or no formal 
education is 20%—two and a half times higher than among A&Y whose 
parents have completed secondary education or higher (8%). In Uruguay 
and Costa Rica, the proportion of NEETs in the first group is five times 
higher than in the second one. Venezuela and Peru are the countries where 
this relative gap is the lowest. 
As with parents’ education, A&Y from household with higher in-
come also attend school and participate in the labor market at higher rates 
than A&Y from poorer families. Partly as a result of this, almost one in four 
(23%) A&Y from the lowest quintile is classified as NEET. This rate is more 
than triple the one for A&Y from the richest quintile (7%). In Brazil and 
Mexico, the rate of NEETs among the poorest A&Y quadruples the one for 
the richest A&Y. 
Figure 11: Youngsters’ labor situation and schooling, by geographic 
location, age, sex, secondary school completion, parents’ education, and 
household income; countries with HHS, circa 2009  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
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Figure 12: NEETs by sex and by country; 18 countries with HHS, circa 
2009 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
Vulnerability in Education and Labor 
Given the problems highlighted earlier, it seems useful to unpack 
the NEETs. This would allow to avoid the gender bias in the construction 
and measurement of this category. In addition, it important to capture the 
weak social inclusion of A&Y who are not only out of school but also unem-
ployed or in very precarious and informal employment. Thus, a measure 
combining both educational as well as labor vulnerabilities is presented. 
This is accomplished by introducing two additional variables: secondary 
school completion and formal employment.  
A three-way classification is proposed. Combining school attend-
ance (and completion) and type of employment (unemployed, informal 
employment, and formal employment), A&Y can be categorized as suffering 
high or medium vulnerability in education and labor, or not suffering vul-
nerability.  
Concretely, we would speak of high vulnerability in education and 
labor (high VEL) when describing A&Y who satisfy the following condi-
tions: 
 They are not attending school 
 They have not completed secondary education 
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 They are outside the labor market 
 They are in the labor market but they are unemployed or 
they have an informal job 
Conversely, A&Y without vulnerability in education and labor (no 
or low VEL) are those who satisfy the following conditions: 
 They are attending school and they do not participate in 
the labor market (this labor market condition applies to 
A&Y under age 19) 
 They are attending post-secondary school (independently 
of their employment situation)  
 They have finished secondary school and they are not at-
tending post-secondary school but they are formally em-
ployed 
 They are formally employed and attending school 
The A&Y who cannot be classified as either suffering high vulnera-
bility in education and labor (because they do not satisfy all four conditions 
simultaneously) or who are not considered without vulnerability, belong to 
the medium vulnerability in education and labor (medium VEL) category.22 
Figure 13 depicts the different possible combinations of school at-
tendance/completion and type of employment with the ensuing classifica-
tion as high, medium, or no vulnerability in education and employment. 
The proportion of A&Y region-wide in each subgroup is also included, 
which shows that roughly half of A&Y in Latin America and the Caribbean 
do not suffer from vulnerability in education and employment, while about 
a quarter of them suffer from medium VEL and another quarter suffer from 
high VEL.  
                                                   
22 This proposed classification, of course, could be adjusted, adapted, and modified. For 
instance, the proportion of overage students (a leading indicator of dropping out) 
could be incorporated. The presence and number of children in the household could 
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Caribbean countries have a higher than average rate of high VEL 
(41%), considerably higher than the regional average (Figure 14). Guate-
mala and Honduras are the individual countries with the highest incidence 
of high VEL, over 50% in both countries. Mexican A&Y also suffer high VEL, 
almost 40%. Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama, and Dominican Republic are coun-
tries where the high VEL incidence is lower than the regional average. Fi-
nally, in Spanish-speaking South America, the incidence of high VEL is also 
below the regional average. 
It is also interesting to consider the incidence of low VEL. For in-
stance in countries like Argentina and Costa Rica, where the incidence of 
high VEL is about average, the incidence of low VEL is among the highest 
(second after Chile) in the region (over 50%). 
Figure 14: Adolescents and youngsters with VEL; countries with HHS, 
circa 2009 
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
 
UNPACKING THE NEETS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN   147 
 
The socioeconomic background of the A&Y suffering from high or 
medium VEL (or not suffering VEL at all) is presented in Figures 15 and 16. 
Almost half of rural A&Y suffer from high VEL, while less than a 
quarter of urban A&Y suffer high VEL. On average, rural A&Y suffer twice as 
much from high VEL than urban A&Y. In Brazil, Mexico, and the Caribbean 
countries, this proportion is lower while it is higher in Spanish-speaking 
South American counties, in particular Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. The 
percentage of A&Y suffering medium VEL is roughly the same (about 25%) 
in both urban and rural areas. 
Older A&Y (i.e., those who are 20–24 years old) have a higher pro-
portion of high VEL (about a third) than younger ones. High VEL affects 
almost one in four adolescent 15–19-year–olds. The highest age-group 
differences are found in Brazil and Spanish-speaking South America (ex-
cept Uruguay, which joins Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico as the coun-
tries with the lowest age group differences). 
As mentioned earlier, the NEET category is embedded in a stereo-
typical perspective about gender roles. As the VEL was constructed partly 
to compensate for this, it is interesting to note that there are almost no 
differences between male and female A&Y in either high or medium VEL. 
This is not the case in every country, which shows that, on the one hand, 
some of the gender bias of the NEET measurement has been corrected but, 
on the other hand, the VEL category can still pick up unfair disparities be-
tween the male and female A&Y. 
In most Spanish-speaking South American countries and in Brazil, 
there is an advantage for adolescent girls and young women, while the 
situation is reversed (at roughly the same magnitude) in Mexico and in 
Caribbean countries. For instance, in Argentina, Dominican Republic, and 
Venezuela, the incidence of high VEL among male A&Y is 20% than among 
female A&Y. In contrast, among female A&Y in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Gua-
temala, the incidence of high VEL is 20% above the one for male A&Y.  
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Figure 15: VEL among A&Y by geographic location, age, sex, parents’ 
education, and household income; countries with HHS, circa 2009   
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
For each A&Y in the richest income quintile who suffers high VEL, 
there are more than four A&Y in the lowest quintile suffering high VEL. 
Spanish-speaking countries in South America show similar values to this 
regional average. However, it is a bit higher in Mexico, and twice as large in 
Brazil. This relative gap is lower in Caribbean countries (where it is about 
two instead of more than four). 
However, the highest disparities exist between A&Y whose par-
ents have little or no education and those whose parents have completed 
secondary or higher education. While one out of four A&Y whose parents 
have little or no education suffer no VEL, about three out of four A&Y 
whose parents have completed secondary or higher education suffer no 
VEL. The disparity is even higher when analyzing A&Y suffering high VEL. 
More than half of A&Y from the first group but less than 3% in the second 
group suffer high VEL. Thus, for the region as a whole, the incidence of high 
VEL in the first group is almost 20 times larger than in the second group. 
The highest divergence occurs in South America (both in Brazil and in 
Spanish-speaking countries). In no country is this ratio less than 10. The 
lowest relative gaps take place in Mexico (about 13 times) and in Guatema-
la and Honduras (12 times).  
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Figure 16: A&Y with high VEL by geographic location, age, sex, parents’ 
education, and household income; countries with HHS, circa 2009  
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
A comparison between NEETs and high VEL is offered in Figure 
17. The proportion of A&Y with high VEL almost doubles the proportion of 
NEETs (28% against 15%). The relative disparities among A&Y suffering 
high VEL are higher than for NEETs when comparing rural and urban A&Y 
as well as income levels or the parent’s education. The relative disparities 
are lower for age groups and they almost disappear between male and 
female A&Y. 
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Figure 17: NEETs and A&Y with high VEL, differences by geographic 
location, age, sex, parents’ education, and household income; countries 
with HHS, circa 2009   
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
Although the VEL has been introduced as a way to surmount some 
of the limitations of the NEETs category, they do share some of the same 
basic information. Thus, it is not surprising they are correlated. Of course, 
the correlation is not one to one and it is worthwhile to explore where 
there are divergences between the two indicators.  
In Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Mexico, A&Y 
suffer both high incidence of NEETs and of high VEL (Figure 18). The situa-
tion is reversed in Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay. Colombia, Costa Rica, 
and Panama show average levels for both measurements.  
However, Ecuador and Paraguay show a divergence. Their A&Y do 
not have a high incidence of NEETs but they do suffer from high VEL. It is 
the opposite in Chile where A&Y classified as NEETs exceed the regional 
average but where the incidence of high VEL is half the regional average 
value. A similar pattern (with less extreme values) is found in Argentina, 
Venezuela, and Dominican Republic. 
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Figure 18: NEETs and A&Y with high VEL by country; countries with HHS, 
circa 2009  
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
As the measurement of VEL combines education achievement with 
labor market conditions, it is clear that policies aimed at improving educa-
tion outcomes and labor inclusion would contribute to reduce the estimat-
ed VEL. However, more than this can be done. First, calculating VEL high-
lights the importance of integrating education and labor policies for A&Y. 
Second, it provides guidance in terms of specific inclusion efforts for the 
most disadvantaged A&Y in order to break the intergenerational transmis-
sion and geographic-specific patterns of social exclusion. In other words, 
“generic” policies will have natural limits or may take inordinately long 
(thus failing the current generation of NEETs—and perhaps even the next 
one). Consequently, universal policies to ensure good-quality education for 
all and full employment may need reinforcements with specific actions to 
promote the inclusion of NEETs. 
In addition, third, adolescent development policies geared toward 
addressing some of the underlying constraints A&Y, in particular the most 
disadvantaged, confront will also help to address the limitations of tradi-
tional education and labor policies. Several years ago, Roth and Brooks-
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Gunn (2003) developed a framework to design these type of policies and 
interventions. The objectives are to build competencies (social, cultural, 
etc.) among A&Y, to strengthen their confidence (so A&Y feel their lives 
matter and they can hope for a better future); to further their connections 
(to family members, mentors, etc.); to reinforce their character (highlight-
ing positive behaviors and distinguishing right and wrong), and promoting 
caring (relying on their compassion to further empathy for themselves and 
toward others). Clearly, none of them, singly or combined with the other 
ones, will solve the problems of low-quality schooling and underperform-
ing labor markets. However, they can be fundamental in providing A&Y 
tools and skills to make the most of the opportunities offered to them. This 
is an important contribution to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
(singly focused, silo-type) education and labor policies.  
Conclusions 
Four main conclusions come out of the previous analysis and de-
scription. First, NEETs are mainly girls and young women. For Latin Ameri-
ca and the Caribbean as a whole, 80% of NEETs are female (this ranges 
between more than 90% in Guatemala and less than 70% in Chile and Do-
minican Republic). Gender dynamics and stereotypes (translated into ana-
lytical categories) explain most of this imbalance. Among the former is the 
fact that girls and young women inherit the primary care responsibility 
from their mothers, all too often at a very early age—either because they 
themselves become mothers or they have to take care of somebody else’s 
children. Thus, given the prevailing gender dynamics and norms, they are 
counted as “doing nothing,” that is, not engaged in productively in the labor 
market. This is when the second elements come to play. While an informal-
ly employed young male is counted as working (in spite of him having ex-
tremely low income, no job security, and probably being engaged in a very 
low productivity activity for a few hours a day), a young woman who toils 
10–12 hours a day fulfilling important activities without which society 
would not be able to reproduce itself is considered a NEET. That means the 
category needs to be revised.  
Second, to respond the need to revise the NEET category, the 
measure of Vulnerability in Education and Labor (VEL) has been proposed 
as a better descriptor of the risks and challenges faced by A&Y in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The VEL does not look just at whether an ado-
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lescent or youngster is in (out of) school or (un)employed. It takes into 
account the completion (or attendance to) of secondary schooling, on the 
one hand, and, on the other one, the type of employment (for-
mal/informal/unemployment). This allows for a richer description of the 
situation of A&Y in the region. Clearly, the measurement of VEL is a tool 
which is just being developed and could certainly be improved (e.g., includ-
ing data on repetition, completion of tertiary education, or other indica-
tors). Compared to NEETs (about 15% of the A&Y population), VEL is twice 
as high (almost 30%). Moreover, there is no gender imbalance in VEL. This 
does not imply that all A&Y are equally likely to suffer from VEL. 
Third, although the VEL shows no major gender discrepancies (the 
female/male relative gap is around 1, meaning equality in most countries 
except Bolivia where it is almost 2 and Dominican Republic where it is 0.8), 
other disparities are quite prominent. The major inequities are concentrat-
ed in rural areas and among A&Y whose parents have low education and 
low income. Clearly, all these three axes of disparity are related, which 
points to a particular kind of exclusion which the younger generations are 
still struggling to break. 
Thus, finally, a set of policies have been highlighted in the chapter 
that could contribute to open the doors of inclusion to these A&Y. These 
policies include higher and more equitable investment in education. Higher 
education investment would not only increase the quality and efficiency of 
education systems, it would also provide A&Y from rural and poorer 
household the skills required to find decent (i.e., productive, well-paid, safe, 
and secure) jobs. As education may not be sufficient to succeed in the labor 
market, in particular for A&Y from excluded families and with low social 
capital (and because the education investments may take several years to 
bear fruit while many A&Y must enter the labor force right now) specific 
employment programs and policies focused on A&Y employability (without 
promoting child labor) would be needed. Given the importance of care 
activities among adolescent girls and young women, it is also important to 
address gender issues in schools as well as recognizing the importance of 
the (unpaid) care economy within the social security system. In order to 
enhance the impact of labor and education policies, they have to be com-
plemented with adolescent development policies to promote competencies, 
connections, and confidence among A&Y, as well as addressing other root 
causes of exclusion (e.g., ethnicity). Clearly, none of these policies will be 
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sufficient if macroeconomic, trade, and productive policies do not provide a 
context of full employment with decent jobs. Thus a combination of social 
and economic policies is necessary (although not sufficient) to guarantee 
not only the rights of A&Y but also to offer opportunities for their social 
inclusion, the means (material and sociocultural) required for the full de-
velopment of their creativity, and the liberty to shape a better future for 
themselves and, consequently, for all of us. 
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“BIOGRAPHICAL DUALISM”: Youth employment and 
poverty patterns in Spain 
Luis Garrido, Rodolfo Gutiérrez, and Ana M. Guillén 
Introduction 
The economic crisis has resulted in a dramatic situation for youth 
employment in Spain. At the end of 2013, the unemployment rate amount-
ed to 75.5% among young people aged 16–19, 50.9% among those aged 
20–24, and 32.3% among those aged 25–29. Half of the young unemployed 
had been looking for a job for more than one year. One in four neither 
worked nor studied. Although the youth population has dropped, their 
employment problems have not improved. Over the last six years, one mil-
lion more young people have joined the unemployment ranks, whereas the 
youth population has decreased by 1.5 million.  
Recent comparative research agrees on identifying the Spanish 
case as one of the lowest performers in aggregate indicators of youth labor 
market integration and in specific dimensions of its quality, also for every 
youth age group and both during growth and, very prominently, during 
recession periods (Berlingieri et al., 2014; O’Reilly et al., 2015; Hadjivassil-
iou et al., 2015). 
Youth unemployment is not the only problem. It is rather the con-
sequence of other shortcomings of the Spanish labor market prior to the 
crisis. What has been failing for more than 30 years is the entire Spanish 
model of youth labor integration. Some of its characteristics are most sin-
gular in the international context. Comparative research on youth employ-
ment in Spain has emphasized two outstanding traits and associated insti-
tutional arrangements to explain the extreme singularity of this national 
case: on the one hand, the low quality of school-to-work transitions (STW), 
related to the different levels of the educational system; and, on the other, 
                                                   
*  This article is a product of the research project “Welfare capitalism in South Europe: 
a comparative assessment (CABISE),” funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy 
(MINECO-13-CSO2012-33976). 
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the high intensity of the insider/outsider divide as to labor market regula-
tions.  
The analysis undertaken in this chapter is oriented by a somewhat 
different viewpoint from the mechanisms interpreting the Spanish case 
from a comparative perspective. In the Spanish case, both flexibilization 
and dualism show specific profiles as to the orientation of the former and 
the peculiar pattern of the latter. Flexibilization has been the main objec-
tive of many different labor market reforms carried out over the last 25 
years. But the type of flexibilization that has been consolidated is “flexibili-
zation at the margins,” as it has mainly affected the labor market entry 
stages, and it has scarcely modified employment regulations for those en-
joying a consolidated working position through a permanent contract. This 
has resulted in a very marked pattern, much more so than in any other 
country (including those of southern Europe), with a longitudinal type 
dualization. In other words, the insider-outsider dynamics have to do main-
ly with the working lifecycle. Thus, this type of dualization has acquired a 
shape peculiar to a queue rather than the typical form of two segments. 
This chapter aims to analyze three major and specific traits of the 
Spanish case. In the first section, comparative research on youth employ-
ment regimes is addressed and discussed in relation with the Spanish case. 
The second section discusses the high and increasing gap of employment 
outcomes by educational level, which is related to the problem of (long-
term) unemployment among the low-qualified youth. The third section 
focuses on the almost universal “temporary” pattern of incorporation into 
the labor market, a pattern having prevailed for three decades and that has 
not been modified during the long recession. The fourth section deals with 
recent deterioration in the traditional pattern of low poverty risk among 
young people. The chapter closes by gathering the research results and 
indicating future avenues for research. 
STW and employment regimes: Situating the Spanish case 
Comparative research has mainly focused on typifying clusters of 
countries with strong similarities in youth labor market performance and 
identifying the specific mechanisms and institutional arrangements that 
can explain the observed variety. STW regimes and employment regimes 
represent the two most relevant approaches in the field. 
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The dichotomy distinguishing between an occupational and an or-
ganizational (or internal) entry into labor markets can be seen as an initial 
formulation of the STW regimes (Shavit et al., 1998; Gangl, 2001, 2002; 
Müller and Gangl, 2003). This dichotomy is based on the assumption that 
the structure of education and training has important effects on the transi-
tion process between education and work. “Occupational labor market” 
countries exhibit extensive systems of vocational training/apprenticeship, 
as in Germany and other Central European countries, where young people 
are predominantly trained within the traditional dual vocational system. 
“Organizational labor markets” can be found in countries with less inte-
grated education and employment systems, such as France, the United 
Kingdom and Spain, where transitions are less socially shaped and employ-
ers deploy a more extensive role of discretionary recruitment and training 
in shaping early labor market careers. 
Following this dichotomy, relative outcomes of labor market en-
trants differ significantly between these two institutional arrangements. In 
occupational contexts, on the one hand, strict educational channeling of 
individuals allows for a more immediate match between qualifications and 
jobs, while lack of experience has low detrimental effects, so that young 
workers should be in a more favorable position both in employment and 
occupational status attainments. In organizational contexts, on the other 
hand, youth labor market outcomes are primarily achieved via work expe-
rience and horizontal mobility, so that young entrants are more dependent 
on contingencies of individual job-worker matches and both unemploy-
ment and precarious employment should exhibit a strong experience gra-
dient.  
The approach in terms of STW regimes constitutes a more ambi-
tious attempt to include in the analysis not only educational and labor mar-
ket arrangements, but also complex systems of socioeconomic structures, 
institutional arrangements, and cultural patterns. Based on a reformulation 
of Gallie and Paugam’s typology of employment regimes (2000), Walther 
(2006) has elaborated a typology of four clusters of STW regimes: univer-
salistic, employment-centered, liberal, and subprotective. 
The subprotective transition regime is supposed to correspond to 
Southern European countries, such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where 
educational systems, labor markets, welfare provision, and youth policies 
have shaped a regime to render specific outcomes and patterns. The school 
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system is structured comprehensively until the end of compulsory educa-
tion and the rate of early school leavers tends to be high. Vocational train-
ing is weakly developed and largely provided by professional schools, with 
low involvement of companies. Higher education plays an important role in 
providing young people with a chance to improve status in the waiting 
phase, prompting risks of either dropping out before reaching the end of 
their degree or becoming overqualified. Labor market segmentation and 
lack of training contribute to very high rates of youth unemployment, espe-
cially affecting young women. Young people are not entitled to social bene-
fits and a scarcity of public childcare facilities leads to dependency on fami-
ly support and delays in individual careers. The most relevant educational 
policies are aimed at prolonging school participation and at integrating 
vocational training, whereas labor market policies are focused on incen-
tives for employers to hire young people together with assistance and in-
centives for those unemployed to turn to self-employment.  
The employment regimes perspective, in turn, emphasizes the in-
stitutionalized role of organized labor in decision-making at both national 
and workplace level and the extent to which employment practices and 
regulations facilitate the integration of the potentially most vulnerable 
labor market groups (Gallie, 2007). A distinction is drawn between “inclu-
sive” and “dualist” regimes. In dualist regimes, such as Germany, France, 
and Spain, organized labor draws its strength primarily from an easier-to-
mobilize core workforce of employees in large firms and its central concern 
is to guarantee rights to this core workforce of long-term employees (insid-
ers). Employment regulations tend to reflect this by providing high em-
ployment protection, good working conditions, and generous welfare sup-
port for the core workforce, but much poorer conditions and significant 
vulnerability for those on nonstandard contracts (outsiders). 
Structural change toward postindustrial labor markets has pro-
duced similar, albeit not identical, sets of insiders and outsiders across 
regimes (Häusermann and Schwander, 2012). Continental and Southern 
European regimes tend to perpetuate and even reinforce the insider–
outsider divide with regard to all three dimensions of dualism: not only the 
labor market dimension of dualism, mainly reflected in unequal access of 
outsiders to job mobility and training, but also the social protection dimen-
sion, by the effect of taxes and transfers on net income differentials be-
tween both segments; and, furthermore, the political dimension, that is, the 
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insider–outsider gap in terms of trade union membership and political 
participation. 
There is a repeated and clear conclusion about all these compara-
tive approaches: South European countries, and more specifically Spain, do 
not fit well into any framework. Gangl (2001) concludes that South Euro-
pean countries clearly do not line up with the patterns found in the United 
Kingdom and France, supposedly in the same organizational cluster, and 
this constitutes the most intriguing weakness of the dichotomy of occupa-
tional/organizational labor markets. The South European pattern combines 
one element present in the occupational system—the role of strong experi-
ence effects on employment outcomes—but also another element of the 
organizational system, as far as large educational differentials may be as-
certained as regards outcomes. Furthermore, the position of Spain is also 
peculiar as it is clustered with the flexible and deregulated youth labor 
market system common to North European countries. 
The picture for South European countries is also somewhat com-
plex under the insider/outsider lens. Häusermann and Schwander (2012) 
found that labor markets are less dualized than in continental Europe, both 
with regard to gross wage gaps and training/promotion prospects, alt-
hough the low degree of dualism may reflect poor job conditions even for 
insiders. The dualist effect is clearer in the dimensions of social protection 
and of political integration than it is in the employment dimension. Another 
intriguing trait of this group of countries, and particularly pertaining Spain, 
is that, while they have introduced many elements of policy reform similar 
to other countries, increased labor market flexibility has not significantly 
improved the employment integration of young people. 
In the analysis based on the employment regimes approach, Gallie 
(2007) calls into question the characterization of countries in terms of the 
emphasis on skills specificity as a predictor or more inclusive employment 
patterns. Further, among supposedly dualist countries, such as France, 
Germany, and Spain, no particularly distinctive traits could be ascertained 
as regards the disadvantage associated with temporary contracts as a de-
terminant of low-quality employment integration. There are important 
variations among countries falling under each of the two regimes and cate-
gorizations are, at best, broad brush. Gallie (2007: 232) closes his ambi-
tious analysis, in the last paragraph of his book, by conceding that “regime 
analysis can complement, but not substitute for, the older tradition of ‘soci-
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etal’ analysis which takes seriously the specificity of the historically derived 
institutional frameworks of particular countries.”  
The limited analytical power of the hitherto discussed characteri-
zations reinforces the need for country case analyses paying more atten-
tion to (a) longer time periods and relevant changes in crucial institutional 
arrangements and (b) to longitudinal approaches in order to assess the 
effects of those changes on different youth generations. The following sec-
tions undertake such challenges in the analysis of the Spanish case.  
The increasing salience of education in the Spanish labor market 
Spain has experienced a massive “educational overturn” during 
the last four decades due to the substantial increase of the educational level 
among younger cohorts. Taking into account only those educational levels 
directly applicable to work (namely, professional training, university de-
grees, but also high school degrees, which were used by older cohorts to 
obtain white collar jobs), those Spanish men born between 1931–1935 
enjoyed 13.5% of education/training for work while those born between 
1976 and 1980 had reached 65.1% in 2014. Such an “overturn” has been 
even more intense among women, who, for the same cohorts, have evolved 
from 6.4% to 75.4%. 
In this context of educational overturn, the dualization of the 
Spanish labor market is directly related to two very important effects for 
youth employment, which go in very different directions: On the one side, 
the likelihood of obtaining a job depends very intensely on the education 
level, a pattern much more intense during economic crisis cycles; on the 
other side, the skill wage premium has clearly deteriorated for the younger 
generations in recent decades. 
The data included in Figure 1 show the aforementioned first effect. 
The employment rates have been calculated from 1976 to 2014 for young 
people of both sexes that have already abandoned their studies. Since 
young people enter the labor market at different ages, the age groups are 
also different for each educational level, corresponding to the first five 
years of their working life for each group (calculated by means of fixed ages 
throughout the entire period). To make the comparison more homogenous, 
only young Spanish people are included (i.e., those born in Spain). In other 
words, no immigrants are incorporated, as their entry trajectories into the 
labor market depend a great deal on the time of their arrival in Spain and, 
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therefore, their experience in the labor market cannot be made to coincide 
with the year they complete their studies as with those born in Spain. 
Data in Figure 1 further prove two facts of singular relevance. 
First, education levels are increasingly and intensely differentiating the 
employment levels of young people. At the beginning of the 70s, the educa-
tion levels of young people hardly affected their employment levels: All 
men enjoyed full, or almost full, employment; all women had lower levels of 
employment and there were some inequalities due to educational levels. 
The tendency to greater inequality began with the oil crises at the end of 
the 70s but it has been maintained afterward, both during the crisis and 
growth cycles. Moreover, the last crisis has had the effect of intensifying an 
already long-term tendency. In fact, intensification has occurred to such an 
extent that the employment rate of the less-qualified (primary education) 
women aged 16–20 years amounted to 7% in 2013, that is, over 50 points 
lower than that of female university graduates aged 23–27 years, which 
was of 64%. Among young men, the difference was only slightly less pro-
nounced, that is, 21% and 60%, respectively. 
Second, the other fact to be highlighted is that the Spanish labor 
market also presents a long-term nonemployment tendency among the 
less-qualified young people. Each crisis period has lowered the employ-
ment level of the less-qualified young people a little more than the previous 
period, while during successive growth cycles the employment level 
achieved in the previous cycle has scarcely been recuperated. This tenden-
cy is much more accused among women than among men. However, the 
different crisis periods affected the employment level among more-
qualified young people much less, especially among young university grad-
uates in general and even less among young female graduates. During such 
a severe employment crisis as the current one, the employment rate of the 
more-qualified young women has dropped 15 percentage points between 
the time they achieved the highest employment level (2007–09) and the 
time of the lowest level (2013). Still, the employment rate of young women 
with compulsory secondary education levels has decreased by 35 points 
between the best time (2006) and the worst time (2013). 
It is noteworthy that, during expansive phases, youth employment 
rates by educational level are very similar when compared at equal “work-
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ing ages” and excluding those who are currently studying, as calculated in 
this chapter.1 Hence, one may consider that labor integration of Spanish 
youth is relatively favorable in such economic phases. Conversely, during 
recessions (as can be observed in the figures with fixed labor ages), per-
formance of the different educational levels are much more unequal, and 
these variations are the product of decreases in the employment rate that 
are much more pronounced the lower the formal educational level. 
Figure 1: Youth employment rates by educational level and age in Spain, 
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1  Fixed ages have been used for each educational level as the age of studies ending is 
not available until 1992. Therefore, tracing the trajectory from 1976 has been con-
sidered preferable to the use of specific “working ages” for each individual (calculat-
ed as years gone by since the end of formal education). If such “individual working 
ages” are used and educational levels are classified into nine levels, the difference 
between the expansion and recession phases becomes much more evident. 
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Source: Own calculations, INE, Labour Force Survey.  
Despite the intensely pro-cyclical behavior of the Spanish labor 
market, the highly qualified young people have managed to maintain their 
long-term employment opportunities at a reasonably stable level, so that 
their position has only deteriorated moderately with the recent crisis. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that their position in the labor market has 
not worsened in other senses, especially regarding their relative salaries. 
Felgueroso et al. (2010) provide the calculations for the skill wage premi-
um (SWP) by age, cohort and gender, comparing educational or qualifica-
tion groups (Figure 2). The results are quite revealing: First, at the time of 
entry into the labor market, the SWP has continued to fall for the cohort 
born after the early 60s (those entering the market after 1985); second, 
despite the apparent increase with age, the SWP falls with time for all the 
male cohorts; the differences by gender are due to a delay in the SWP fall 
for females. Specifically for women, a substantial increase of the SWP for 
the cohort born 1963–1967 (aged 43–47 in 2010) is observed. For those 
born after 1967, a small decrease of the SWP is detected at all ages. Alter-
natively, for men, the fall of the SWP starts for cohorts born between 1958 
and 1962, currently aged 48–52. Note, finally, that for both genders the 
discrepancies between the SWP measured by educational level or occupa-
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tion	are	 larger	 for	younger	cohorts,	very	 likely	due	to	 the	 increasing	 frac‐
tion	of	mismatched	educated	individuals	in	younger	cohorts.	
Figure 2: Skill wage premium by age, birth year, and gender (wage earn-
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Fixed-term contracts as a peculiar dualization mechanism 
The	main	causes	of	 the	extension	and	severity	of	 the	 liabilities	of	
youth	 employment	 in	 Spain	 are	 deeply	 rooted	 (Garrido	 and	 Gutiérrez,	
2011).	They	have	to	do	above	all	with	the	way	in	which	some	basic	prob‐
lems	of	 the	Spanish	 labor	market	were	addressed	at	 the	end	of	 the	Fran‐
coist	dictatorship	and	during	the	early	democratic	 transition.	Some	of	 the	
answers	 to	 the	challenges	at	 those	critical	moments	were	consolidated	as	
more	 or	 less	 implicit,	 social	 agreements,	 and/or	 as	 institutional	 arrange‐
ments,	 both	 with	 powerful	 inertias	 on	 the	 capacity	 to	 generate	 new	 an‐
swers	to	old	problems.	
Spain	 is	 a	 country	where,	most	 paradigmatically,	 an	 institutional	
device	of	 the	 labor	market	can	be	seen	as	a	dualization	mechanism.	Since	
the	mid‐1980s,	Spain	has	introduced	successive	reforms	aimed	at	increas‐
‘BIOGRAPHICAL DUALISM’   167 
 
 
ing labor market flexibility. Those attempts to increase flexibility have 
taken place through changes at the margins in the employment protection 
legislation. The latter liberalized the use of fixed-term (or temporary) con-
tracts, while leaving largely unchanged the legislation affecting the stock of 
employees under open-ended (or permanent) contracts.  
The successive changes implemented since the mid-1980s to regu-
late labor contracts maintained a pattern of two-tier employment protec-
tion (Guillén and Gutiérrez, 2006; Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno, 2012). 
Reforms have modified all the items of temporary contracts (causality and 
costs of dismissals, mainly) and have encouraged open-ended contracts in 
all possible ways, modifying their protection only slightly.  
The intensity of the 2007 crisis and the extraordinary increase in 
unemployment were not sufficient reason for the Spanish government to 
carry out labor reforms. The initial reaction was that the reforms were not 
necessary and that, if they were carried out, they would have to be the 
result of an agreement with the social partners. But those agreements nev-
er came about and the government, forced by the threats of the financial 
markets and the pressure of its European co-member states, changed its 
stance about the need for reforms, and at the beginning of 2010 began a 
series of actions that led to another employment protection modification 
phase between June 2010 and September 2011. These reforms were much 
more extensive and intense than the previous ones and mainly affected 
four areas: dismissal costs, working hours, active employment policies, and 
collective bargaining. 
The entry in office of a new center-right wing government at the 
end of 2011 led to a major labor reform in 2012, which modified many 
aspects of employment protection and continued along the line of the re-
duction of severance payments for permanent contracts. Thus, the law 
established incentives to internal flexibility measures in order to save jobs 
of workers on fixed-term contracts. More recently, in 2013, the government 
introduced some measures on stable employment and employability pri-
marily focused on young unemployed with little or no work experience. For 
instance, the Decree-Law 11/2013 of 2 August, introduced a temporary 
contract (primer empleo joven) aimed at encouraging first working experi-
ence among young unemployed under the age of 30. 
It is still very early to evaluate these latest reforms and even more 
difficult in a period of economic recession that has brought employment 
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creation to a standstill. The initial impression is that these reforms are 
moving in the direction of reducing institutional duality, but they are doing 
so in a very timid way. Spain was the country where young employees had 
the shortest tenure in their first job during the years of booming employ-
ment (2006–2007) and it still remains so during the crisis. It is not strange 
that new reforms in the same direction are more than likely to be required 
in coming years (Bentolila et al., 2012; OECD, 2013).  
Despite all the efforts aimed at promoting permanent contracts 
and at limiting temporary or fixed-term ones, the proportion of temporary 
jobs in Spain has remained at very stable levels over the last 30 years. Such 
levels are much higher than those of other countries in the south of Europe, 
such as France or Italy, where there is a similar weight of strong seasonal 
economic activities (agriculture and tourism, mainly) as well as similar 
labor relations systems, leading one to believe that they would also show 
very similar proportions of temporary employment. 
In fact, temporary employment has become an almost universal 
labor integration track in Spain. It constitutes more of a formal rule to 
shape the integration process than a factual rule regulating the actual dura-
tion of contracts. With data from the Labour Force Survey in 2014, 45% of 
those employed through fixed-term contracts have enjoyed a chain of fixed-
term contracts in the same firm and 59.2% of them have been working for 
the same firm for almost a year. Temporary employment as a dualization 
mechanism does not work as a secondary segment but rather as a predom-
inant queue for youth integration and consolidation in the labor market. 
Equally, the overall temporary employment rate is a very limited 
indicator of the salience of this situation in young people's work trajecto-
ries. A longitudinal approach is required to observe these trajectories bet-
ter, as offered in the data of Figure 3. The temporary employment rate 
curves are illustrated for the different demographic cohorts for men and 
women who have been part of the Spanish labor market over the last two 
decades. These include the cohort born between 1931 and 1935, the closest 
cohort to retirement age during that period, and the cohort of those born 
between 1991 and 1995, that is, the youngest to join the market, which can 
only be observed, therefore, up to 24 years of age.2 
                                                   
2  We must warn that this representation is not entirely rigorous from the viewpoint of 
the longitudinal monitoring of the trajectory of a cohort. It must be taken into ac-
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This way of presenting the temporary employment trajectories 
shows the biographic stability of temporality. Longitudinally, temporary 
contracts have become the canonical form of labor integration, with such 
continuity that each cohort follows a practically identical trajectory to 
those preceding it in the association between age and level of temporality 
in employment. Successive cohorts of men and women follow an upward 
contract stability trend that mimics that followed by their predecessors. 
The cyclical oscillation of employment, which as we have seen, is very in-
tense in the Spanish case, only manages to slightly and transitorily alter 
what has become a consistent regularity over the last two decades. 
The relevant parallelism between the trajectories of both genders 
makes it easier to measure the distance between them. The average trajec-
tory rate is calculated for each gender. The difference in temporary em-
ployment of those average trajectories is obtained for each age. The aver-
age for the whole working life (from 16 to 68 years) amounts to 3.0 points. 
This difference is maintained for the greatest part of the trajectory with the 
exception of the central phase (35 to 45 years), where it rises to 4.3 points, 
and in the final phase (from 54 to 64 years), where it decreases to 1.1 
points. This comparison clearly proves the similarity of the labor consolida-
tion process for both genders.  
Another way of measuring this difference consists of advancing 
female trajectories by one year. In this way, it will coincide with the trajec-
tory of men in the entire initial part, to the extent where the average differ-
ence in the phase from 16 to 34 years is 0.0 points. This means that the 
difference as regards the incidence of temporary employment between 
men and women in the integration phase is that men “are one year ahead” 
in biographical terms.  
                                                                                                           
count that the components of a cohort share the birth period but they are very dif-
ferent in terms of education levels and, therefore, they join the labor market at very 
different ages. That is why, within the younger age ranges, although they do share 
that same birth period, they do not represent the same group as they reach the suc-
cessive ages. This is due to the fact that, as only salary earners are included, these 
start work at very different ages depending on their respective study levels. To this 
end, during the first age ranges (16–20 years), the majority are people with low 
qualifications and, as they grow older, the others, who have higher education levels, 
gradually join the labor market. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of employed people with fixed-term contracts by 























































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations, INE, Labour Force Survey 
Having verified this overlapping of trajectories, it is especially in-
teresting to focus on what has occurred during the current crisis. The initial 
drop of temporary employment, as the principal way to adjust employ-
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ment, has meant that the proportion of permanent employment has in-
creased, so that the trajectories of the younger cohorts show less temporal-
ity. It must be highlighted that, during the strongest crisis phase, no cohort 
(except for the males born between 1986 and 1990) decreased in 2009 by 
9.5 points, which is the general rate. This is due to the fact that this im-
portant drop of the temporary employment rate is the result, mainly, of the 
loss of employment among young people, who are those who endure tem-
porary employment the most.  
Therefore, the “departures” from the trajectories of their prede-
cessors are less important than the total drop of temporary employment. 
Admittedly, it would be possible to reduce general temporality without the 
trajectory of any cohort being altered provided each one of them were to 
lose temporary and permanent employment in the same proportion, but 
only if the younger cohorts were to lose more jobs because the majority of 
the temporary jobs are held by them. As we can see in the following text, 
this is precisely what has happened in the end. 
Indeed, the last two years show a return to the average trajectory, 
by going back to the previous situation where age marks the temporary 
employment pattern rather than changes in intensity and age composition 
of employment. These results show that the decrease of the general tempo-
rary employment rate is precisely an employment composition effect. The 
loss of jobs among young people (above all those with the lowest levels of 
qualification, who register the highest levels of temporary employment and 
who are also those that start working earlier) leads to a decrease in the 
general proportion, but this does not alter the biographic regularity of the 
trajectories. It can be deduced from this that, in the end, the proportion of 
both temporary and permanent jobs lost in each cohort is the same as veri-
fied previously at each age. During the first two years of the crisis, tempo-
rary jobs were the first to drop, while permanent jobs increased strongly, 
thus altering the trajectory in a transitory manner. However, in the next 
two years there were more permanent dismissals (or less stabilization of 
the temporary ones than was typical of each age), thus resulting in a return 
to the canonical trajectory. 
The importance of this recovery of the trajectory is decisive with 
respect to the construction of the biographies of young people, above all of 
those young-adults who have all kinds of difficulties to consolidate their 
labor integration. Although it could be argued that it is early days to evalu-
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ate the results of the 2012 labor reform, its ineffectiveness to reduce that 
basic dualization mechanism seems clear. This is proof of the continuity of 
the extensive and drastic segmentation of the labor market with respect to 
the termination of work contracts depending on age, both as to the bio-
graphic age and the “working age,” understood not as employment experi-
ence but as time elapsed since they abandoned their studies. 
Youth poverty risks 
Under the assumptions of the insider–outsider approach, a clear 
income gap should be observed between both groups. In the southern 
countries, a combination of poor employment outcomes and weak social 
protection has worsened the situation for young outsiders, further widen-
ing the net wage gap after taxes and transfers (Häusermann and Schwan-
der, 2012).  
In the case of Spain, those expectations are only partially con-
firmed. Youth poverty risk is comparatively high in Spain, but not as high as 
expected by such poor labor market outcomes (Goerne, 2011; García-
Espejo and Gutiérrez, 2011). With data from EU-SILC, in 2005, at the peak 
of the economic boom phase, the rate of youth (18–24 years) in poverty 
risk was 17.0, considerably lower than in some Nordic countries (Denmark 
33.9, Sweden 29.5) and also lower than in some other southern countries 
(Italy 22.1, Greece 21.4). At the peak of the recession period (2012), this 
rate amounted to 28.2 in Spain, higher than the average in EU-15 countries 
(23.1), but still lower than in Denmark (40.5) and Sweden (29.9). 
This traditionally low level of youth poverty in Spain is clearly due 
to the role played by living arrangements as a protection mechanism (Ayl-
lón 2009). The scarce labor market integration of young people in Spain 
has been compensated by household behavior. An increase in the number 
of dual-earner households, thanks to the rise in female participation in the 
labor market, has played a crucial role in the reduction of poverty among 
youth, counteracting the effect of the decline in the economic status of 
young people. Delayed emancipation, concentrated mostly among those 
families that can best afford it, also means than emancipation occurs when 
young individuals and couples access more secure income. Under these 
circumstances, a high poverty risk among young outsiders only occurs 
(albeit significantly) when emancipation involves childbearing. 
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Such pattern has remained basically stable during the recession 
period despite intense deterioration of employment opportunities for 
young Spaniards (Figure 4). Those youths who have either avoided or 
overcome the “integration queue,” by reaching a long-term contract, enjoy 
a very low poverty risk, only slightly increased by the crisis. In fact, the 
poverty risk amounted to 6.3 in 2005, and it reached a maximum of 8.3 in 
2010. It is precisely among those young people still in the “queue” where 
risk has grown most because of the recession: They used to triple the risk 
of those with permanent employment, and in 2012 they almost doubled the 
poverty rate they suffered in 2005. 
That a return to the postponement of emancipation is the case, ex-
plains that those youths less linked to employment, namely those who are 
inactive, have increased very slightly their poverty risk, for they are the 
group that has delayed both the exit from the education system and eman-
cipation. Even the young unemployed, with a poverty risk affecting 4 out of 
10, have failed to see an increase in accordance with the predictable loss of 
income (as the proportion of young long-term unemployed among them 
has been growing and, over time, a higher portion have lost unemployment 
benefits). 
In the Spanish case, welfare performance during the crisis has 
proved particularly weak for those households including low-qualified 
adults with minor dependents (Guillén et al., 2012; Gutiérrez, 2013). This is 
the population group that should be classified as subprotected, much more 
so than those young people who have been able to keep their poverty risk 
stable, that is, those having overcome the phase of outsiders, and those who 
have seen it only slightly increased thanks to a protracted stay within the 
education system and the postponement of emancipation. 
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Figure 4: At-risk-of poverty rate among youth in Spain, 2004–2013 (18–
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Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC 
Conclusions 
Spain has evolved as an extreme case in terms of poor perfor-
mance and quality of the youth labor market, even worse in comparison to 
other countries in Continental or Southern European geographical areas in 
economic recession periods. Explaining this with reference to its belonging 
to a specific regime, either the subprotective or the insider–outsider, is 
clearly insufficient. Moreover, it can also be confusing as regards the identi-
fication of the actual institutional mechanisms behind the observed out-
comes. 
In this chapter, Spanish youth employment has been analyzed, 
during the last three decades from a longitudinal perspective, and two of 
the most dominant and stable traits have been ascertained, namely, the 
relationship between employment participation and educational levels, and 
temporality as an almost universal pattern of labor insertion. The risk of 
poverty for different labor positions has also been observed, in this case for 
a more recent period.  
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Results of the analysis show that youth employment bears a singu-
larly cyclical behavior: (1) differences in employment are considerably 
reduced during expansion phases, (2) there is a tendency toward growing 
nonemployment among the lowest qualified youth, and (3) the skill wage 
gap has notoriously narrowed. This study has also presented evidence to 
prove the persistence of the same biographical profiles of temporality over 
the analyzed period of 30 years, closely linked to the incorporation of 
young people into the labor market, prolonging employment beyond the 
duration of formal contracts. Temporality seems more a universal queue 
shaping the entry into the labor market than a trait of a secondary segment. 
In spite of this, youth poverty risk is moderate and clearly linked to tempo-
rality and unemployment. 
For all these reasons, the Spanish case can be better understood 
with the perspective of trajectories of dualism under strong pressure for 
flexibilization than from the perspective of employment regimes. Since the 
mid-1980s, the Spanish labor market has undergone successive institu-
tional reforms aimed at increasing flexibility. Attempts with this aim have 
taken place through changes at the margins by modifying the employment 
protection legislation that liberalized the use of fixed-term (or temporary) 
contracts, while leaving largely unchanged the legislation affecting the 
stock of employees under open-ended (or permanent) contracts. Compara-
tively rocketing shares of temporary employment have remained as a very 
stable trait of the Spanish labor market and the first candidate to constitute 
the main mechanism of dualization. 
The most accepted hypothesis among scholars assumes that tem-
porality constitutes a “pure” mechanism of dualization: It contributes to 
create two separate segments in the labor market, divided by their respec-
tive sets of unequal rewards, and characterized also by low mobility among 
both segments. Nevertheless, findings of this study could also support an 
alternative interpretation of the effects of temporality dualization. The 
dominant profile of dualization in the Spanish labor market is of a “bio-
graphical” nature. Despite the changes in the composition and characteris-
tics of occupation, temporality trajectories remain (practically) constant 
among consecutive cohorts. Temporality is closely connected to the age of 
workers so that it strongly decreases after the insertion phase into the 
labor market is completed, even if this phase is comparatively longer. 
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This hypothesis would also affect the interpretation of the political 
mechanism that explains the existence and stability of a labor market with 
two-tier employment protection, even though combating and overcoming 
this has been a declared objective of all the governments and social part-
ners. The usual interpretation, above all in economic analyses, is based on 
the theory of the “average voter” of governments and unions, in other 
words, the stable predominance of a constituency for both, comprised of 
insiders. The biographical profile of temporary employment and its empiri-
cal configuration would adjust better to a hypothesis of “implicit intergen-
erational pact.” 
Insiders (adult workers with open-ended or permanent contracts 
and an advantageous position in the labor market despite their low educa-
tional and training skills base) and outsiders (young and young-adult 
workers with fixed-term contracts, disadvantaged labor and wage condi-
tions, and a comparatively higher educational and training skills base) 
would live in the same households. In other words, the former are the fa-
thers and the latter are the offspring. In this context, insiders would prefer-
entially hold the central positions in the work and public spheres. In turn, 
outsiders would enjoy freedom and take advantage of “domestic” services 
in the parental household while extending their formative period and pre-
paring for a long process of consolidation within the labor market. 
In Spain, young workers would be made to compete against each 
other for labor market insertion in a sort of queue rather than being able to 
compete with all workers by using their productive capacities and corre-
sponding salaries. In other words, the institutional framework of the Span-
ish labor market produces a very rigid differential remuneration by capaci-
ty, while flexibility to contract and dismiss is very high. This may explain 
overqualification and low salaries among young workers. Moreover, it is in 
this sense that the Spanish pattern of youth employment can be character-
ized as “longitudinal” or “biographic” dualism in comparative terms.  
Furthermore, there are many factors that contribute to the deteri-
oration of the skill wage premium for young workers. Atypical work has 
become structural (typical) for young Spaniards, supported by a sectorial 
and uncoordinated collective bargaining that has generated wage increases 
above market prices for permanent workers. Admittedly, in the presence of 
excess demand (and/or severe crisis) entrepreneurs have the opportunity 
to offer lower wages and successive labor reforms have given them the 
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tools to perpetuate these dualizing practices. Moreover, economic uncer-
tainty obliges many youths to accept (despite their preference for stability) 
temporality and overqualification, considering that, ultimately, the afore-
mentioned intergenerational pact serves to soften their transition to per-
manent labor integration. 
To sum up, the results of this research reinforce two salient con-
clusions for comparative endeavors on employment and income attain-
ments among young people. On the one hand, more longitudinal evidences 
should be gathered in order to nuance the comparative panorama. Limited 
descriptive evidence has been offered here, with fixed ages as relates labor 
market entry and birth cohorts in temporality profiles. Pure longitudinal 
analyses are needed, based on panel data. On the other hand, it is also nec-
essary to develop approaches incorporating an interpretation of trajecto-
ries of policy reform. In this way, a better understanding could be reached 
of why similar labor market flexibilization reforms are conducive to very 
different results as to types of dualization. 
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YOUTH IN THE GREEK LABOR MARKET 
Apostolos Dedoussopoulos and Eva Maria Papachristopoulou 
The question of youth employment and the labor market remains 
a hotly debated political topic that also poses analytical and empirical is-
sues. Though work along alternative theoretical approaches has increased 
our insight and understanding of this issue, empirical work lags behind, 
mostly because of the complicated nature of the issue itself.  
The aim of this chapter is twofold: We briefly review the main the-
oretical currents and questions posed on the issue and provide an account 
of significant macro-tendencies on the basis of constructed indices for 
Greek society of the period between 1983 and 2013. We approach various 
dimensions of youth labor market problems in Greece from a longitudinal 
perspective and with a clear focus on gender and age-related issues. 
Our empirical investigation constitutes a preliminary attempt to 
clear the ground for more detailed and focused empirical research. We 
believe that specific case studies become meaningful and add to our under-
standing by showing the significance of additional explanatory factors only 
when macro-tendencies have been clearly established. Data availability is 
always a factor, limiting choices and creating inevitable disjunctions be-
tween theory and empirical research. Thus, our approach in this chapter is 
determined by both methodological considerations and the availability of 
relevant data. 
Youth unemployment: How important is it?  
Almost 15 years ago, two of the most prominent US American 
economists, D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (2000; 1997), stated in 
their introduction to a NBER volume dedicated to the problem of youth 
employment that young people in modern society were much better off in 
all aspects of their lives in comparison with past generations, with one 
notable exception: all aspects related to work, that is employment status, 
stability of work, career prospects, and remuneration, had been deteriorat-
ing 
One may easily admit that this is a correct description, but at the 
same time it is somehow an absurd one. It overlooks the centrality of work 
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in modern society and its role in shaping social identities; it ignores the 
social and individual costs of unemployment, precarious work, and low-
level wages. Ultimately, it is a comforting statement. What Blanchflower 
and Freeman implied is that things are not as bad as they look.  
The grievances of youth unemployment have become a key argu-
ment for the introduction and proliferation of policies such as training 
without jobs, tailor-made educational programs, flexible working time ar-
rangements, part-time and fixed-time wage contracts, substitution of ap-
prenticeships or stage contracts for regular work, wages under minimum 
standards, national security exceptions, costless hiring and hiring proce-
dures, and marginal or none unemployment benefit. In this sense, the youth 
labor market has been an extremely unregulated market, a social experi-
ment per se to be generalized and institutionalized. 
However, unemployment rates among young persons are high as 
ever, with the ratio of youth unemployment being constantly double that of 
adults in most EU countries—with only four exceptions. To be more pre-
cise, the ratio of youth unemployment rate to total unemployment rate for 
all 28 EU countries stands at 2.34 with a standard deviation of 0.473. Four 
countries (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and Romania) have a ratio exceed-
ing the average by more than one standard deviation, while four countries 
(Germany, Denmark, Lithuania, and the Netherlands) have a ratio lower 
than the average by one standard deviation. Ireland, Croatia, and Sweden 
are at the margin. 
Figure 1 indicates the close relationship between overall unem-
ployment and youth unemployment rates. For EU countries, a 1% increase 
in total unemployment means an average rise of 2.14 in the youth unem-
ployment rate. Though the estimated regression does not indicate any 
causality, it points to the existence of common determinant variables af-
fecting the behavior of both total and youth unemployment. In fact, this 
evidence reinforces the validity of the conclusions reached by estimations 
of the so-called “Gaude regression” indicating a constant long-term rela-
tionship between youth and adult unemployment rates (Blanchflower, 
1999; Gaude, 1997; O’ Higgins, 1997).1 
                                                   
1 The Gaude regression is expressed as ln( ) ln( )t t tYUR a b AUR    , connecting the 
youth unemployment rate to adult unemployment rate in a logarithmic form. 
YOUTH IN THE GREEK LABOR MARKET   183 
 
Figure 1: Total unemployment rates vs youth unemployment rates, 
EU28, 2013 
 
The school to work transition: Youth theories 
Education has been compulsory up to a certain age in European 
countries since the late 19th century. Compulsory education is not only 
providing a minimum age separating children from persons who are con-
sidered fully able to work, it has also helped to define the category of 
“youth” itself. In a sense, any theory addressing the question of youth is 
bound to be related to a theoretical conception of education in modern 
society. This statement holds true for all sociological and for most econom-
ic theories. 
It is not our aim to discuss in detail the various theories advanced 
to deal with the relationship between youth and the labor market. The 
table in Appendix I tries to recapitulate the main theories and themes in 
order to simplify the presentation (Dedoussopoulos, forthcoming; Rudd, 
1997). 
Summarizing essential characteristics of the various theories, one 
may conclude that: 
 Structural–functionalist approaches implied a rather static con-
ception of social order with limited social mobility. Within their 
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framework, youth employment prospects have been largely pre-
determined. Three factors of determination were notified, that is, 
social class (defined as social class in Marxist terms, or as income, 
wealth, education level of parents, position in the work hierarchy, 
groups, or any combination of them), gender and racial, ethnical, 
or religious groups, representing social inequalities. Transition 
from education to work positions was considered being instanta-
neous, so that the relationship between the educational system 
and work was an immediate one. On a whole, system rationality 
prevailed over individual rationality, with the individual having to 
either adjust consensually to pre-determined jobs, or be excluded 
(anomy).  
 Individualistic approaches flourished after unemployment and, 
long-term unemployment, in particular, has been an established 
permanent feature of modern societies since the last quarter of the 
20th century. The time spent in unemployment (unemployment 
duration) increased and unemployment spells became more fre-
quent. As a result, attention was directed to individual actions 
aiming at “filling the void” per se or acquisition, either real or fric-
tional, of occupational skills, through training programs, part-time 
employment, fixed time contracts, or low-paid temporary 
schemes, stage employment, and in-firm training. Baethge (1989) 
notes that the concept of individualization questions the existence 
of “youths” as a specific social category.  
 “Reflective modernity,” according to Beck, or “rationalization” 
(Furlong, 2003) indicates a phase of reconsideration, self-
evaluation, and adjustment to future opportunities and risks of the 
inherently rational individual. Thus, re-orientation and new ac-
tions are evoked after a previous stage of planning and acting. The 
individual moves from “station to station,” from education to vari-
ous forms of jobs, training schemes, idle time, or combinations of 
the above, following individualized trajectories, paths, or routes, 
materializing a transition process, until a satisfactory job is ob-
tained.  
 Though “the individualization project” has been developed in view 
of explaining a reality of increased complexity and uncertainty, the 
empirical outcome has not been promising. Empirical work has ei-
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ther taken the form of specific case studies, the conclusion of 
which could hardly be generalized, or ended up reaffirming the 
explanatory power of the dominant three factors, celebrated by 
the structural–functional approaches: the role of social class, gen-
der, and race (Vickerstaff, 2003). Individual choices and available 
opportunities are confined within a well-specified area of social 
action, determined by social structures and procedures, indicating 
the need for a new approach combining the concept of transition 
with structural conceptions of society. 
 State policy has contributed to a large degree in both the prolifera-
tion and the shaping of these “station posts” and, hence, of pat-
terns of transition. Flexibilization of the labor market, marginal 
social protection of the youth, active labor market policies, and ac-
tivation policies have created the institutional setting of the so-
called “transitional labor markets” (Brzinsky-Fay, 2010), and in-
spired a large volume of theoretical and empirical work in the last 
15 years. Yet, as Ch. Brzinsky-Fey observes, “bridging the micro-
macro gap remains a problem that has not been solved satisfacto-
rily” (2010: 17). Social class is commonly omitted from the ex-
planatory factors of the transitional labor markets project, though 
policy and social institutions are incorporated in the analysis. 
Hence, transitional labor markets tend to contribute to a broader 
conception in comparison to the simple supply-side fixation of the 
individualistic approach. Though the evidence is still inconclusive, 
some indication exists that part-time jobs, mini-jobs, or temporary 
contract jobs for young persons may lead to a permanent trap ra-
ther than creating a bridge to better jobs, unless they contribute to 
the acquisition of firm-specific and/or occupational skills. Such a 
conclusion is also consistent with traditional human capital theo-
ry.  
 Economic approaches, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on 
explanations based on lower-than-average individual labor 
productivity of youth, resulting in lower wage rates, unemploy-
ment, or frequent unemployment spells. Supply-side considera-
tions are prominent in human capital, skill mismatch, employabil-
ity, structural unemployment, or inadequate social skills varia-
tions. The demand side is reflected in approaches based on “ports 
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of entrance,” which may lead to inferior job traps, if coupled with 
segmentation theories and/or institutional approaches of labor 
market organization. 
 Transitions in economic approaches are treated as a sequence of 
independent decisions taken by a rational, utility maximizing indi-
vidual when faced with two or more alternative situations. Deci-
sions are always made in the present, with future costs and bene-
fits converted to their present value. This has been the clear pat-
tern in most of the literature concerning transitional labor mar-
kets.  
In conclusion, sociological research has contributed to our under-
standing of youth as a transitional social category, that is, a social group in 
the process of transition from education to the labor market. Such a transi-
tion is not an instantaneous one, as simplified in structural–functionalist 
approaches, nor a series of decisions made by rational agents, as supported 
by economic theory. Transition is characterized by uncertainties and risks 
and the final outcomes, though structured, are not predetermined. Paths 
and trajectories do not describe a step-by-step advancement toward a 
given end, but involve regression, stagnation, and shifts, while the target is 
continuously redefined. 
Furthermore, structural analyses underline the importance of ma-
jor social factors that divide youth and determine their prospects in the 
labor market. “Youth” is not a homogeneous category; it is a highly differ-
entiated, heterogeneous group.  
Hence, the relationship of youth, as a transitional social category, 
with the labor market, cannot easily be quantified with the use of the usual 
labor market indices. This observation has to be kept in mind throughout 
the analysis of the empirical evidence that follows. Indices tend to moder-
ate a situation, that is, hide important differences that are revealed only at a 
more micro level.  
Youth in the Greek labor market: Long run tendencies  
The conceptualization of youth as a transitional social category di-
rectly implies the existence of an inherent instability in the relationship 
between youth and the employment structure. This has forced the ILO staff 
to propose seven distinct, though related, indices in order to anticipate and 
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measure adequately the labor market involvement of young persons (ILO, 
2003; ILO, 2001).  
Youth unemployment is an important policy issue for many coun-
tries at all stages of development. For this purpose, the term “youth” covers 
persons aged 15–24, while “adults” are defined as persons aged 25 and 
over. Youth unemployment is presented in the following four ways: (1) the 
youth unemployment rate, (2) the ratio of the youth unemployment rate to 
the adult unemployment rate, (3) the youth share in total unemployment, 
and (4) youth unemployment as a proportion of the youth population (ILO, 
2003; ILO, 2001).  
The unemployment rate is probably the best-known measure of 
the labor market. Together with the labor force participation rate and em-
ployment-to-population ratio, it provides the broadest available indicator 
of economic activity and status in terms of labor markets for countries that 
regularly collect information on the labor force. The unemployment rate 
tells us the proportion of the labor force that does not have a job, is availa-
ble to work, and is actively looking for work. It should not be misinterpret-
ed as a measurement of economic hardship, although a correlation often 
exists (ILO, 2003; ILO, 2001). We have used all of the above indices togeth-
er with the education ratio for young people. Thus, we hope to form a clear 
picture concerning the issue of youth unemployment. The key indicators of 
the labor market measures should be analyzed together; any of the seven, 
analyzed in isolation, could present a distorted image.  
We have calculated these indices for Greece over the 1983–2013 
period (all data are from the Labour Force Survey [LFS], Greek Statistical 
Service and refer to the second quarter of the year), in an attempt to estab-
lish long-term patterns and changes. We use three age groups, two belong-
ing conventionally to the “youth population” and the third as a result of our 
estimations of the age in which this transition process reaches its end, that 
is, as a measure of employment “near maturity.”  
Where transition (roughly) ends?  
In order to roughly define the age at which transition has almost 
come to an end, we have used the employment rate, that is the percentage 
of an age cohort in any form of employment in relation to the respective 
total population. There is a certain degree of ambiguity in choosing em-
ployment rate as an indication of the end of the transition process. Howev-
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er, our alternative estimations with persons in permanent full-time jobs did 
not change much of the conclusion, so for simplicity we have chosen to 
report the employment rate. Employment rates have been calculated with 
respect to gender and level of education for age cohorts 15–35 years in the 
year 2008. For simplicity, we have used three levels of education corre-
sponding to elementary (level 1), secondary (level 2), and tertiary (level 3). 
The year 2008 was depicted as the last “normal” year, just before the be-
ginning of the recent economic crisis. 
Education levels may, under certain conditions, reflect the indirect 
effect of socioeconomic factors, whose influence has been well documented 
in theory and in some empirical work (parents’ employment position, edu-
cation level, etc.). LFS data do not provide such information, with the ex-
ception of youth staying with parents, which introduces a bias in estima-
tion. We assume, therefore, that education exercises both a direct and an 
indirect effect on employment rates, as it also reflects indirectly unob-
served factors of socioeconomic origin. 
Figures 2 and 3 report the estimated rates of employment for 
males and females separately.  
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As expected, persons with an elementary education level enter 
employment earlier than those with higher levels of education. By age 20, 
young males of this category reach a peak in their employment rate (90%). 
The employment rate fluctuates randomly after that age with no clear ten-
dency. For females of the same level of education, we observe two or three 
peaks at the age of 18, 25, and 29. Dropping out of school too early, does 
not simply determine early attempts to find a job but also forming a family 
and raising one child or more. This category of young females exhibits a 
most traditional pattern in their relation to the labor market and the struc-
ture of employment, the so-called “double reverse U.” Employment rela-
tions are interrupted by marriage and child infancy. On the whole, their 
employment rate remains very low, lower than the other two educational 
categories—with the exception of the early 20s.  
Both males and females with secondary education, exhibit a stable 
pattern of increase in their rate of employment until the age of 30. Male 
employment rates increase more rapidly until the age of 27 (90%) and then 
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continue to rise at a much smaller pace, climbing to 96.3% at the age of 35. 
Female employment rate reaches its peak at the age of 28.  
The employment rate of males with tertiary education does not 
show any difference in size after the age of 25 in relation to the other edu-
cational categories. One should note, however, two interesting indications: 
First, and contrary to theoretical predictions, males with tertiary education 
find a job earlier than those with a secondary education, but, second, the 
level of their employment rate remains marginally below the other two 
groups. Moreover, the age of 30 is also a good approximation for the age 
where the transition ends for this educational category.  
The most interesting behavior is that of the employment rate of 
females with tertiary education. Firstly, the employment rate is much high-
er than the corresponding rates of the other two female groups, close to 
that of males with tertiary education at the age of 30, where it peaks 
(84.9%). This is a well-documented feature of the Greek labor market, with 
both the participation and the employment rates of females with tertiary 
education significantly exceeding corresponding rates of other females. In a 
sense, tertiary education has become a precondition for females to enter 
into an employment relationship. Secondly, employment rate exhibits a 
mild reverse U, a result of family creation and childbearing after the age of 
30 years old. 
Early dropouts apart, transition ends about age 30 (on average). 
However, marked differences exist in the behavior of the rate with respect 
to gender, education, and specific age.  
The participation rate by gender: Long-run tendencies  
Figure 4 indicates significant long-term differences in participa-
tion rates with respect to both gender and age. Though gender differences 
tend to be reduced, age differences have increased overtime. The evidence 
is summarized in Table 1.  
Participation rates are falling rapidly over time for both genders in 
the age category of 15–19 years. The age category of 20–24 years shows a 
more complicated pattern. The participation rate of men tends to fall quite 
rapidly at the beginning of the period (1983–1992), stabilizes in the second 
sub-period (1993–2000), then falls rapidly (2000–2007), and stabilizes 
again after 2008 (the crisis period).  
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Figure 4: Participation rates, 1983–2013 
Table 1: Participation Rates by Gender and Age Group 1983–2013 
AGE	GROUP	 1983 2008 2013
MALE	 	
15–19	 29.1 10.3 8.9
20–24	 71.2 55.4 55.2
25–29	 94.8 91.5 ...
15–64	 81.2 79.2 ....
FEMALE	 	
15–19	 20.3 7.2 6.1
20–24	 49.1 45.2 46.0
25–29	 48.2 76.4 81.6
15–64	 39.0 55.1 58.7
One	should	note	the	divergence	in	the	pattern	of	the	participation	
rate	 of	 females	 in	 the	 20–24	 and	 25–29	 age	 brackets.	 For	 a	 rather	 long	
period,	 the	 two	age	groups	 tended	 to	move	 together,	but	since	1999	 they	
have	moved	in	opposite	directions.	It	 is	clear	that	the	females	aged	20–24	
years	 postpone	 their	 participation	 in	 the	 labor	 force,	 as	 scholarization	
(schooling)	rates	for	this	population	group	have	rapidly	increased.		
On	 the	 whole,	 participation	 rates	 for	 youth	 below	 25	 years	 old	
have	been	reduced	significantly.	This	finding	implies	a	postponement	in	the	
age	of	entering	into	the	labor	market,	partly	as	the	effect	of	extended	par‐
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ticipation in education. The severity of the employment crisis does not 
seem to have an effect on participation rates, that is the expected “addi-
tional laborer” effect has not been very strong. 
The time period since 1983 is marked by the massive entrance of 
females into the labor force, with the female participation rate gaining 20 
percentage points. It is clear that this phenomenon has been confined to 
females older than 25 years of age. 
The employment rate by gender: Long-run tendencies  
Figure 5 represents the long-run tendencies in the employment 
rate by gender and age group. 
Figure 5: Employment rate, 1983–2013 
 
With respect to the employment rates, there are also gender and, 
to a lesser degree, age differences within genders. During the period 1983–
2009, male employment rates fell steadily in all youth age groups, but this 
decline is not uniform. Female employment rates present a most varying 
pattern. In the age group of 15–19 years, there exists a steady and rapid 
decline. In the age group of 20–24 years, the employment rate, though 
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fluctuating, remains relatively constant, while in the age group of 25–29 
years, employment rates have rapidly risen.  
Table 2 reports simple linear trends for participation and em-
ployment rates over the period 1983–2009, that is the period before the 
employment crisis of the Greek economy.  
Table 2: Simple linear trends for participation and employment rates, 
1983–2009 
 MALE FEMALE 
AGE GROUP COEFFICIENT R2 COEFFICIENT R2 
PARTICIPATION RATE 
15–19 0.584 0.912 0.405 0.745 
20–24 0.480 0.557 0.017 0.001 
25–29 0.109 0.334 1.109 0.964 
     
EMPLOYMENT RATE 
15–19 0.559 0.911 0.285 0.876 
20–24 0.303 0.564 0.045 0.044 
25–29 0.179 0.728 0.873 0.965 
The trend in employment rates is very strong and is a negative 
sign for persons of the 15–19 age group for both genders. It is also very 
strong but with a positive slope for females aged 25–29 years. It is less 
strong for males of the same age, but with a negative slope. There is no 
significant tendency for persons in the 20–24 age group, especially for 
females.  
An examination of the relationship between the trends in partici-
pation and employment rates indicates the existence of common patterns. 
One might come to the conclusion that youth employment prospects are 
strongly determined by supply of labor factors. This would be a hasty con-
clusion. Demand factors, determining the availability of employment op-
portunities and the quality of the available positions, may influence partici-
pation rates as well as employment rates.  
Employment in all age groups is rapidly reduced after 2009, as a 
result of the crisis in the Greek economy. Though participation rates are 
marginally altered, the probability of a person having a job, that is, the size 
of the employment rate, is significantly reduced, almost to half or even 
more for the 15–19 age group. Table 3 depicts this reduction in the histori-
cal probability of a person belonging to a specific age and gender group to 
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be in employment. Employment rates are interpreted as the historical 
probability that a person belonging to a specific population group has a job. 
Table 3: Probability of a person belonging to a specific age and gender 
group to be in employment 
YEAR MALE FEMALE 
 15–19 20–24 25–29 15–19 20–24 25–29 
1983 24.3 57.6 86.1 13.8 34.3 39.8 
1993 15.1 55.4 83.9 8.1 34.5 50.6 
2003 10.1 51.0 80.7 5.0 33.5 59.3 
2008 8.4 47.4 82.8 4.6 33.3 63.5 
2013 3.1 26.4 52.7 1.1 17.2 42.7 
The unemployment rate and ratio by gender: Long-run tendencies  
Needless to say, unemployment rates for youth went sky high dur-
ing the years of the economic crisis. Youth unemployment rates have been 
relatively high for the whole 1983–2013 period, but it is its rapid increase 
over the past five years that created a dramatic and distressing situation. 
Figures 6 and 7 provide valuable information on the issue. 
Figure 6: Unemployment rates, 1983–2013 
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The picture does not change if we calculate the unemployment ra-
tio, that is, the ratio of unemployment to the population, instead of the 
unemployment rate.  
However, a significant difference exists between the two figures. If 
we look at Figure 6 we note that the unemployment rate of the 15–19 age 
group, in both genders, stands higher than the corresponding rates of the 
other two groups. However, Figure 7 reveals that the unemployment-
population ratio of that age group during the period 1983–2013 remains 
well below the ratios of the other two groups. 
This is an example of how the use of a single index—especially the 
unemployment rate—may lead to erroneous conclusions. Unemployment 
rate expresses the probability that a person belonging to a certain popula-
tion group may face unemployment under the condition that he/she already 
belongs to the labor force (conditioned probability). This means that the 
unemployment rate expresses the burden of unemployment for those in 
the labor force, not the population of the group.   
Figure 7: Unemployment ratio, 1983–2013 
 
Econometric estimations by the authors (not reported in this 
chapter) indicate that participation rates of youth depend upon the mature 
persons’ unemployment rate (current and lagged) plus a mild time trend. 
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Hence, up to a certain age, the decision to enter the labor force is affected 
by the state of the labor market. 
The impact of unemployment on youth population is relatively 
larger for the 20–24 age group of both genders and, even more so for the 
25–29-year-olds. The latter group is more severely hit during the crisis 
period. 
Youth unemployment and the unemployment of adults  
Figures 8 and 9 highlight the relation between youth unemploy-
ment and adult unemployment. Figure 8 depicts the share of youth unem-
ployment in total unemployment, while Figure 9 indicates the ratio be-
tween the youth unemployment rate and the adult unemployment rate. 
The sky-high levels of the youth unemployment rate tend to hide a 
more disturbing negative development of the Greek labor market, namely, 
the increasing burden of unemployment on the mature age groups. 
Figure 8: Share of youth unemployment in total unemployment, 1983–
2013 
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Figure 9: Youth unemployment rate to adult unemployment rate, 1983–
2013 
 
Figure 8 provides two kinds of information. First, it shows that, 
though the danger of being unemployed increases, the social burden of 
youth unemployment diminishes when compared to the social burden of 
adult unemployment. Second, though gender differences in unemployment 
rates continue to exist, youth unemployment shares converge. This implies 
the existence of a specific social mechanism discriminating against young 
females. Such a mechanism has lessened its impact since 1999, while the 
general employment discrimination against females irrespective of age is 
still functional.  
The same conclusions seem to be reaffirmed when using the ratio 
of youth unemployment rate to adult (25–55 years old) unemployment 
rate. The ratio declines steadily since 1992, while young males are in a 
relatively worse position than young females, as compared to mature per-
sons of the same gender. 
A legitimate objection may be raised in this context: The falling 
share of youth unemployment in total unemployment may be attributed to 
demographic reasons, namely the decrease of the youth population. Using a 
shift-share analysis for the two genders and the three age groups, we de-
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composed changes in the level of unemployment for six consequent periods 
(1983–1988, 1988–1993, 1993–1998, 1998–2003, 2003–2008 and 2008–
2013). Decomposition established the predominance of net cyclical (de-
mand-side) effects over demographic factors in all cases with just a few 
exceptions. The graphs of the decomposition findings are included in Ap-
pendix II. 
It is clear that the widely accepted view that the Greek unemploy-
ment problem has been caused by supply factors, that is by the low em-
ployability of youth and females, cannot be maintained. If that problem 
ever existed, it has long lost its significance, well before the eruption of the 
current crisis.  
Participation in formal education  
As indicated in Figure 10, schooling ratios have been rising steadi-
ly. Females have rapidly gained ground in participation in education, with 
education being almost a precondition for their participation in the labor 
market.  
The fall in the schooling ratios for the 15–19 age group in 1999–
2000 by 5 percentage points is due to a short-lived educational reform, 
which was reintroduced, but abandoned after the elections in January 
2015.  
Staying in the educational system has been a real option for young 
persons in their 20s. On the one hand, the opportunity cost for education is 
very low, given the situation in the labor market and on the other hand, 
education becomes a shelter against inactivity, as well as a private resource 
for migration opportunities. In fact, a large number of Greeks with universi-
ty degrees have sought jobs in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
during the past few years. Yet, the rate of increase has been reduced during 
the crisis.  
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Figure 10: Schooling ratio, 1992–2013 
 
The effects of youth migration on population and the labor market 
magnitudes have not yet been reflected in official statistics, because of the 
sampling methods of the LFS. This creates an additional source of ambigui-
ty in the aforementioned analysis. 
Youth and the labor market: A quasi-cohort analysis  
LFS data do not permit a formal longitudinal analysis to be at-
tempted. Yet, we have tried a quasi-cohort analysis by observing changes in 
employment status, education, and household autonomy as the individuals 
belonging to a specified age cohort mature in age. The analysis is not an 
actual cohort analysis, in the sense that we do not observe exactly the same 
individuals through time, but individuals belonging to the same age. We 
have to assume that personal characteristics other than the ones we are 
checking are distributed with the same pattern in the consecutive samples 
of the LFS and we have not tried to adjust for changes in distribution.  
We have chosen three distinct cohorts, that is, persons 15 years of 
age in 1999, 2004, and 2009. The choice was made in an attempt to esti-
mate the effects of the economic crisis on youth. For each age cohort, we 
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formed two sub-cohorts according to gender. The results are reported in 
the form of tables (see Appendix III).  
Data (in the tables) are interpreted as consecutive historical prob-
abilities of a person belonging to a specific cohort to be in a certain situa-
tion. Probabilities change as the person matures in age following specific 
patterns. As is shown, patterns are disrupted because of the crisis in the 
Greek economy.  
The conclusions reached from the examination of the basic em-
ployment indices above are largely reaffirmed. The employment crisis has 
not affected participation in the labor market for either gender. The only 
indication to the contrary is the female 2009–15 cohort—at the age of 19, 
the participation rate is reduced by 8 percentage units in comparison to the 
2004–15 cohort, but the schooling ratio has increased by 11 percentage 
units.  
Employment rates have been significantly affected. A 19-year-old 
male in 2013 had an 8.5% probability of having a job in comparison to 
22.7% of a 19-year-old in 2008, just before the crisis erupts. For females of 
the same age the probability, of having a job was close to zero, 2.2%, in 
comparison to 14.8% for those who were 19 years old in 2008.  
The male cohort 2004–15 had an employment rate of 41.9 in 2013 
(age 24 years old); one-third lower when compared to the rate of 63.5 of 
the older age cohort (1999–2015) at the same age. Within the same cohort 
(1999–2015) the employment rate is reduced by 7 percentage units (from 
70.5 at the age of 25 to 63.7 at the age of 29. The same direction of change 
applies in the case of female cohorts. 
Unemployment rates rapidly increased in all age and gender co-
horts after 2008. From 13.4% at the age of 24, unemployment rate rises to 
33.1% at the age of 29 for males of cohort 1999–2015. All other cohorts 
face a bleaker situation.   
The comparison among the three age cohorts indicates that the 
crisis has increased schooling age for both genders, in accordance to theo-
retical predictions, but more for females than males. For females, getting a 
postsecondary education degree is considered a precondition for entering 
into the labor market and in employment structure. However, employment 
prospects seem rather bleak for both genders irrespective of their educa-
tional level.  
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The out-of-education/out-of-work fraction of the youth popula-
tion, however, has been accelerating over the past five years, pointing to 
the reinforcement of social processes of exclusion, deprivation, and pov-
erty. One has the feeling of a lost generation.  
Figures 11 and 12 indicate the degree of educational and work ex-
clusion of the age cohorts by gender. Though female cohorts participate 
more than their male counterparts in education, overall, they are more in 
danger of this “double exclusion.” However, one should note the alarming 
steep increase of the ratio for the male 2009–15 age cohort at the age of 18 
and after, that is, after finishing the secondary noncompulsory education.  
It is clear that the danger of the double exclusion increases with 
age in each cohort. Postsecondary education provides temporary shelter 
during times of regular economic environment, but it fails during crisis. 
One may conclude that unemployment becomes a severe burden on youth 
as both crisis and age develop.    
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females)	 they	 tend	 to	 return	 to	 the	 parental	 family.	 Yet,	 the	 degree	 of	
achieving	 autonomy	 from	 parental	 family	 for	 the	 age	 cohort	 1999–2015	
supports	 fully	 our	 previous	 conclusion	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 age	 that	 the	
transition	period	ends.	
Conclusions and policy Implications 	
Our	analysis	has	reaffirmed	some	important	conclusions	concern‐
ing	the	youth	employment	problem.		
First,	 it	has	 indicated	 the	close	 relation	between	youth	and	adult	
unemployment	and	their	dependence	on	the	growth	rates.	Unemployment	

















those	 who	 were	 15	 years	 old	 in	 2004.	 Having	 reached	 a	 high	 degree	 of	
autonomy	 before	 the	 crisis,	 more	 than	 50%	 of	 men	 and	 60%	 of	 women	
tend	to	return	to	the	parental	family	during	the	crisis.	However,	the	degree	
of	achievement	of	autonomy	from	parental	family	for	the	age	group	1999–






although	 women's	 groups	 participate	 more	 than	 men	 in	 education,	 as	 a	
whole,	they	are	more	at	risk	of	this	double	exclusion.	It	is	clear	that	the	risk	
of	double	exclusion	 increases	as	 the	age	 increases	 for	 each	group.	Higher	
education	provides	temporary	shelter	in	times	of	“normal”	economic	envi‐
ronment,	 but	 it	 fails	 during	 economic	 crisis,	 postponing	 at	 best	 the	 phe‐
nomenon.	One	may	 conclude	 that	 unemployment	 becomes	 a	 serious	 bur‐
den	at	an	increasing	pace	for	the	youth	as	crisis	and	age	grow.		
Based	 on	 our	 conclusions	 of	 long‐term	 trends,	 the	 gender	 differ‐
ences	 regarding	 participation	 and	 employment	 rates	 are	 very	 interesting	
and	are	a	significant	point	of	 the	empirical	analysis.	These	differences	are	
                                                   






men	 (for	 the	 25–29‐year‐olds),	 thus	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 positive	 slope	 for	
women	(in	Table	1)	for	the	period	before	the	crisis.	During	the	crisis,	even	
though	 there	 is	 a	 convergence	 in	 unemployment	 risks	 between	men	 and	
women,	 unemployment	 rates	 for	 women	 are	 still	 higher	 than	 for	 men	
(though	there	are	variations	with	regard	to	male	and	female	age	brackets).		






On	 the	 other	 hand,	 youth	 unemployment	 has	 been	 a	 structural	
problem	that	predates	the	crisis	(but	it	has	been	exacerbated	by	the	crisis)	
and	currently	it	is	a	relative	rather	than	an	absolute	problem,	as	supported	
by	 the	 analysis.	This	 brings	 into	 question	 the	policies	 adopted	before	 the	
crisis	(2008),	policies	that	continue	to	be	applied	in	the	times	of	crisis.	
However,	 our	main	 analytical	 conclusion	 is	 that	 “youth”	 is	 not	 a	
homogeneous	social	category.	Sharp	diversities	exist	even	with	 respect	 to	
the	 three	 characteristics	 considered,	 that	 is,	 gender,	 age,	 and	 the	 level	 of	
education.	 Social	 structures	 result	 in	 inequalities	 that	 shape	 prospects,	









institutional	arrangements	have	 tended	 to	 impose	a	 further	 flexibilization	
on	 working	 conditions	 of	 youth—imposition	 of	 a	 youth	 minimum	 wage	
lower	 than	 the	 adult	 minimum	 wage,	 differential	 treatment	 toward	 new	









are	 important	 questions	 raised	 concerning	 both	 short‐term	 (mainly	 on	
productivity)	 and	 long‐term	 impacts	 of	 these	 institutional	 changes.	 Long‐
term	impacts	relate	to	job	stability,	career	prospects,	low	prospect	jobs	and	
poverty	traps,	and	ability	to	secure	a	pension	in	the	future.		
The	 institutional	creation	of	a	 flexible	youth	 labor	market	 is	aug‐
mented	by	recent	(2012)	reforms	in	the	minimum	wage	setting.	Minimum	
wage	 is	 set	by	administrative	decisions,	 annihilating	 collective	bargaining	
and	the	role	of	social	partners.	With	respect	 to	youth	up	to	 the	age	of	25,	
minimum	wages	are	set	well	below	the	set	adult	wage	rate,	irrespective	of	









30%	of	 labor	cost	will	 result	 in	a	 feeble	4%	reduction	of	 total	cost.	Given	
that	youth	employment	cost	is	a	small	percentage	of	total	labor	cost,	a	fail‐
ure	of	the	policy	in	question	had	to	be	expected.	In	fact,	youth	employment	
has	 been	 stabilized	 in	 sectors	 where	 youth	 employment	 was	 relatively	
large,	that	is,	in	catering	services.	This	is	partially	due	to	labor	substitution	
between	youth	and	mature	age	employees.	The	occurrence	of	such	a	substi‐
tution	 is	 confined	 in	 sectors	 or	 enterprises	 for	which	work	 experience	 is	
either	not	considered	an	asset	or	it	is	easily	acquired.		
Active	labor	market	measures	have	promoted	part‐time	and	tem‐
porary	 jobs,	 stage	 work,	 and	 training	 schemes	 through	 vouchers.	 In	 all	
cases,	youth	eligible	 in	participating	 in	 these	measures	have	been	 treated	
mostly	 as	 an	 age	 category,	 overlooking	 other	 divisions.	 The	 Greek	 Man‐
power	Organisation	(OAED),	responsible	for	designing	and	implementation	
of	 active	 labor	market	 policies,	 remains	 ineffective.	 A	 recent	 study	 noted	
that	OAED	did	not	 implement	a	 thorough	practice	of	 individualized	coun‐
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Local	 job	centers	should	be	 in	constant	contact	with	 local	enterprises	and	
employers.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 effort	 should	 be	 made	 in	 trying	 to	 match	




is	 also	needed.	 Targeted	 initiatives	 aimed	 at	 informing	 young	people	 and	
their	 parents	 about	 current	 and	 expected	 labor	market	 opportunities	 are	
vital	 initiatives	 that	would,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 require	 taking	 into	 account	
cultural	backgrounds	in	the	design.	Policies	are	needed	to	ensure	primary	
and	 secondary	 schooling,	 and	 to	 avoiding	 early	 school	 leaving.	 Policy‐




We	 should	 note,	 however,	 that	 forecasting	 future	 labor	 market	
needs	is	a	tricky	project,	due	to	the	instability	 in	consumer	demand,	 tech‐





viders	 (i.e.	 formal	education,	occupational	 training	 institutions).	This	con‐
ception	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 attempt	 by	 enterprises	 to	 externalize	
training	costs,	but	in	fact	it	has	led	to	the	creation	of	an	industry	of	multiple	
training	 schemes	 of	marginal,	 if	 any,	 real	 impact.	We	need	 to	 return	 to	 a	
simpler	 model,	 with	 formal	 education	 and	 occupational	 training	 institu‐
tions	 providing	 generic	 and	 social	 skills	 and	 leave	 the	 firm‐specific	 skills	
provision	to	the	enterprises	themselves.	Both	schemes	of	stage	jobs	and	of	
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apprenticeships may become effective, provided that the employers are 
persuaded to invest in labor skills in anticipation of increased productivity.   
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 MALE FEMALE 
AGE 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 
15 6.8 2.8 1.5 2.2 1.6 0.5 
16 8.7 3.8 2.8 3.9 1.7 1.3 
17 13.2 6.8 3.2 6.9 4.4 3.2 
18 19.8 18.2 11.2 14.6 11.0 13.6 
19 25.0 27.8 24.5 21.4 25.6 17.6 
20 26.3 34.0  27.5 28.8  
21 47.9 45.0  39.6 38.2  
22 57.9 56.6  47.8 47.5  
23 64.1 62.9  59.4 61.8  
24 73.3 75.4  68.2 75.0  
25 81.7   75.3   
26 83.8   81.7   
27 91.0   85.5   
28 93.8   82.7   
29 95.2   84.9   
  
EMPLOYMENT RATES 
 MALE FEMALE 
AGE 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 
15 5.5 2.1 0.9 1.6 0.8 0.5 
16 5.9 3.0 2.2 2.5 1.3 1.3 
17 10.5 5.4 1.7 4.0 3.4 0.7 
18 16.4 14.6 4.4 7.7 7.6 3.8 
19 19.4 22.7 8.5 11.8 14.8 2.2 
20 18.3 25.4  13.9 16.2  
21 38.3 30.6  22.6 24.1  
22 49.0 36.3  29.4 25.7  
23 56.2 38.2  39.8 23.5  
24 63.5 41.9  51.6 28.6  
25 70.5   57.2   
26 69.9   61.2   
27 70.4   56.6   
28 63.8   50.2   
29 63.7   47.6   
  
220   DEDOUSSOPOULOS AND PAPACHRISTOPOULOU 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES  
 MALE FEMALE 
AGE 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 
15 18.7 27.9 39.8 29.2 54.2 0.0 
16 31.9 20.9 23.1 34.6 22.4 0.0 
17 20.5 19.5 47.2 41.6 22.3 79.3 
18 17.5 19.8 60.9 47.3 30.7 71.8 
19 22.4 18.1 65.4 44.7 42.2 87.7 
20 30.5 25.3  49.4 43.9  
21 20.1 32.0  42.9 36.9  
22 15.4 35.9  38.4 46.0  
23 12.3 39.2  32.9 62.0  
24 13.4 44.4  24.4 61.9  
25 13.7   24.1   
26 16.7   25.1   
27 22.7   33.9   
28 31.9   39.2   
29 33.1   43.9   
  
PART-TIME RATIOS 
 MALE FEMALE 
AGE 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 
15 20.0 1.0 42.5 25.8 0.4 54.8 
16 14.4 23.6 17.6 0.0 32.2 37.2 
17 10.3 11.7 34.2 31.9 23.1 0.0 
18 21.4 14.2 45.7 19.8 30.9 55.6 
19 20.1 12.9 33.0 21.7 21.5 47.7 
20 8.9 18.5  20.3 18.4  
21 7.4 16.4  20.8 22.7  
22 7.4 12.0  13.9 21.1  
23 6.7 15.7  15.9 12.9  
24 6.2 14.1  13.0 20.1  
25 6.1   17.7   
26 5.8   8.3   
27 7.5   11.4   
28 9.7   16.4   
29 7.7   11.4   
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SCHOOLING RATIOS 
 MALE FEMALE 
AGE 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 
15 93.2 95.9 98.9 95.3 94.4 98.3 
16 90.8 93.4 95.8 92.2 92.1 96.6 
17 87.1 92.7 96.3 89.4 93.6 93.0 
18 79.4 72.6 81.3 81.6 74.2 78.7 
19 68.7 65.5 67.6 68.1 66.5 77.8 
20 67.6 67.2  64.9 73.0  
21 52.4 54.9  59.6 63.3  
22 43.0 43.1  49.5 50.0  
23 37.3 34.7  36.2 35.1  
24 28.7 25.2  22.9 24.1  
25 20.1   14.1   
26 15.0   10.8   
27 8.4   8.7   
28 8.4   5.7   
29 6.5   5.2   
  
OUT OF WORK – OUT OF SCHOOL 
 MALE FEMALE 
AGE 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 
15 1.8 2.5 0.6 3.6 5.2 1.5 
16 4.5 4.7 2.4 5.2 6.6 2.9 
17 4.9 2.9 3.2 7.3 4.1 6.9 
18 7.9 14.9 15.8 11.5 21.4 19.0 
19 16.6 15.0 25.9 22.4 21.3 20.1 
20 16.2 11.4  23.2 14.7  
21 13.2 18.0  22.8 17.5  
22 10.8 24.3  24.6 28.7  
23 10.1 29.1  29.3 44.8  
24 12.3 36.3  29.1 50.3  
25 14.1   32.2   
26 16.1   31.0   
27 22.6   38.1   
28 28.8   45.5   
29 31.2   48.4   
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AUTONOMY FROM PARENTAL FAMILY RATIOS 
 MALE FEMALE 
AGE 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 1999=15 2004=15 2009=15 
15 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
16 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.4 
17 2.1 0.3 0.0 2.2 1.1 0.3 
18 12.3 4.0 7.4 13.3 8.0 7.3 
19 11.7 14.4 14.8 15.2 25.0 22.8 
20 21.2 28.5  27.1 33.3  
21 27.1 51.4  26.9 60.8  
22 21.7 48.2  31.1 59.3  
23 21.2 21.8  28.5 23.9  
24 22.6 19.3  28.4 26.2  
25 23.5   32.7   
26 22.2   35.0   
27 24.7   37.7   
28 27.1   44.6   




SOCIAL ENTERPRISES, SOCIAL AND SOLIDARITY 
ECONOMY, AND YOUTH: What is the role for policy-
making? 
Sofia Adam 
Social economy and social entrepreneurship are promoted as ef-
fective strategies against unemployment and social exclusion with particu-
lar reference to youth and vulnerable social groups both at the EU and 
national level.1 What are the inherent attributes of these forms of economic 
activity that raise expectations for addressing such complex and worrying 
challenges as youth unemployment? To what extent are these expectations 
grounded on a sound theoretical base of social economy and social enter-
prises, on a close monitoring of what is happening in the field and on con-
sistent policy formulation and implementation?  
This chapter addresses the previous questions with regard to the 
reality of recent social enterprise development in Greece in comparison to 
the Latin American context. At the beginning, we define social economy and 
social enterprises through a review of the relevant literature placing em-
phasis on existing differences between the European and the Latin Ameri-
can context. Then we provide evidence on public policy the development of 
Social Cooperative Enterprises (SCEs) in Greece. With these preliminary 
results, we intend to highlight the discrepancy between policy expectations 
and reality as it unfolds in the field. This is followed by a brief description 
of the way solidarity economy is promoted in Latin America at the policy 
level. In the concluding section, we identify inconsistencies in policy-
making and implementation and provide some insights for a reformulation 
of the relevant policies in Greece based on the insights provided by the 
Latin American context.      
                                                   
1  Indicatively, one of the events conducted within the framework of the Greek presi-
dency of the EU was an International Conference titled: “Social Entrepreneurship: A 
tool for addressing local development, youth unemployment and social needs” 
<http://www.esfhellas.gr/en/Pages/NewsFS.aspx?item=126> accessed September 
10, 2014).  
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Social economy and social enterprises: Conflicting visions and 
expectations 
The third sector consists of entities—such as cooperatives, non-
profit organizations, and mutual societies—that cannot be easily classified 
in the private or the public sector (Defourny, 2001). The term itself is wide-
ly accepted by a rich array of theoretical approaches (Moulaert and Ailenei, 
2005) and emerges in many EU policy documents. In this respect, it seems 
plausible to use it as a starting point in order to delineate other concepts in 
use, namely solidarity economy, social economy, and the nonprofit sector.  
Table 1: The terminological ambiguity of the third sector 
Source: Adam and Papatheodorou (2010) 
TERM Solidarity Economy Social Economy Nonprofit Sector 
Definition Includes all economic 
activities which aim at 
the economic democra-
tization on the basis of 
citizen participation. 
They involve a dual 
perspective: 
 economic because 
they attempt to cre-
ate economic rela-
tions based on reci-
procity while making 
use of resources 
from the market and 
welfare state redis-
tribution and 
 political because 
they attempt to cre-
ate autonomous pub-
lic spaces and open 
up discussion on 
both means and 
ends. 
 
Includes all economic 
activities undertaken by 
enterprises, mainly coop-
eratives, associations, and 
mutual societies, which 
adhere to the following 
principles: 
 providing members or 
the community a ser-






 priority given to per-
sons and work over 
capital in the distribu-




tions with the 
following charac-
teristics: 
















trol their own 
activities, 
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Table 1 describes the terminological pluralism that underlines di-
verse theoretical approaches and historical trajectories. The relevant con-
cepts are presented intentionally from the left to the right in conjunction 
with their connotation in the literature. Schematically, the term Solidarity 
Economy is mostly associated with radical approaches that emerged in the 
framework of social movements mainly but not exclusively in Latin Ameri-
ca. Social Economy is more francophone in its origin and clearly incorpo-
rates the experience of the European cooperative movement. The term Non 
Profit Sector follows the Anglo-American tradition of charities.  
Having sketched the main terminological issues, it is important to 
proceed with a critical examination of the main theoretical approaches. The 
Anglo-American tradition has largely focused on the emergence of nonprof-
it organizations (NPOs) through the lenses of orthodox economic analysis 
(Weisbord, 1975; Ben Ner and van Hoomissen, 1991; Hansmann, 1987; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1996). As such, the third sector is analyzed as distinct 
from both state and market without any reference to its historical dynam-
ics in specific social formations and is theorized as a response to state fail-
ures (provision of uniform services to diversified needs) and/or market 
failures (asymmetric information, transaction costs). In contrast, theoreti-
cal approaches of social and solidarity economy analyze the associated 
practices as hybrids within the intersection of state, market, and communi-
ty practices and their respective underlying operating principles (redistri-
bution, exchange, reciprocity). The social economy approach focuses more 
on the convivial nature of this interplay while the solidarity economy ap-
proach highlights the tensions inherent therein. It is useful to illustrate the 
main tenets of this heterodox approach with the use of Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Positioning social and solidarity economy practices 
Source: Pestoff (2004) 
Social enterprises express new dynamics within the third sector 
(Defourny and Nyssens, 2006). The aforementioned theoretical differences 
are reflected in alternative conceptualizations of social enterprises in the 
Anglo-American and European traditions.2 The US-led approach defines 
social enterprises in a broader way (Kerlin, 2006; Kernot, 2009) placing 
them in a continuum of hybrid cases including NPOs trying to secure mar-
ket income and for-profit enterprises developing socially responsible activ-
ities (Table 2). This positioning of social enterprises follows a number of 
underlying assumptions: (1) no collective ownership or decision-making is 
required, (2) market generating income is deemed the most important 
source of funding, and (3) the activity developed does not require the ful-
fillment of any specific criterion (i.e., social usefulness) as long as it gener-
ates income for a “good” purpose.  
                                                   
2  It is important to note that this simplistic dichotomy between European and Ameri-
can approaches does not mean that there are not scholars in each region, reflecting 
alternative than the dominant views.  
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Source: Alter (2007)  
The European tradition positions social enterprises within the 
universe of social economy practices as an intersection between two fami-
lies of organizations: cooperatives and NPOs (Defourny and Nyssens, 
2008). In particular, social enterprises resemble more worker cooperatives 
and NPOs with productive activities (Figure 2). On the one hand, they move 
closer to cooperatives, because they explicitly undertake a continuous 
economic activity. On the other hand, they move closer to NPOs because 
they do not serve only their members as traditional cooperatives did, but 
they often express the interests of different stakeholders formally (multi-
stakeholder membership or management) or informally (open events, 
assemblies with the participation of community members). This approach 
is based on the following underlying assumptions: (1) social enterprises 
are collective initiatives, (2) they are democratically owned and/or operat-
ed, (3) they undertake activities with social usefulness, and (4) they involve 
the wider community in their operations.  
















Source: Defourny (2001) 
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In sum, there are differing conceptualizations of social economy 
practices in general and social enterprises in particular. These alternative 
visions raise in turn different expectations. In a nutshell, social enterprises 
can be seen as market-driven solutions to social problems (neo-liberal 
discourse), as remedies for the correction of both market and state failures 
(third way thinking), as emancipatory projects for economic and social 
transformation (radical approach). Evidently, this ideal typology will not be 
found in a clear-cut form in the real world where the boundaries are often 
thin and elusive. However, it is important to bear in mind when we attempt 
to formulate policies to which we now turn.  
Social economy in Greece: Policy and practice  
Law 4019/2011 provided the legal framework for the develop-
ment of social enterprises in Greece.3 Three types of SCEs can be estab-
lished in accordance with the principal goal pursued: (1) social inclusion 
with 40% of employees belonging to vulnerable social groups4; (2) social 
welfare for the provision of social care services to specific target groups5; 
and (3) general and/or productive purpose, which forms the broader cate-
gory encompassing a multiplicity of goals and activities.6  
The main requirements with regard to the start-up, operation and 
management of these enterprises are described in Table 3.  
                                                   
3  The former law of 2716/1999 regarding social cooperatives of limited liability 
(KOISPE in Greek) addressed only the need for work integration social enterprises 
employing people with mental health problems.  
4  The category of vulnerable social groups includes: people with disability, former 
addicts or persons in treatment from addictions, HIV positive, ex-prisoners, and ju-
venile delinquents.  
5  These target groups refer to the elderly, children, people with disability or chronic 
illness.  
6  The indicated goals include local and collective benefit, employment creation, social 
cohesion, and regional development while the fields of activity include culture, envi-
ronment, ecology, education, use of local products, and preservation of traditional 
activities and professions. 
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Table 3: Main requirements and provisions of Law 4019/2011 
Field  Requirements and provisions 
Membership Physical or legal entities, 7 members for social inclusion, 5 mem-
bers for social welfare and general purpose, public law entities 
are allowed to participate only in inclusion SCEs.  
Start-up capital No obligatory threshold, freely decided by members. 
Shares One obligatory and up to five supplementary shares. 
Voting rights One vote regardless of the number of shares. 
Decision making General assembly.  
Management Management committee (min. 3 persons, service 2–5 years). 
Profit distribution 5% of profits obligatorily reserved, up to 35% distributed only to 
employees, minimum 60% reinvested at the enterprise for the 
fulfillment of objectives. 
Liability Limited for each member to the level of purchased shares.  
Social insurance 
obligations 
Membership does not create social insurance obligations. All 
workers sign dependent employment contracts and must be 
insured.  
Reconciliation with 
other work status 
Unemployed, employees in the private and public sectors and 
retirees are allowed to become members. Unemployed on bene-
fits do not lose their social protection while members.  
Source: Law 4019/2011, http://www.socialcooperatives.gr/page/30/110/greeklaws  
Indicatively, the law on SCEs envisages the collective ownership 
and democratic decision-making of these entities without forcing excessive 
thresholds in terms of membership. In addition, limited profit distribution 
only to employees could deter opportunistic behavior on behalf of owners-
members. Other factors, which increase the appeal of this legal form espe-
cially but not exclusively for young unemployed persons, are the lack of 
start-up capital thresholds, the noncompulsory social insurance of mem-
bers, and the ability to reconcile membership with other work or nonwork 
status (i.e., insured unemployed with benefit). 
The initiative for drafting and enforcing Law 4019/2011 as well as 
the registration of social enterprises lies within the Ministry of Labor, So-
cial Security and Solidarity.7 Law 4019/2011 was later followed by a Stra-
tegic Plan for the Development of the Social Entrepreneurship Sector in 
Greece (February 2013). According to the main tenets of this strategic plan, 
social economy is reduced to SCEs to the exclusion of other legal entities, 
                                                   
7  At the time of the introduction of Law 4019/2011, the title was Ministry of Employ-
ment and Social Protection. There is a culture of renaming Ministries after each elec-
tion round.  
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traditional actors of social economy (mainly but not exclusively other types 
of cooperatives). The underlying hypothesis is the inherent link between 
social economy, unemployment, and social inclusion with a sole focus on 
social enterprises. In this way, social enterprises are mainly seen as a tool 
for the (re-integration) into the labor market of those facing the strongest 
barriers.  
In addition, the bundle of priority axes does not address the need 
for inter-ministerial coordination despite the fact that social economy enti-
ties fall under the supervision of at least four ministries in Greece (i.e., 
Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Agricultural Development, Ministry of 
Labor, Social Security and Solidarity, and Ministry of Health). Law 
4019/2011 addresses the need for an inter-ministerial committee only for 
the preparation of guidelines regarding public procurement with social 
clauses.8 This inter-ministerial committee has not materialized in practice 
so far. In turn, this fragmented institutionalization process is reflected in 
the field with the lack of a coherent representative network of social econ-
omy entities. 
As a result of the policy framework and institutionalization pro-
cess, the support measures envisaged mainly refer to grants and subsidies 
for the start-up and development of individual SCEs without a focus on 
more systemic approaches, which could potentially link social economy 
development with unmet social needs at the regional level (i.e., environ-
mental sustainability, employment, and income generation) or more im-
portantly with the untapped human capital of young unemployed persons 
(i.e., social economy enterprises in innovative sectors, such as IT, renewa-
ble energy, alternative tourism, culture, etc.).  
However, even this short-sighed view of policy-making was not 
implemented in practice. All in all, SCEs developed thanks to the unassisted 
efforts of interested groups of people. From the introduction of the relevant 
law up to the end of September 2014, 632 entities have applied at the So-
cial Economy Registry. From this data, we have an indication of the status 
of these entities according to the registration procedure. SCEs are divided 
                                                   
8  In essence, it refers to guidelines that define the framework within which the wider 
public sector can include social criteria in the procurement of goods and services. 
One such criterion could be the preferential treatment under certain thresholds of 
work integration social enterprises.  
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into four categories (Figure 3): the ones with temporary certificate (mainly 
not having completed registration with the relevant tax authorities in order 
to start economic activity), the ones with permanent certificates (having 
completed all registration procedures), the ones with member certificate 
(having completed one year of operation), the deleted cases (mainly upon 
the request of the founding members themselves), and a few cases on uni-
dentified status.  
Figure 3: Number of SCEs according to registration status     
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Registry of Social Economy, Ministry 
of Labor, Social Security and Solidarity 
Figure 4 depicts the type of SCEs according to the main goal pur-
sued. Contrary to the direct link expressed in dominant policies between 
social enterprises and social inclusion, the share of social inclusion9 to total 
SCEs is relatively small with the vast majority falling under the general or 
productive purpose. This finding is of interest because it implies a tendency 
                                                   
9  Social inclusion SCEs comprise two sub-groups according to the law: (1) new SCEs 
with at least 40% of employees from vulnerable social groups and (2) the estab-
lished according to law 2716/1999 Social Cooperatives of Limited Liability with at 
least 35% of members from people with mental health problems applying for the 
new status of SCEs.  
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to resort to this business model in order to enact any type of economic 
activity albeit in a collective manner.  
Figure 4: Number of SCEs by main goal pursued 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Registry of Social Economy, Ministry 
of Labor, Social Security and Welfare  
Another interesting dimension involves the extent of collectivity 
as indicated by the number of founding members. In other words, do SCEs 
pursue a multi-membership approach or do they exhaust their member-
ship to the required thresholds by the legal framework? Figure 5 sheds 
some light on the collective dimension of 330 newly formed SCEs in Greece, 
which have completed the registration procedure and for which data could 
be retrieved.10 As indicated, half of SCEs (50.6%, or 167 SCEs) comprise the 
minimum threshold of foundation members, one-third of them (33,9%, or 
112 SCEs) surpass the minimum threshold by five members, while numer-
ous, in terms of membership, SCEs are clearly the exception. It is important 
to make two remarks at this point: (1) Membership is a constantly chang-
ing reality since members leave and new ones enter; and (2) a greater 
number of members does not entail more democratic decision-making of 
the respective SCE. However, membership conforming to minimum thresh-
                                                   
10  Excluding from 632 SCEs the deleted entities (59), the ones on temporary certificate 
(226), the ones on unidentified status (4), the social cooperatives of limited liability 
(6), and entities for which data could not be retrieved (7).  
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olds might conceal hidden family enterprises under the law for social en-
terprises.  
Figure 5: Number of SCEs by number of founding members* 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Registry of Social Economy, Ministry 
of Labor, Social Security and Solidarity  
*By minimum number we refer to 7 members in the case of social inclusion SCEs and 5 
members in the case of the other two categories (social welfare, general or productive 
purpose).  
Figure 6 presents the age composition of the 2,895 SCEs members 
for which we were able to retrieve the date of birth in a total of 329 SCEs. 
Contrary to what might be expected, the biggest share of SCEs founding 
members belongs to the age group 45–64 years whereas the share of the 
age group of <25 years is the second from the bottom (191 persons, or 7% 
of all members). Even if we increase the age threshold to 29 years, the cu-
mulative share amounts to 20.6% of total members. Another interesting 
finding is the significant for the specific age group participation of mem-
bers above 64 years. These findings indicate that the development of SCEs 
in Greece has been mostly an elder age group development possibly reflect-
ing the ability of such members to reconcile SCE membership with other 
work/retirement status. The rather significant participation of above 64 
years members possibly reflects the tendency of retirees to participate in 
SCEs in order to assist younger family members and/or counterbalance 
reduced pensions.  
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Figure 6: Number of SCE members by age group  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Registry of Social Economy, Ministry 
of Labor, Social Security and Solidarity 
Finally, it is interesting to explore the median age of members per 
SCE in order to identify “youngsters” social enterprises (Figure 7). Only 
8.5% of the 329 SCEs have a median age of membership below 29 years, 
while 32% have a median age of membership within the age group 45–64 
years.  
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Figure 7: Number of SCEs by median age of founding members  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Registry of Social Economy, Ministry 
of Labor, Social Security and Solidarity  
To sum up, the bulk of SCEs belongs to the third type of general or 
productive purpose, half of them involve members at the minimum legally 
enforced threshold and the age composition is skewed in favor of the 45–
64 years age group. How can public policies for the promotion of social and 
solidarity economy affect the reality in the field? In particular, why expecta-
tions regarding the role of social enterprises for the confrontation of youth 
unemployment did not materialize in Greece? What are the missing links 
needed at the institutional levels in order to design, implement, monitor, 
and effect positive changes in the field?  
Solidarity economy policies in Latin America  
In order to draw some policy insights for the case of Greece, it is 
useful to explore policy-making for the solidarity economy in the Latin 
American context for a number of reasons: (1) The policy discourse adopt-
ed is oriented toward social transformation, which opens up the space for 
innovative policy-making much needed in a crisis-ridden country with 
endemic structural problems, such as Greece; (2) the significance attached 
to solidarity economy as a policy priority by the left-leaning governments 
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that came to power in many Latin American countries during the past years 
is comparable with the policy discourse adopted by the newly left-leaning 
government in Greece; and (3) despite the geographical distance, there is 
an exchange of ideas and practices in the field with initiatives in Greece 
being inspired by the Latin American experiences.11  
The theoretical foundation of solidarity economy as a social trans-
formative project, as has been depicted in section 1, goes hand in hand with 
innovations at the policy-making level in many Latin American countries 
(Saguier and Brent, 2014). For comparative reasons, it is useful to briefly 
examine the way solidarity economy policies have been pursued there, 
even though there are socioeconomic and political differences between 
Latin American countries and Greece. 
First of all, the priority given to solidarity economy in the Latin 
American context is crystallized in the development of specialized agencies 
at the governmental level with some countries going as far as to create a 
dedicated ministry in order to foster intergovernmental coordination (i.e., 
Ministry of Communal Economy in Venezuela). Table 4 displays the main 
locus of policies for the solidarity economy at the governmental level in 
selected Latin American countries.  
                                                   
11  Indicatively: (1) The book by Andrẻs Ruggeri, activist-researcher-author, titled 
“Worker-recuperated enterprises in Argentina” was presented in the open discus-
sions held in support of the occupied factory VIOME in Thessaloniki in February 
2015. (2) Dario Azzelini, researcher-writer-documentary producer, was invited in 
Thessaloniki in March 2015 in order to inform on the practices and ideas of popular 
assemblies and solidarity economy initiatives in Chaves’ Venezuela, (3) Euclides An-
drẻ Mance, member of the Popular Network for Solidarity Economy in Brazil 
(Solidarious) was invited in Athens in June 2015 by a number of initiatives 
(Solidarity4All, SynAllois—Cooperative of Solidarity Economy, Efimerida ton Syn-
takton—The Journalist’s Newspaper, initiative for a public dialogue space on Soli-
darity Economy, Cooperators of Zografou, P2P Foundation, cooperative Sociality, 
portokaliradio.gr, cooperative grocery Sesoula) in order to exchange ideas and prac-
tices for a Solidarity Economy.  
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Table 4: National bodies in charge of solidarity economy in selected 
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tives at the state level,12 two coming from the solidarity economy move-
ment and one coming from local authorities.  
Third, the significance attached to solidarity economy is manifest-
ed in the design and implementation of nation-wide multifaceted programs. 
The interesting structural aspects of these programs involve the combined 
use of policy tools, which defy clear-cut dichotomies between active and 
passive labor market policies and grant a dual role to the state both as a 
provider of support and as the recipient of goods and services.  
In Argentina, the nation-wide program “Let’s get to Work” (Manos 
a la Obra in Spanish) offers capacity building, technical assistance, and 
financial support to solidarity economy initiatives with a potential of sus-
tainability (Morais, 2014). The Sustainable Integrated Agro-ecological Pro-
duction Program (PAIS in Portuguese) in Brazil intends to create work and 
income for young people in rural areas with limited employment prospects 
by fostering agricultural production based on the so-called social technolo-
gy. The latter involves the use of production methods that promote envi-
ronmental preservation (i.e., no pesticides). In addition, technical assis-
tance is provided in order to foster producers as well as marketing cooper-
atives and solidarity-based open-air markets. Part of the produce is pur-
chased by municipal governments in order to provide healthy food at 
school canteens (Morais and Bacic, 2013). In Ecuador, the Ministry of Social 
and Economic Inclusion implements the “Agenda for the Revolution of the 
Popular and Solidarity Economy” (AREPS in Spanish) with programs in 
many sectors including construction, manufacturing, alimentation, tourism, 
services, and finance (Ruiz, 2012). For example, the program “Weaving 
Development” supports production of school uniforms from cooperatives 
and micro-enterprises through the facilitation of access to credit and the 
purchase of output from provincial public schools (Morais and Bacic, 
2013). In Venezuela, the Ministry of Communal Economy (previously Min-
istry of Popular Economy) coordinated the support of cooperative produc-
tion through the Mission “Changing Face”13 (Vuelvan Caras in Spanish). The 
program offered training and financial support for the creation of worker 
cooperatives with members coming from poor and disadvantaged back-
grounds (Azzelini, 2012). These cooperatives were granted access to credit 
                                                   
12  Brazil has a federal government.  
13  By “changing face,” it implies a change of direction in public policies. The program 
was later restructured and renamed as Che Guevara.  
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with preferential terms through the creation of specifically dedicated banks 
(i.e., Bank of Economic and Social Development). In the framework of the 
same program, the Ministry created endogenous development zones with 
the participation of state agencies and cooperatives in order to establish 
networks of cooperation that could promote a solidarity economy logic 
along a new development path.  
All in all, these experiences with public policy-making imply the 
centrality given to solidarity economy as a social transformation project. 
The main tenets of this new approach involve an open view of solidarity 
economy as encompassing many types of entities and not only social enter-
prises, the creation of spaces for the interaction between solidarity econo-
my movements and the state, the institutionalization of this process of 
interaction, the identification of unmet social needs to be addressed by 
solidarity economy initiatives, and the design and implementation of far-
reaching multi-faceted fostering the intersection of solidarity economy 
with the public sector. Evidently, the trajectory of policy-making in the area 
of solidarity economy in these selected Latin American countries remains 
to be assessed. There are growing concerns over the efficacy of policies so 
as to avoid the replication of deficiencies that characterize this sector, 
namely the tendency of cooperatives to benefit members to the detriment 
of other broader social goals as well as the reproduction of corruption in 
the administration of public support to particular entities (Orhangazi, 
2014). Nevertheless, policy efforts in this area denote an ambitious strate-
gy for the incorporation of social and solidarity economy in the public 
agenda, which is of interest for the reformulation of the Greek public policy 
toward social and solidarity economy in at least four respects: (1) the 
adoption of a unified and broader view of the field which moves beyond 
social enterprises, (2) the enactment of interaction processes between 
initiatives in the field and the wider public sector, (3) the consolidation of 
inter-governmental coordination, and (4) the design of far-reaching multi-
faceted programs.   
Concluding remarks and policy implications  
As mentioned earlier, social economy and social enterprises can be 
conceptualized as an intermediate area trying to rectify state/market fail-
ures or as a transformative strategy aiming at fostering an economy based 
on the principles of redistribution and reciprocity. The former constitutes a 
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narrow approach that views social enterprises as a social inclusion tool for 
social groups unable to enter the labor market. The latter conceptualization 
allows for a broader view of social economy as a development pathway that 
aims to channel economic activities toward addressing unmet social needs 
in a collective and democratic way.  
Despite the policy expectation of the narrow focus on social enter-
prises in Greek public policy agenda, the reality of recent social economy 
development in Greece shows that the bulk of these entities does not aim at 
social inclusion or social services provision but on collective start-up of 
general productive activities. Moreover, these entities are mainly created 
by elder persons even though a small percentage of founding members 
belongs to the age group below 25 years.  
The trajectory of social enterprise development in Greece could be 
explained as a by-product of ill-conceived policy design and inconsistent 
policy implementation. In terms of policy design, the narrowing down of 
social economy as a social inclusion tool does not open up the space for 
innovative policies with far reaching transformational potential. In addi-
tion, the sole focus on social enterprises to the exclusion of other social 
economy entities hinders both inter-ministerial coordination and the con-
solidation of a collective identity in the field.   
In terms of policy implementation, even this shortsighted view has 
not been implemented in full. On the contrary, people themselves followed 
the path of social economy unassisted both in terms of public support 
measures and collective representative social economy networks. That is, 
an instrumental view of social economy coupled with inconsistent policy 
implementation fell short even from addressing its narrow policy goals: 
namely, the integration into the labor market of the young and vulnerable 
social groups.   
The broader vision of solidarity economy adopted in the public 
policy agenda of selected Latin American countries offers significant in-
sights for policy reformulation in Greece even though concrete experiences 
cannot be replicated in different contexts. The main tenets of solidarity 
economy public policy in the Latin American context might indicate the 
direction of change in Greece along the following lines: (1) appeal to all 
social economy entities and not exclusively to social enterprises, after all 
the latter will thrive if the whole ecosystem of social economy thrives, (2) 
intense inter-ministerial coordination in order to enable the prioritization 
of social and solidarity economy in public policy-making, (3) identification 
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of unmet social needs which could be better addressed by social economy 
entities instead of traditional for-profit enterprises or the public sector (i.e., 
innovative social and environmental services), (4) design and implementa-
tion of far-reaching programs targeting multiple goals, (5) special efforts to 
address the youth and other vulnerable social groups through intermediate 
support structures while acknowledging that social entrepreneurship is not 
suitable for everyone, (6) consolidation of social dialogue between state 
authorities and representative social economy networks, and (7) innova-
tive policy-making for a fruitful interaction between the broader public 
sector and social economy entities (i.e., meals in school canteens by coop-
eratives and/or social enterprises).  
The economic crisis presents enormous challenges especially for 
the young generation. It is of outmost importance to address social eco-
nomic development. Otherwise, we risk missing another round of social 
economy development despite the dynamics displayed by the unassisted 
efforts of citizens themselves.      
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“GENERATION NOWHERE”: The youth in South Africa’s 
informal economy—the case of day laborers and waste 
pickers  
Catherina J. Schenck, Phillip F. Blaauw, and Jacoba M.M. Viljoen 
In his analysis of the value and meaning of work, Du Toit (2003) 
shares renowned psychologist Sigmund Freud’s assertion, following a pro-
tracted study of the human condition, that work and love are the two es-
sential ingredients of a healthy and well-adjusted personality. Work, ac-
cording to Du Toit (2003), has the power to contribute to a person’s well-
being in many ways. First, having work implies that people receive an in-
come as a reward for the effort expended in a productive endeavor, ena-
bling them to sustain themselves and their families. Second, the work peo-
ple do determines to a large extent where and how they live and socialize, 
and what their status is in society. Finally, work is a source of identity and 
can positively (or negatively) influence people’s self-esteem and feelings of 
self-worth. Echoing these views, the economists Sen (1999) and Max-Neef 
(1991) regard the economic activities in which people are engaged as vital 
for their sense of well-being, their ability to function as humans and their 
collective freedoms (Sen, 1999) and critical for the satisfaction of multiple 
fundamental human needs (Max-Neef, 1991). Being unemployed, therefore, 
affects people’s ability to function at multiple levels. 
Youth unemployment has become an acute global concern, eating 
away at the productive core of many economies and weakening efforts to 
build stable societies for future generations (Du Toit, 2003; Marock, 
2008;ILO, 2013; Yu, 2013). In fact, youth unemployment has reached an 
historical peak and is now three times higher than adult unemployment 
(ILO, 2013). Globally 74.5% of young people in the 15–24 age group were 
unemployed in 2013, which is 1 million more than in 2012. It is predicted 
that this upward trend will persist for the foreseeable future (ILO, 2013). In 
South Africa, young people certainly face poorer absorption prospects and 
higher unemployment rates than adults. Particularly worrying is the fact 
that the unemployment rate for young people in the 15–24 age bracket 
increased from 45.6% in 2008 to 51.3% in 2014, which is the largest in-
crease among all age groups (StatsSA, 2015). This sets off alarm bells for 
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the future of South Africa where nearly half the population is under the age 
of 25. 
Jeffrey (2008) reveals that 85% of the world’s youth (aged 16–30) 
live in Africa, Asia and Latin America. UNESCO (2013), in turn, reports that 
89.7% of young people under the age of 30 live in the emerging economies 
and developing countries, with Africa and the Middle East being home to 
70% of the world’s youth population. Furthermore, present estimates sug-
gest that more than 200 million people in Africa are between the ages of 15 
and 24, with the median age being 18. This is no less than seven years 
younger than the median age in South Asia, which is the world’s next 
youngest region (Fox, 2015).  
According to the ILO (2013), only 35% of women and 59% of men 
aged 15–19 in the global South are engaged in paid employment. The rest 
are likely to be either unemployed or employed in low-skilled, low-paid 
informal work. “Productively employing Africa’s ‘youth bulge’ is an urgent 
urban development problem” (Fox, 2015: 1). Fox views the discussion 
among urban leaders on this topic as focusing on the creation of more wage 
employment opportunities. Although this is undoubtedly important, most 
of the “youth bulge” aged 25 and under are not able to get any kind of wage 
or salaried employment, be it with a contract (indicating some sort of for-
mality) or as casual labor (Fox, 2015).  
As a result of the high rate of unemployment among young people, 
Jeffrey (2008) refers to the unemployed youth as the “Generation No-
where.” The World Economic Forum Global Risk Report (2014), in turn, 
refers to them as the “lost generation” while the ILO (2013) sees them as 
the “scarred” generation. At a conference on youth unemployment held at 
the University of Cape Town (UCT) in August 2014, the unemployed youth 
were referred to as the “waiting generation.” 
South Africa has the dubious reputation of having the third highest 
youth unemployment rate globally among the 15–24 age group (i.e., 50% if 
one excludes discouraged work seekers, or 63% if one considers both dis-
couraged work seekers and the unemployed) (Rankin & Roberts, 2011; 
World Economic Forum Global Risk Report, 2014). Greece and Spain take 
the top two positions with 58% and 57%, respectively (World Bank, 2015). 
Furthermore, using the broader definition of youth (i.e., aged 15–34) as 
given in South Africa’s National Youth Policy 2009–2014 (Office of the 
Presidency, 2009), youth unemployment in the country currently stands at 
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over 36% (StatsSa, 2014). According to Banerjee et al. (2008), the main 
reasons for the high youth unemployment rate in the country are the struc-
tural changes that have been taking place in both the global and South Afri-
can economies, generally low education levels, and a mismatch between 
what the education and training sectors deliver and what the labor market 
requires. Kingdon and Knight (2003) point to labor market rigidities as a 
major contributing factor to high and persistent unemployment. They sug-
gest that for those who are not already accommodated in the formal econ-
omy, the informal economy, as an alternative, presents significant barriers 
to entry.  
Ligthelm (2006) expresses the concern that unemployment tends 
to target the youth in South Africa, who generally have rudimentary skills 
and education, and have little to no experience of formal employment. 
What is particularly disturbing is that unemployment is regarded as the 
single biggest obstacle to poverty reduction in South Africa (Ligthelm, 
2006). With the labor market in South Africa favoring more skilled work-
ers, it is very difficult for unskilled individuals to find work (Banerjee et al., 
2008). 
Rankin and Roberts (2011) emphasize that youth unemployment 
matters because it impacts on the lifetime employment trajectory of the 
individual. Critical for the employability of the youth is that they possess 
technical skills but also that they are able to read and write, engage in basic 
arrhythmic and other fundamental activities such as problem solving, 
planning and decision making, and have the capacity for higher-order 
thinking skills, dependability, a positive attitude and other affective skills 
and traits. Without these attributes, a person will not be regarded as em-
ployable in the formal economy (Marock, 2008). It is for this reason that 
day laborers and waste pickers typically find themselves eking out an ex-
istence in the informal economy. As they tend to have few of the attributes 
and skills required to join formal businesses, they become marginalized 
and are forced into low-paying economic activities. Day laborers and waste 
pickers ostensibly operate on the fringes of society, where they tend to be 
seen and not heard. Yet they make an important contribution to the South 
African economy, offering useful services (albeit on a very small scale), 
reducing the obligation of the state to provide them with financial support 
(if they qualify) and often displaying an attitude that suggests they nurture 
a vision of better things to come.  
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The aim of this chapter is to summarize the results of the research 
that the authors have conducted over the past decade on the day laborer 
and waste picker communities in South Africa, of which the youth forms a 
major part. Given the complexities of the topic, the picture that is painted is 
not complete and the research is ongoing. Yet readers will acquire a new 
appreciation for this often-neglected group of people, their socioeconomic 
circumstances and how they view their lives.  
The rest of the chapter describes the role of the informal economy 
in the broader South African economy and the attributes and contribution 
of day laborers and waste pickers, in particular.  
South Africa’s informal economy 
The literature is yet to provide an unchallenged definition 
(Charmes, 2012; Valodia and Devey, 2012), and so for the purpose of this 
chapter the informal economy is viewed as a collection of “unorganised, 
unregulated and mostly legal, but unregistered economic activities that are 
individually or family owned and use simple, labour-intensive technology” 
(Barker, 2007: 59).  
In the first quarter of 2014, there were 2.446 million people in 
South Africa (constituting 12.3% of the active labor force of around 20 
million people) trying to make a living in the informal economy (excluding 
the agricultural sector) (StatsSA, 2014). Charmes (2012) estimates that 
32.7% of South Africa’s labor force works in the informal economy (includ-
ing the agricultural sector). In terms of labor force absorption, South Afri-
ca’s informal sector makes a small contribution compared to that of India 
(which absorbs 90%), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (which 
absorbs 77%), Cameroon (which absorbs 84%) and Mozambique (which 
absorbs 87.2%) (Harris-White, 2002; Charmes, 2012). Considering that 
South Africa has one of the highest unemployment rates (25.5% in 2015) 
and youth unemployment rates (50%) in the world, more people should 
theoretically be able to enter the informal economy. Yet between 2008 and 
2014, the number of those employed in the informal sector essentially 
remained constant at 2.4 million (with a negligible increase of 13,000 jobs 
during the period in question; StatsSA, 2015). 
Lund and Skinner (2004) are of the view that the informal econo-
my in South Africa is still “underdeveloped,” mainly due to a lack of educa-
tion and skills, a negative mindset about the informal economy and its 
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potential, and—importantly—a challenging policy environment (Valodia 
and Devey, 2012). Yu (2013) weighs in on this debate by asserting that 
some of the uneducated youth who struggle to find employment in the 
formal sector could survive in the informal sector, but that finding informal 
employment is hindered by various barriers to entry, ranging from unhelp-
ful government policies and a lack of access to credit, to a dearth of training 
opportunities and susceptibility to crime. A concern expressed in the Na-
tional Development Plan 2030, South Africa’s overarching economic route 
map, is that those who make a living from informal activities will remain 
poorly paid and unable to build up savings, leaving them dependent on the 
state for health and social protection (NPC, 2012).  
Two visible forms of informal worker in South Africa, apart from 
street traders, are the large numbers of day laborers who wait on the side 
of the road in anticipation of being picked up to do ad-hoc work, and street 
waste pickers who push their trolleys around the cities piled high with 
recyclable waste. Other waste pickers, who work on the landfill sites, are 
largely out of the public eye. 
What is day laboring? 
Day laboring is a national and international phenomenon that re-
fers to people, mostly men, gathering at pick-up points (hiring sites) hoping 
to sell their labor for the day (or longer) to prospective employers in order 
to earn some income (Blaauw, 2010; Valenzuela et al., 2006). The number 
of day laborers appears to be growing steadily. In the United States, for 
example, the number of day laborers doubled between 1995 and 2004 to 
117,000 (Louw, 2007; Valenzuela et al., 2006). In a study conducted by 
Harmse et al. (2009), it was estimated that every morning between 45,000 
and 100,000 day laborers congregate at more than 1,000 hiring sites 
throughout South Africa (Blaauw, 2010).  
A day laborer described his work as follows: 
Day labour work is the most feasible way of generating 
income. You don’t need an identity document or certificates to get 
a job. In order to survive, you need to keep a low profile, stay 
away from the police, get a girlfriend who is a stay-in domestic 
worker for accommodation, and impress your employer the day 
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you get a chance to do a piece job. (Schenck, Xipu and Blaauw, 
2012) 
From this description of day laboring, it would appear that there 
are no concrete barriers to entry but a number of survival tactics are nec-
essary.  
What is waste picking?  
Waste picking, particularly street waste picking, is a common phe-
nomenon on the streets and landfill sites of South Africa. According to Sam-
son (2010a, 2010b), waste pickers make a living by gathering waste from 
the streets and landfill sites and on selling it to entities operating within the 
recycling industry. While the waste pickers interact with the formal waste 
system, it seems that the structural gap between the formal and informal 
waste economy is significant (Samson, 2012; Schenck et al., 2012; Viljoen et 
al., 2012; Viljoen, 2014).  
The recycling industry creates opportunities for people to earn an 
income by informally collecting and selling waste to the buy-back centers 
(BBCs), which in turn sell the waste to the bigger recycling companies. This 
process dovetails with the work of the municipal waste management de-
partments, which collect waste and either dump it on the landfill sites or, if 
they have the capacity, recycle it to some extent and sell it to the recycling 
companies (Samson, 2012; Schenck et al., 2012; Huegel, 2013; Viljoen et al., 
2012). 
The World Bank estimates that there are around 15 million waste 
pickers across the globe. As is the case with day laborers, it would be prac-
tically impossible to determine the exact number and geographical spread 
of waste pickers in South Africa, as they are unregistered and unregulated. 
However, it is estimated that the country has between 35,000 and 70,000 
waste pickers. Langenhoven and Dyssel (2007) cite the South African Year-
book 2000/2005, which proposes a number of 37,000 waste pickers oper-
ating in South Africa, while Schenck et al. (2012) suggest that 70,000 waste 
pickers is a good estimate. Waste picking is quite fluid, with pickers enter-
ing and leaving the field as their circumstances change. Some, for example, 
collect and sell waste only occasionally when they need additional income 
(Chvatal, 2010; Schenck & Blaauw, 2011a). 
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The following quote by a waste picker summed up the nature of 
his work: 
Waste picking is an unskilled profession that gives un-
skilled labourers the opportunity to enter the labour market. 
(Schenck and Blaauw 2011a; Schenck et al., 2012) 
In further discussions with this particular waste picker, it emerged 
that, as with day laboring, waste picking has no direct barriers to entry, and 
any person—despite having little schooling and skills—who is physically fit 
can enter the profession (Schenck and Blaauw, 2011b; Schenck et al., 
2012).  
Research methodology  
In studying day laborers and waste pickers, respectively, the au-
thors adopted a case study research approach. In case study research, a 
unit of analysis is studied intensively (Welman et al., 2007; Du Plooy et al., 
2014) so as to gain a comprehensive and detailed understanding of a par-
ticular phenomenon. It is used to answer “how” and “why” questions, while 
also attempting to give a voice to the powerless and the voiceless (Maree, 
2007). 
For their research on the day laboring and waste picking phenom-
ena, the authors used a variety of data collection methods. Both studies are 
still underway. Up to the time of writing, the studies had unfolded as fol-
lows:  
Day laborer studies 
The authors’ research on day laborers began as early as 2003 and 
has involved the following phases: 
Study 1:  (2003) Exploratory qualitative interviews conducted with day 
laborers at one hiring site in Pretoria (Schenck and Louw, 2005). 
Study 2:  (2004) Observation and reconnaissance in the broader Pretoria 
area, counting the day labor hiring sites and determining the 
prevalence of day laborers in Pretoria. 
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Study 3:  (2004) Survey conducted in Pretoria with 242 respondents (us-
ing qualitative questions) (Blaauw et al., 2006, 2007; Louw, 
2007). 
Study 4:  (2005/06) Observation and reconnaissance in various parts of 
South Africa to determine the geographical locations of hiring 
sites and to estimate the number of day laborers in South Africa 
(Harmse et al., 2009). 
Study 5:  (2007/08) National survey conducted with 3,830 respondents 
(Blaauw, 2010). 
Study 6:  (2008) Exploratory interviews with people affected by day la-
borers in Pretoria (Nell and Schenck, 2009). 
Study 7:  (2008) Observation of the activities and dynamics at day labor 
hiring sites (Schenck, Xipu and Blaauw, 2012).  
Study 8:  (2014) Pilot ethnographic study conducted on one-day labor site 
(report in progress). 
Waste picker studies 
The authors’ research on waste pickers has followed a very similar 
pattern to that of the day laborer study. 
Study 1:  (2009) Exploratory interviews conducted with street waste 
pickers in Pretoria in order to understand their way of life 
(Schenck and Blaauw, 2011a, 2011b). 
Study 2:  (2010) Survey conducted in Pretoria with 142 respondents 
(Schenck and Blaauw, 2011a, 2011b). 
Study 3:  (2011) Observation and reconnaissance in the major cities of 
South Africa to determine the prevalence of BBCs and street 
waste pickers. 
Study 4:  (2012) National survey conducted with 910 street waste pickers 
and 68 BBCs in all the provincial capitals and major cities of 
South Africa (Viljoen et al., 2012; Viljoen, 2014). 
Study 5:  (2012) Survey conducted with 400 waste pickers on nine landfill 
sites in the Free State province of South Africa (Schenck et al., 
2012). 
The sampling process in both studies was challenging, as both the 
populations were unknown and mobile. 
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 In both the Pretoria and national day laborer surveys, cluster sampling 
was used. Cluster sampling is used when groups of sampling units oc-
cur (Louw, 2007; Blaauw, 2010) and the groups are informal and 
known only in their immediate environment (Blaauw, 2010). As day 
laborers start to assemble early, in time to be picked up from 06:00 
onward, it was important for the fieldworkers to be at the hiring sites 
by no later than 06:00. At many sites, day laborers who had not man-
aged to get a job by 10:00 started to leave.  
 With regard to the waste pickers, snowball and availability sampling 
were used (Viljoen, 2014). As the street waste pickers were constantly 
on the move, the fieldworkers interviewed those waste pickers whom 
they could find either on the streets or at the BBCs. In contrast to the 
day laborer study, the best time to be at the BBCs was after the waste 
pickers had sold their recyclable materials and completed their tasks 
for the day.  
Results 
Profile of the day laborers and waste pickers 
In a study conducted by Gonzo and Plattner (2003), it was found 
that 85% of the day laborers in Windhoek, Namibia were younger than 35. 
This number points to the fact that day laboring is more difficult for older 
people. One needs to be young and strong in order to do hard labor. How-
ever, street waste picking does not exclude older people, as evidenced in 
the fact that some of the individuals on the landfill sites were as old as 80.  
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Gender	 	 	 	
Male		 96%	 96%	 52%	
Female		 4%	 4%	 48%	
Total		 100%	 100%	 100%	
Race		 	 	 	
Black	 92%	 84.6%	 98%	
Colored	 7.3%	 14.6%	 2%	
Indian/Asian	 0.4%	 0.4%	 0%	
White	 0.3%	 0.4%	 0%	
Total		 100%	 100%	 100%	
Source:	Research	data	
In	 terms	of	 the	gender	split,	a	higher	proportion	of	 female	waste	
pickers	operated	on	the	landfill	sites	(48%)	than	on	the	streets	(only	4%).	
Moreover,	 females	 constituted	 only	 4%	 of	 day	 laborers	 and	 4%	of	 street	
waste	pickers.	The	trolleys	are	difficult	to	push	over	long	distances,	and	the	
streets	 pose	 particular	 challenges	 for	women	 given	 their	 vulnerability	 to	
harassment	and	crime.		
Regarding	race,	black	African	people	were	the	majority	in	both	the	
day	 laborer	and	street	waste	picker	groups,	with	colored	 (or	mixed	 race)	
people	making	up	the	second	largest	group.	The	remaining	1%	consisted	of	
White	and	Indian	people.	The	fact	that	Black	people	made	up	the	significant	


















dependent	 families	are	 living	 in	poverty.	Like	many	of	 the	youth	 in	South	
Africa,	Zimbabweans	often	find	themselves	compelled	to	seek	work	in	the	
informal	 sector,	 where	 neither	 waste	 picking	 nor	 day	 laboring	 has	 strict	
entry	criteria.	
Country of origin	
In	 both	 groups	 the	 South	 Africans	 constituted	 the	majority,	with	
Zimbabweans	making	up	 less	 than	10%.1	 It	 is	 interesting	 that	15%	of	 the	
street	waste	pickers	and	9%	of	the	landfill	waste	pickers	were	from	Leso‐
tho	 (a	 small	 independent	 country	 surrounded	 by	 South	Africa).	 Less	 sur‐
prising,	 though,	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 very	 few	waste	 pickers	 and	 day	 laborers	
came	 from	Namibia	 and	Botswana,	 both	 of	which	 are	 politically	 and	 eco‐
nomically	stable.		
                                                   
1		 In	 South	Africa,	 the	 popular	 belief	 is	 that	 Zimbabweans	 are	 in	 the	majority	 in	 the	
informal	economy	and	are	thus	taking	many	of	the	job	opportunities	away	from	the	
South	Africans.	This	belief	 has	 at	 times	prompted	xenophobic	 attacks.	Preliminary	
results	 from	a	recent	repeat	of	 the	nationwide	survey	among	day	 laborers	suggest	
that	the	picture	reflected	in	Table	2	has	changed	dramatically,	with	the	proportion	of	













South	Africa	 85.2 72.3 89




Lesotho	 1.4 15.7 9
Botswana	 2 0 1
Other		 0.9 1.1
Total		 100 100 100
Source:	Research	data	
Whereas	 the	majority	of	day	 laborers	 in	South	Africa	were	 found	
to	be	South	African	citizens,	the	day	laborers	who	featured	in	the	USA	study	
were	 predominantly	 (i.e.,	 93%)	 foreigners	 from	Mexico,	 Central	 America,	
and	 South	 America.	 Only	 7%	 were	 US‐born	 workers	 (Theodore	 et	 al.,	
2015).	
Education 
Figure	 1	 is	 very	 revealing	 in	 a	 number	 of	 respects.	 Firstly,	 there	
was	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 level	 of	 education	 of	 the	 South	
African	day	 laborers	and	 the	Zimbabwean	day	 laborers.	Fifty‐one	percent	
of	the	Zimbabwean	day	laborers	surveyed	had	completed	school	and	12%	
had	a	post‐school	qualification.	 In	 contrast,	49%	of	 the	South	African	day	
laborers	and	51%	of	the	South	African	waste	pickers	had	completed	some	
secondary	schooling,	with	those	who	had	completed	secondary	school	and	
obtained	 a	 postschool	 qualification	 being	 very	much	 in	 the	minority.	 For	
example,	only	15%	of	the	South	African	day	laborers	had	completed	school	
and	3%	had	a	postschool	qualification,	while	only	5%	of	the	landfill	waste	
pickers	 and	 9%	 of	 the	 street	 waste	 pickers	 had	 completed	 school.	 In	 a	
country	where	 people’s	 level	 of	 schooling	 is	 closely	 aligned	 to	 their	 pro‐
spects	of	finding	employment,	it	is	not	surprising	that	many	people	end	up	
engaged	in	marginal	activities	in	the	informal	economy.		
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Figure 1: Education of South African and Zimbabwean day laborers and 
South African waste pickers  
 
Source: Research data 
On closer questioning, it was revealed that many of the day labor-
ers and waste pickers did not complete their schooling because they had 
failed their matric (i.e., Grade 12/the last year at secondary school) and had 
not returned to repeat the year. The most frequent reasons given for put-
ting in a lackluster performance at school or not completing Grade 12 were 
related to poverty. The same unfortunate reality is echoed in Branson et al. 
(2013) and Green (2016), who indicate that, along with the inability to 
keep pace at school (academically), the three major reasons for dropping 
out of school are: pregnancy (even though schools are prohibited from 
expelling pregnant girls), an inability to continue their studies due to pov-
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erty, and the need to go out to work to support themselves and their fami-
lies. According to the data, most of the participants in Green’s study had 
tried (enduring multiple setbacks) to stay in school, but then one factor 
was the “final straw” that had pushed them out (Green, 2016: 1).  
The plight of some of the day laborer and waste picker respond-
ents in the respective studies was exacerbated by family problems, such as 
the illness or death of one or both parents, which reinforced their already 
poverty-stricken state. This left the rest of the family with no money to 
afford school, and the respondents had to go to work to support their par-
ents and/or other family members. As they had not been able to extract 
themselves from their cycle of poverty (Chambers, 1983), their personal 
development had taken a knock and their employment prospects signifi-
cantly dimmed.  
Wilson et al. (2006) confirm that there is an undeniable link be-
tween poor education and an inability to find formal employment. This is 
supported by Nzeadibe et al. (2012), who found that most of the waste 
pickers whom they interviewed in Nigeria were unable to find jobs in the 
formal sector as a result of a lack of education and skills. The figures 
gleaned from the studies on day laborers and waste pickers in South Africa 
are supported by the last census of 2011 by StatsSA (2014), which indicat-
ed that 60% of the unemployed in South Africa had not completed their 
secondary schooling.  
Income earned  
In the South African studies, it was difficult to determine exactly 
what the day laborers and waste pickers earned as they did not get a fixed 
daily or monthly income. Based on the answers to the question: “What did 
you earn yesterday/last week/last month?” estimates were calculated. 
Street waste pickers earned an average of ZAR 85 (USD 8) per day, 
while the landfill waste pickers in the Free State earned an average of ZAR 
404 (USD 40) per day (Schenck et al., 2012).2 Some landfill waste pickers 
said that they had chosen waste picking as they could earn more than if 
they were to work for the minimum wage, which is on average ZAR 80 
(USD 8) per day for unskilled workers in South Africa. This income figure 
                                                   
2  The US dollar values were determined from the prevailing nominal exchange rate at 
the time of the survey. 
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for the landfill waste pickers is confirmed by Reyneke (2012), who spoke 
about one of the waste pickers, Simon, on the landfill site in Pretoria:  
Simon earns more than R5000 a month working as a 
waste picker […..] he further mentioned that he aimed at saving 
R10 000, because he wanted to buy a small motorcycle that he 
was going to use to increase his monthly income, transporting 
people and certain commodities he wanted to sell at the site. 
(Reyneke, 2012) 
Over and above the opportunity of earning more than the mini-
mum wage, other reasons given for being a day laborer or waste picker 
were: “I am my own boss,” “I get sufficient income,” and “I’m doing well 
enough.” Some respondents, however, remarked that waste picking was 
“the only option” due to their having little education, few skills, and limited 
opportunities in the formal labor market.  
Reverting to the issue of some South African day laborers harbor-
ing the xenophobic-induced belief that Zimbabwean day laborers were 
working for less than they were and therefore undermining their chances 
of getting work, the survey results were surprising. In a study by Schenck et 
al. (2012), one of the day laborers was quoted as saying: 
...these Makwerekweres (derogatory term for foreign-
ers) are spoiling the employers by charging R 20 (USD 2) per day 
when we charge R100. (USD 10) per day 
The actual results, however, showed that the Zimbabwean day la-
borers earned from R 63–R 142 (USD 6–14) per day, while the South Afri-
can day laborers earned from R 57–R 117 (USD 5–11) per day depending 
on how often they were employed on a particular day (Blaauw, 2010). It 
was also revealed that Zimbabwean day laborers were employed more 
often, probably because they were better qualified and more proficient in 
English (Blaauw, 2010). 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, day laboring and waste picking 
have few barriers to entry in terms of qualifications and skills. However, it 
is to the workers’ advantage if they have tools (day laborers) and a trolley 
258   SCHENCK, BLAAUW, AND VILJOEN 
 
(street waste pickers) and if they can speak English or Afrikaans in order to 
communicate with their prospective employers and understand their in-
structions (Blaauw, 2010; Viljoen, 2014). The data in the studies showed 
that those with postschool qualifications earned 18% more, and those day 
laborers whose language proficiency was good were hired more frequently 
than those who struggled to understand and negotiate in English or Afri-
kaans. Notes from the fieldworker in the ethnographic study attest to this:  
Frans (a day labourer) had been looking for work out-
side Builders Warehouse […] He also had no tools of his own—a 
key component of finding work on a reliable basis. Frans, howev-
er, relied on his friendship with John, a man with his own set of 
tiling tools and who was something of a legend among the men 
looking for day work. 
The fieldworker commented further on the circumstances of the 
day laborers, saying that they live complex economic lives and day laboring 
is but one of their economic activities. In addition to day labor: 
… their economic activities stretch further—such as 
guarding cars (at motor shows or sports events or elsewhere) 
over weekends, gambling, cutting hair for other men outside 
Builders Warehouse, doing favors, selling drugs and offering cash 
loans. 
An ethnographic study by Reyneke (2012) on a landfill site in Pre-
toria suggested that multiple economic activities, besides collecting and 
selling waste, were also being played out on landfill sites, such as producing 
useful or saleable items from the collected waste. These activities deserve 
further investigation.  
Family obligations 
A fieldworker in the day laborer study recalled how Frans, one of 
the respondents, had revealed rather poignantly how ashamed he felt when 
he did not have money to give his family what they wanted, and that a 








the	 type	 of	 family	 life	 the	 day	 laborers	 and	 waste	 pickers	 were	 leading	
while	on	the	streets	or	landfill	sites	(Table	3).		
Table 3: The place where the day laborers and waste pickers had slept 












Brick	house	 32 18 46












to	 go	 home,	while	 in	 the	 cities	 day	 laborers	 (and	 in	 particular	migrants)	
might	not	have	been	able	to	afford	to	go	home	in	the	evenings	if	they	were	
short	 of	 funds.	 It	 is	 significant	 that	 60%	of	 the	 street	waste	 pickers	 slept	




sleep	 at	 home.	 On	 all	 nine	 landfill	 sites,	 the	 waste	 pickers	 lived	 in	 close	
proximity	to	the	sites	and	were	able	to	go	home	each	evening.	Other	stud‐
ies,	 however,	 suggest	 that	 the	 situation	 on	 landfill	 sites	 in	 the	 big	 cities	
could	 be	 different.	 For	 example,	 Reyneke	 (2012)	mentions	 that	 there	 are	
about	 300–400	waste	pickers	working	on	 the	 landfill	 site	 in	Pretoria,	 yet	
260   SCHENCK, BLAAUW, AND VILJOEN 
 
not all these individuals live onsite. Only about 200 of the waste pickers 
own shacks on the landfill and the others commute back and forth on a 
daily basis. This means that around 50% of the waste pickers sleep on the 
landfill site. 
Figure 2 shows that most street waste pickers in Pretoria were 
migrants from other provinces, which helps to explain why they sleep 
“elsewhere.” 
Figure 2: Provinces from which street South Africa’s waste pickers mi-
grated to Pretoria 
 
Source: Viljoen (2014) 
Only 28% of the South African street waste pickers found in Preto-
ria came from Gauteng province, where Pretoria is situated, meaning that 
72% of the street waste pickers had migrated to Pretoria to look for or 
create employment opportunities. 
The following comment from a fieldworker highlights the chal-
lenges faced by many day laborers and waste pickers in travelling to and 
from their places of work:  
Frans (a day labourer) is a 33-year-old man from Polokwane (i.e. a 
migrant from another province)[…] he used to live in the public park up the 
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road	 from	 Builders	 Warehouse.	 While	 living	 there,	 he	 found	 and	 saved	
materials	until	he	eventually	had	enough	to	build	the	shack	where	he	now	
lives	 in	 a	 relatively	 new	 part	 of	 Atteridgeville	 (a	 Black	 township	 on	 the	













they	 eat	 from	 the	 dustbins,	 with	 a	 typical	 refrain	 being:	 “You	 see	 some‐
body’s	supper	from	last	night	and	you	eat	it.”	




















–	 31	 15	 83	 15	
Source:	Research	data	
Thirty‐one	percent	of	 the	 landfill	waste	pickers	 in	 the	Free	 State	
province	 indicated	 that	 they	 acquired	 food	 that	had	been	dumped	on	 the	
landfill	 sites.	 Fieldworkers	 witnessed	 how	 landfill	 waste	 pickers	 dug	 out	
food	 from	mounds	 of	 rubbish.	 Remarked	 one	 of	 the	 fieldworkers:	 “Some	
people	hang	meat	in	the	sun	and	dry	it	until	their	next	trip	home.”	 If	they	
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earned enough, waste pickers would buy food and often support each other 
by sharing. At times, pickers received food from churches and NGOs. 
In the study on day laborers, 2,300 respondents (56%) indicated 
that they often did not have enough to eat. It was observed that at some of 
the more permanent or connected hiring sites, another type of informal 
economy had developed in the form of people selling food to the waiting 
day laborers, but not necessarily of the nutritious variety. At the one hiring 
site, the fieldworker had the following to say: 
Most food is bought from the two tuck shops on the road 
outside Builders Warehouse. The first tuck shop offers “mag-
winya” (“vetkoek” or bread dough deep fried in oil) for R 1.50 (US 
0.15) and “spatlo” (polony and potato fries in half a loaf of bread) 
for R 10 (USD 1). They also sell fruit (apples and bananas) and 
packets of crisps, as well as coffee and tea for R 5 (USD 0.50) [….] 
The food goes together with the other parts of the business (ciga-
rette sales, phone calls and cash loans).  
Survival strategies  
To be able to live under such harsh circumstances, survival strate-
gies are needed (Blaauw, 2010; Viljoen, 2014). Du Toit (2003) indicates 
that there is a link between unemployment and psychosocial distress. The 
unemployed are often unstructured when it comes to time management, 
lack strong social contacts, are excluded from a collective societal purpose, 
and have no recognized social status or identity. To enter the informal 
sector is already an exercise in survival. To help stay the course, day labor-
ers and waste pickers invoke various strategies, of which the two most 
prominent ones are networking and soliciting group support. 
 
 Networking (day laborers) 
The fieldworkers in the studies found that day laborers often re-
lied on the support of staff at, for example, hardware stores and other firms 
who would recommend them to clients who might be looking for workers. 
As one of the day laborers remarked to the fieldworker in the study by 
Schenck et al. (2012): 
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… when you befriend an edge trimmer and buy him “ita-
kana” (liquor), you are set to become one of the regulars in the 
gardening service. 
 Soliciting social support 
In Schenck et al. (2012), a fieldworker shared his observation of 
what happened to those laborers who were not picked up for the day: 
…if the day laborers do not manage to get a job by 
around 10:00 and have not already left the site, the mood chang-
es from looking for work to socializing. They will share food and 
water and play “morabaraba” (a local “board” game which in-
volves drawing a board on cardboard or in the sand, and playing 
with stones/marbles. (Schenck et al., 2012) 
Blaauw (2010) explains that social support is very important for 
being able to cope with everyday hardships. Support can reduce the nega-
tive consequences of this type of existence and help maintain people’s psy-
chological and physical well-being (Gonzo and Plattner, 2003). According 
to Blaauw (2010) and Viljoen (2014), the day laborers and waste pickers 
participating in the studies tended to organize themselves into groups, 
which became support systems for identifying or accessing job opportuni-
ties, and providing food and regular accommodation or occasionally a place 
to sleep. Indeed, it was found that 73% of the day laborers viewed them-
selves as being part of a “support group.” The waste pickers also indicated 
that they supported each other by providing food, looking out for other 
workers when they were ill, and even assisting in waste collection or in 
providing protection services (Schenck et al., 2012; Viljoen, 2014). Both 
day laborers and waste pickers revealed that if they slept on the streets or 
in a field, they would sleep in a group as a safeguard against gangsters and 
other criminals.  
Despite the support they gave each other, it was clear that the day 
laborers and waste pickers (even those who were very young) had a strong 
sense of independence, that is, everyone worked for him/herself (Schenck 
and Blaauw, 2011a).  
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I am my own boss; no one tells me [….] what to do, what, 
when and how….  
Your employer does not push you, even if you are not 
feeling well [….] He does not push you, he is not after you. You 
push yourself, your pay is determined by you. 
I am my own boss. 
I can say no [to a job]. 
Looking ahead 
Day laboring and waste picking remain activities that provide sig-
nificant economic benefits to a segment of the urban and rural unemployed 
youth, although it remains a survivalist existence (Nzeadibe et al., 2012). 
For as long as youth unemployment, or for that matter all unemployment, 
does not receive the necessary attention by policymakers, these two sur-
vivalist activities will continue. And that is not a bad thing, provided—in 
the opinion of the authors—efforts are made to improve the conditions 
under which day laborers and waste pickers are able to function so that 
they can earn a better (including more dignified) living. 
Addressing the plight of (especially) young day laborers and waste 
pickers calls for a multidisciplinary and multisectoral approach because 
these groups of people are operating on the margins of many formal struc-
tures, policies, and economic sectors. The following framework, which is 
discussed in Schenck et al. (2016), offers useful guidelines for debating 
possible facilitating actions on the part of government, the private sector, 
and civil society.  
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Figure 3: Guidelines for facilitating actions for young day laborers and 
waste pickers  
 
Source: Authors’ framework as adapted from Schenck et al. (2016) 
Theme 1 (policies and strategies): According to South Africa’s Na-
tional Planning Commission (NPC, 2012), gaining entry into the labor mar-
ket is not a smooth process for the youth, and so efforts should be made to 
streamline things with the adoption of more conducive policies. The NPC 
(2012) further emphasizes that these efforts are the responsibility of gov-
ernment at all levels (Banerjee et al., 2008). Theme 1 calls for existing poli-
cies and procedures to be scrutinized from the perspective of how they can 
facilitate greater access to work and economic reward for day laborers and 
waste pickers, respectively. Banerjee et al. (2008) suggest the introduction 
of policies that specifically assist the youth to look for work, develop skills 
in areas where they are needed, and address the mismatch between where 
the youth live and where the jobs are. All these collective actions should be 
taken by governments on national, provincial, and local levels, with the 
supporting policy framework being developed on the strengths of sound 
research results. 
Theme 2 (operational challenges and enabling factors): Young day 
laborers and waste pickers need to be better supported so that they can 
overcome challenges and improve their job prospects and quality of life—
from gaining access to affordable education, vocational training, and health 
services, to acquiring the equipment that will help them ply their trade 
(such as protective clothing and tools). Responsibility for this should be 
appropriately apportioned among government departments, NGOs, civil 
society, faith-based organizations, and businesses (NPC, 2012). 
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Theme 3 (attitudinal enabling factors): Day laborers and waste 
pickers deserve to be brought in from the fringes of society and afforded 
more recognition for the work that they do and afforded more security in 
their places of work. Supportive attitudes from the South African Police 
Service, the Metro Police, businesses, and ordinary citizens with whom day 
laborers and waste pickers interact could make a world of difference to 
their state of mind and level of productivity, while also providing the 
springboard for additional, more lucrative business opportunities. 
Conclusions 
High levels of poverty and unemployment have been evident in 
South Africa for many years, and government and business leaders have 
long been wrestling with the twin challenges of creating a lean and compet-
itive economy, while also fueling economic opportunities for millions of 
people whose educational and social backgrounds have left them ill pre-
pared for mainstream economy activity. With youth unemployment rising 
at an alarming rate, however, South Africa is looking at a future in which 
the mainstream economy, which has helped to position the country region-
ally and globally, will be hollowed out in the face of dwindling human capi-
tal.  
All over the world, the informal economy offers an outlet for peo-
ple to take up a trade, polish their skills, provide for their families, and 
acquire a sense of purpose and pride. It has been empirically shown that 
people can even be better off working in the informal economy than in the 
formal economy with its sometimes stern performance criteria and other 
workplace rigidities (Ligthelm, 2006). The existence of a large and sprawl-
ing informal economy in South Africa is acknowledged and tentatively 
welcomed, but it is not well understood. Assorted initiatives have been 
launched in an attempt to stimulate informal economic activity, but these 
seldom gain traction, and large numbers of people remain marginalized. A 
contributing factor is that the prevailing economic mindset and govern-
ment policy framework focus on stimulating economic growth but give 
insufficient attention to how to build an inclusive and sustainable society. 
An antidote to this is to put entrepreneurship at the center of the country’s 
development plans.  
Day laboring and waste picking are excellent examples of entre-
preneurship in action, as they have become established features of big 
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cities in South Africa and elsewhere, despite the odds often being stacked 
against them. Day laboring and waste picking typically attract the youth as 
they demand a fair level of stamina and mental agility, particularly in the 
need to be constantly on the lookout for ways to make money and steer 
clear of danger. As revealed in the authors’ studies on these two groups in 
South Africa, day laborers and waste pickers also often display an air of 
independence that is characteristic of an entrepreneur.  
Taking a serious look at the barriers that make it difficult for the 
day laborer and waste picker communities to ply their trade and earn de-
cent wages, while also providing more practical support to these informal 
operators, will signal South Africa’s willingness to tackle the country’s 
growing unemployment crisis. At the same time it will also start to address 
the worrying “youth bulge” which, if left unattended, could eventually man-
ifest as an older population that is increasingly reliant on the state’s dwin-
dling reserves. If successful, the strategic model applied to day laborers and 
waste pickers could be adapted for other parts of the informal economy as 
well. 
The youth represent South Africa’s future and the country can ill 
afford at this juncture to turn a blind eye to the needs and potential of those 
who are trying to make ends meet in informal settings across the country. 
Young workers have age, energy, and sometimes hope on their side, and 
these attributes need to be harnessed by an empathetic government and 
responsive community before youthful enthusiasm morphs into the type of 
anger that cannot be quelled.  
References 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Galiani, Sebastian, Levinsohn, Jim, McLaren, Zoë and Woolard, Ingrid 
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“INDEPENDENT, YET NOT GROWN UP”: Young migrant 
workers’ journeys in post-Mao China 
I-Chieh Fang 
This chapter is based on research conducted among young people 
from the Chinese countryside who migrate away from home to work in 
urban factories. These young people are sometimes referred to as “new 
generation migrant workers.” They are generally thought to have some 
different characteristics and behavior patterns from previous generations 
of migrant workers (Wang, 2001). 
There are two types of question that can be said to preoccupy 
young migrant workers in China today. On the one hand, they ask them-
selves, “What are my dreams?” On the other, they also ask, “How can I pos-
sibly achieve these dreams when the real world is so tough?” As they start 
out in life, they need a strategy for reconciling their dreams and desires 
with a reality that is often difficult and disappointing. 
Through examining the cases of young people, I hope to shed light 
on the process of rural-to-urban migration in today’s China. More specifi-
cally, in this chapter, migration from the viewpoint of young people from 
the countryside is examined. I choose progression through the life course as 
my primary focus in this chapter, since young people perceive the strong 
constraints imposed by markets and social structures precisely when they 
must move through it as they mature, that is, in the flow of time. I deal 
primarily with the stage of adolescence and postadolescence, since a num-
ber of key life decisions must be made in these stages. Here the struggles, 
negotiations, and compromises of young people with the inconsistencies of 
the structure around them are sharply revealed.  
A key point is that migration, for young people, is not a purely 
economic activity. It is now an essential rite of passage for them, a funda-
mental part of the process through which they gain full membership in 
their communities and the wider society. In this sense, migration functions 
as a mechanism for modifying social statuses and constructing new subjec-
tivities, or for establishing a “valuable self” in the market economy. For the 
young people who go through it, uncertainty, fluidity, and ambiguity—
including in relation to “who they are”—have become the norm. By study-
ing migration as it unfolds during the life course, we can therefore shed 
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light not only on this particular case but also on more general questions of 
human agency and resistance. This chapter argues that migration in the 
Chinese context is an incomplete “rite of passage” for many contemporary 
rural youths.  
Most migrant workers of the younger generation inevitably have 
to experience separation, multi-locality, and the informalization of their 
jobs. This, largely, alters the way in which they perceive social norms and 
relationships between themselves and others. Leaving home to become 
factory workers makes them “independent” from rural society, from which 
they are keen to leave in order to rid themselves of the stigma of being 
“backward,” and of “low quality.” However, they soon learn that it is hard to 
“achieve adulthood” in the destination coastal city due to the restraints 
imposed on them by the hukou (household registration) system. 
Being “independent, yet not grown up” leaves their rite of passage 
incomplete and hanging. They are held between two societies (rural village 
and city) and two statuses (child and adult), never achieving full member-
ship in Chinese society. The dual characteristics of the adolescent play a 
role here: On the one hand, the childhood of workers is prolonged. Workers 
are told to obey, in the interest of human resources and management. On 
the other hand, their adulthood arrives earlier, when factory and party-
state ask them to handle their own disadvantage and be responsible for 
themselves. These characteristics thus rationalize the paradoxical phenom-
enon of migrant workers’ drift to the margins while remaining highly de-
pendent on paternalism and the support of natal family and rural commu-
nity. This chapter will suggest changing this situation by removing the 
barrier imposed by the hukou system to allow migrant workers to fully 
integrate in their new urban location, enjoy state-supported rights, and 
become full citizens.  
Literature review and discussion: Youth and problematized transition to 
adulthood 
According to the existing literature, the experience of young Chi-
nese migrant workers reflects the general situations young people encoun-
ter under globalization, such as the extension of adolescence, the rupture 
with parents’ experience, and becoming constantly stuck in precarious 
work. All these could be deep reasons behind youth poverty. Apart from 
globalization and the global market, the case of young Chinese migrant 
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workers also reminds us of the crucial role of state policy influencing youth 
poverty. We should take into account the role of the state in urbanization, 
labor regulation, and the welfare system. Previous research has already 
pointed out that the rural–urban dichotomy, implemented through the 
hukou system, has led to peasants from countryside, especially the youth, 
paying the cost of Chinese economic transition and its rapid development 
(Anagnost, 2004; Pun, 2005; Lee and Kofman, 2012).  
Adulthood does not come naturally by reaching a certain age. It is a 
prolonged process, which may never be complete (Blatterer, 2007). For 
anthropologists, adulthood is never judged by age. Adulthood is marked by a 
ritual of “transition to adulthood,” like initiation. Through initiation, a child is 
transformed into an adult. It is marked by completing the shift of social 
status attached to a person. Anthropologists have paid attention to youth and 
see adolescence as an important transitional stage in the life course (Mead 
1928, 1970, 1975). Growing up means becoming an independent, recog-
nized member of society with corresponding social responsibilities, power, 
and duties. The stage of youth is situated in between childhood and adult-
hood, which reproduces the original social structure but meanwhile also 
resists and undermines it. Thus, anthropologists have conducted research on 
initiation, that is, the ritual that marks the transition to adulthood in various 
cultures, and tried to find out what criteria are applied in particular cultures 
to measure the achievement of adulthood. 
In the global era, both the content and progress of the “transition to 
adulthood” have already been transformed (Cole and Durham, 2008; 
Durham, 2008). Some scholars call for a fresh and systematic understanding 
of adulthood, which has been taken for granted and used in various ways for 
so long (Blatterer, 2007). In this chapter, two notable characteristics with 
reference to youth under globalization are particularly considered. First, 
young people, especially migrant youth, suffer from the rupture with their 
parents’ experience and the strain on family relationships. Second, the 
youth are facing the transformation of work, from regular to precarious.  
Several pieces of research emphasize that the period of transition 
to adulthood is prolonged (Blatterer, 2007; Cole and Durham, 2008). Both 
the timing and the sequencing of events in the transition to adulthood are 
supposed to have been subject to changes. During the era of globalization, 
motion and migration have become the norm. Migration to the city, for 
migrants, is not only motivated by the desire to pursue modernity but has 
276   I-CHIEH FANG 
 
become the central part of adolescent life (Osella and Gardner 2003). The 
youth, during their transition, are facing different contexts from their par-
ents, whose experiences are hardly helpful to pass on to the next genera-
tion. When parents still feel they are shouldering the responsibility of giv-
ing some guidance to their children, the conflicting and inconsistent in-
structions might make the transition to adulthood even more complicated, 
confusing, and experimental (Fong, 2007; Anagnost, 2008). This can be 
called “rupture.” 
The rupture has occurred not only with parents’ experiences and 
guidance, but also in the social context. When migrant youth are transiting 
to adulthood, they are mostly in new social settings, separated from family 
members and familiar social relationships. They need to handle the rup-
tures and manage to achieve adulthood without the effective support of 
their parents. This calls for a new arrangement in the sphere of reproduc-
tion. The kinship relationship, which people normally take as a strategy to 
count on when social institutions collapse, is fragmented and shaky. Re-
production (i.e., growing up, marriage, rearing children, retirement, etc.) 
changes its meaning and content in terms of practice due to the rapidly 
changing social context. For example, intimate relationships shift from 
reproduction to companionship, from companionship to recreation 
(Bernstein, 2007: 6). Consequently, it is hard to pass on the customary 
practice to the next generation. In the face of a new social context, without 
their parents’ support, young people must respond to their world and find a 
way to cope with great creativity and flexibility. They might reinvent tradi-
tions, hybridize globalization and localization, or adopt brand new ideas 
exploiting new technologies. Meanwhile, the nation-state has largely with-
drawn from the private sphere. Social contracts are being revised (Cole and 
Durham, 2008). In short, a new arrangement is called for in terms of social 
reproduction, and the youth under globalization are obliged to respond.  
Globalization, precarious work, and informal workers 
Second, there has been a surge in work with high flexibility and in-
formality in the global markets (Standing, 2009; Kuruvilla et al., 2011; 
Standing, 2011; Standing, 2014), which has created insecurity in both eco-
nomic and social realms. In the era of precarious work, young people inevi-
tably have to learn to deal with the new workplace arrangement. Arne 
Kalleberg claimed that neoliberal globalization brought in the era of precar-
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ious work in the USA since 1970 (Kalleberg, 2009: 2). Law, policy, and 
workflow are adjusted to spur globalization. Consequently, the employers 
seek the most flexible employment relationship in order to cope with 
changes at the macro level. Kalleberg argues that “it is important to under-
stand the new workplace arrangements that generate precarious work and 
worker insecurity . . . [E]mployment relations form[s] the foundation of 
theories of the institutions and structures that generate precarious work 
and the cultural and individual factors that influence people’s responses to 
uncertainty” (Kalleberg, 2009: 10). Precarious work firstly leads to eco-
nomic insecurity and instability, then makes the household unstable too. 
Standing (2011) calls the precariat “a new dangerous class.” Who are the 
most likely to become the precariat? This is affected by education, age, 
family responsibilities, type of occupation and industry, and the degree of 
welfare and labor market protections in the society (Kalleberg, 2009: 10). 
Some people are more fragile than others, such as members of ethnic mi-
nority groups. Quite surprisingly, well-educated young people easily be-
come the victims of precarious jobs (Jeffrey, 2008). 
The life course, that is, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and re-
tirement, which is defined from a labor-centric viewpoint, seems no longer 
workable. Informality and flexibility is corresponded to the adolescent 
stage. Since the economic recession and economic crisis of the 1980s and 
1990s it has been common to see young people who are NEET (not in edu-
cation, employment, or training). This makes adulthood even harder to 
achieve (Cole and Durham, 2008). Under such conditions, the question 
arises of whether prolonged adolescence plays an important mechanism to 
justify the changing arrangement of work characterized by informality and 
flexibility, by saying it offers young workers a sense of freedom. What if 
public discourse tries to justify the workplace rearrangement and the pov-
erty it creates under the era of global neoliberalism by saying precarity is 
affordable for young people?  
The experiences of young migrant workers in contemporary China 
reflects this situation. First, the unique household registration (hukou) 
system forces them to move back and forth between countryside and cities. 
Migrant workers are constantly separated from their families, only experi-
encing short reunions during Chinese New Year. This “multilocality” forces 
them to find a flexible and creative arrangement to handle their lives. Sec-
ond, the hukou system also causes them to face the high informality of work 
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when working in the cities. Without urban registration, they can only sign 
short working contracts with lower wages. What is worse, this informality 
of work can last a very long time, even become a norm.  
This chapter asks how these two unavoidable situations affect 
young migrant workers in contemporary China in their process of growing 
up. What kind of future awaits young migrant workers, growing up in con-
ditions of multilocality and informality?  
Young peasants in marketized socialist China: Who pays the cost of 
development?  
When we use the two approaches outlined earlier to understand 
young migrant workers in China, we should of course not leave out the 
crucial fact of China’s version of socialism. Only by taking it into account 
are we able to contextualize the in-between predicament of Chinese rural 
youth. Under the current economic policy and household registration sys-
tem, they are forced to live with a broken family, in between constant 
moves and precarious jobs, and with a future prospect which might never 
be realized. If we look into their “transition to adulthood,” we shall see they 
are the group bearing the cost and expense of China’s rapid development, 
which echoes the conclusions of other research on migrant workers.  
The regime in contemporary China is officially called a “socialist 
market society with Chinese characteristics” (Brandtstädter, 2009: 142). 
That is, China has implemented economic reforms based on market princi-
ples but retains its “socialist” political form, that is, this is a world of party-
led marketization, involving its own pattern of national development rather 
than following the Western route. Leonard, for example, states that the 
Chinese party-state is not willing to allow so-called “Western ideology” to 
dominate China—even if it emerges naturally from the market economy—
even more so after China gained in confidence following its economic mira-
cle (Leonard, 2008: 14–16). This shows that “socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics” can function better than Western neoliberalism. In pursuing 
economic growth, the Chinese party-state embraces neoliberal values se-
lectively. As a socialist regime, its aim is to provide the world with another 
set of values and ideologies that can compete against the “universalization 
of Western liberal democracy” (Leonard, 2008: 117). 
Since the Chinese party-state has its own agenda vis-à-vis devel-
opment, Chinese youth are growing up under “socialism with Chinese char-
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acteristics.” One consequence is that there are considerable tensions and 
contradictions between the official ideology that children learn in school 
and the practices and ideology they experience in everyday life (Kwong, 
1994). Individualism is encouraged (Yan, 2010) but only the kind that will 
fulfill China’s need for competitive, self-responsible individuals who can 
help fuel national economic growth (Rofel, 2007; Yan, 2010). Chinese youth 
are expected “to be individualistic in some aspects (entrepreneurial and 
competitive) but not others (self-expression and empowerment)” (Weber, 
2002: 347), although self-expression is picked out as associated with ne-
oliberal values in some ways. They therefore grow up in a highly ambigu-
ous situation.  
This issue can be traced back to the historical root of individualism 
in China. Modern notions of individualism have been coming to China since 
the Qing dynasty in the 17th century. However, this was not the Western 
model. As promoted by intellectuals, who asked citizens to be independent, 
autonomous, and responsible for themselves, the intention was that people 
should fundamentally serve the “big self” (i.e., the nation or society as a 
whole) (see Liu, 1993; Yan, 2010). As an ideology, individualism was con-
ceived not as an end in itself but as the means to collective goals (national-
ism) and the remedy to cure a weak nation. Such “individualism with Chi-
nese characteristics” is thus intrinsically intertwined with collectivism (and 
long before the socialist era). Correspondingly, it is less about free choice, 
the development of individuality and individual autonomy than it is about 
taking on individual responsibility for achieving collective goals. 
In this sense, as part of growing up, Chinese youth have to “feel 
their way towards a functional coexistence of individualistic and collectiv-
ist value systems” (Weber, 2002: 347). The rapid pace of marketization in 
China makes the process of growing up for contemporary Chinese youth 
somewhat experimental. Because being a “desiring subject” is a relatively 
new status for Chinese adults, the processes of “learning how to express 
various longings, needs and aspirations” and “struggling over how to dis-
play and embody the correct class subjectivity toward diffuse lessons on 
how to become cosmopolitan desiring subjects” are still unfolding (Rofel, 
2007: 11). There are no firm norms, rules, and role models for Chinese 
youth to follow. This opens a space within which Chinese (urban or neo-
urban) youths can negotiate between grassroots values and neoliberal 
values (Kwong, 1994; Yan, 2010) and “push the parameter of acceptable 
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behavior” (Weber, 2001; Weber, 2002). Kwong thus argues that Chinese 
youth are experiencing an ideological crisis under the Party’s continued 
rule (Kwong, 1994). This leaves young people in the position of having to 
figure out almost for themselves “the definition of self and relation to socie-
ty” which is the crucial content of youth stage (Gold, 1991: 597). They must 
achieve adulthood but their own parents are not able to provide them with 
viable role models and guide them through the rapidly changing realities 
that confront them (Fong, 2007). 
This leads to a significant consequence for the new generation of 
rural migrants. The contest of values between marketized China and social-
ist (and pre-socialist) China often happens in between urban and rural 
settings. In Fujian, according to Brandtstädter (2009: 153), rural villagers 
actively contest the “official narrative of improving their quality”: instead, 
they insist they want to be pusu (simple and plain). Distinguishing bendiren 
(local persons) and waidiren (outsiders), they reinforce local solidarity and 
readopt gift exchange as a way of re-building social relationships. They 
reject consumerism in the name of a “politics of sincerity” redeploying 
“class politics” to uncover fake goods (Brandtstädter, 2009: 143, 153–54). 
According to Brandtstädter’s study, from rural people’s perspective, the 
values of the market, which to a large extent are equal to “money talk” 
values, are seen as intrinsically selfish and opposed to the collective good 
(Brandtstädter, 2009: 150). Far from agreeing that they are “backward,” 
peasants criticize richer households as “money-minded, greedy and with-
out renqingwei (moral standards and human feelings)” (Brandtstädter, 
2009: 150). They use Maoist language and traditional renqing (moral 
standard of human feeling) to criticize corruption and consumerism and 
have “developed an attitude of general doubt against any official narrative 
or statement” and were “always searching for the ‘real thing’ behind the 
surface appearance” (Brandtstädter, 2009: 149). To give another example, 
rural villagers in Shandong apparently reject the role of individualized 
peasant-citizen, preferring to remain altruistic peasants (Keane, 2001). 
This leads to a question that this chapter attempts to answer: How do 
young migrant workers decide what kind of self to become as they try to fit 
into contemporary, marketized, socialist China? 
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Fieldwork and data collection  
I spent twelve months conducting fieldwork in China (October 
2007–October 2008), primarily in an electronics factory in Shenzhen’s 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ). I refer to this factory as THS. I also collected 
material in three other factories (KS1, KS2, and KS3) in Kunshan, near 
Shanghai. My most important informants were the young migrant workers 
of THS. My roommate in the factory dormitory, Silk, was particularly im-
portant as she was especially willing to tell me her story and bring me into 
her social circle. She also took me to her home town in Hubei province for 
three weeks during the Chinese New Year. I therefore met her natal family, 
some of her relatives, and some of her classmates. I visited the homes of 
her uncles, aunts, and grandparents during my stay and visited the nearby 
town several times with Silk and her laoxiang (friends from the same native 
place). These opportunities to understand her story and her situation in 
detail gave me insights into the position of (especially female) migrant 
workers that were confirmed by my interactions, formal and informal, with 
others. 
In order to understand which “valuable self” young migrant work-
ers judged to be most useful for fulfilling what they wanted, I sought to 
collect data about: (1) how young migrant workers negotiated their mar-
riage and career goals; (2) how they made sense of these goals and their 
own sense of where their migration and the factory system have helped or 
failed them; and (3) what influenced the choices they made.  
I was interested in the possibilities and constraints that shape in-
dividual choice in this context. I therefore paid attention, for example, to 
managerial strategies in the workplace and the ways in which migrant 
workers reacted to them. I listened to conversations when young migrant 
workers talked about their future dreams and decisions. Since they never 
understood what an “anthropologist” was and often confused me with a 
psychologist, they would come to me to talk about their xinshi (worry, frus-
tration, angry, negative feeling). For me, although I was quite embarrassed 
in failing to answer questions, like “If I cannot sleep, what should I do?,” 
this was an ideal opportunity to understand their feelings, thoughts, and 
reasoning. Luckily, they were also willing to share their happy moments 
with me, chatting about things they found interesting and exciting. During 
the Beijing Olympic Games, we watched the matches in the dormitory or 
the common room and shared information about our favorite sports. 
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Background of the workers  
As might be expected, the young migrants came from different 
provinces across China. There are 1,545 workers in total at the KS2 factory 
in Kunshan. The largest proportion is from relatively nearby, in Jiangsu 
province (24.6%, 380 workers). Second and third places are taken by 
Shandong (17.73%, 274) and Anhui (13.85%, 214) provinces, while Henan 
(10.49%, 162) is fourth. At the THS factory in Shenzhen, the largest number 
of workers was from Henan province (21%, 25), the second largest from 
Hubei (16%, 19), and the third largest from Guangdong (13.4%, 16). There 
were also workers from Guangxi (11.8%, 14), Jiangxi (9.2%, 11), and Hu-
nan (7.6%, 9). However, these proportions have changed over time. For 
example, older workers at THS say that migrants from Hubei formerly 
outnumbered migrants from Henan; today the situation has reversed. This 
has come about, they said, as a result of conflict between the Hubei and 
Henan groups. Indeed, I noticed soon after I started my research that “local 
knowledge” about the backgrounds of different groups of people—and 
especially about their places of origin—was a regular topic of conversation 
among the migrant workers (and also among local people outside the fac-
tories). In an environment consisting of many unknowns, this was a way of 
trying to gauge their colleagues, who might be from very different cultural 
backgrounds, speak different languages, eat different food, and make dif-
ferent moral judgments from themselves. Workers need to find ways, how-
ever crude, to interact in everyday life. 
However, even though migrant workers come from different prov-
inces, their family background tends to be rather similar. They generally 
grew up in rural villages. Their parents are mostly farmers—or at least 
officially classified as such. The young migrants themselves are registered 
in the hukou system as nongmin, that is as farmers/peasants (Knight and 
Song, 2005). The government has allocated the majority of them land to 
farm. However, at least half of them do not know how to farm and have 
almost no agricultural skills, knowledge or experience (Yu and Pan, 2008; 
Chen, 2010). Some of them do not have land allocated under their names, 
that is because their birth violated China’s birth control policy or because 
their families were affected in other ways by government land policy (Gao, 
2010: 10).  
Starting with or before their parents’ generation, rural people be-
gan to crowd into nearby towns or cities farther away on a large scale to 
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dagong (work for a salary). Consequently, about half the migrants I met 
grew up as liushou ertong (“children left behind”) (Ye and Pan, 2011) and 
were taken care of by their grandparents or uncles and aunts, seeing their 
parents only during the Chinese New Year period. 
These young people are part of what is generally known in the lit-
erature as “new generation migrant workers” (xinshengdai nongmingong). 
This expression is used by some scholars specifically to describe migrant 
workers born after 1980 (Li, 2009; Chen, 2010; Gao, 2010) in order to 
distinguish them from the first generation of migrant workers, those born 
before 1970, and the second generation, who were born between 1970 and 
1979 (Wu and Xie, 2006). According to a survey conducted in 2009 by the 
National Bureau of Statistics, more than 120 million migrant workers in 
China today were born after 1980, which means that this group constitutes 
about 60% of the total migrant workforce (Bian et al., 2010; Chen, 2010: 
79–80; Gao, 2010: 9). One quarter of young people (aged 16–30) in today’s 
China are “new generation migrant workers” (Chen, 2010: 80). 
Unlike first-generation migrants (who for the most part had al-
ready married before migrating, had children in their home towns, and 
shifted back and forth between their urban and rural bases) and second-
generation migrants (who also tended to marry before leaving home but 
typically stayed longer in the city and lived separately from their spouse 
and children), most of the new generations have still not married (Wu and 
Xie, 2006; Yu and Pan, 2008; Fu and Huang, 2009: 28; Chen, 2010). In a 
society where marriage remains a defining feature of full adulthood, this is 
a crucial fact, as discussed next.  
The circumstances of these young migrants have attracted much 
scholarly and political attention in recent years, especially after the State 
Council of the PRC issued a call for “resolving the issues of new generation 
migrant workers” in its Central Number One Document (zhongyang yihao 
wenjian) in January 2010 (Chen, 2010; Gao, 2010). Corresponding to the 
official stance, much of the current discussion treats new migrants as a 
problem—an obstacle to the satisfactory urbanization and modernization 
of China. International attention was recently focused on migrant workers 
when 14 suicides occurred at Foxconn, Apple’s biggest original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) factory in China. They were all migrant workers aged 
18–25 (Chen, 2010). Even the doubling of salaries seemed to leave the 
problem of worker disaffection unresolved: The suicides continued. This 
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led people to ask, “Who are these young workers, how do they think and 
what exactly do they want?” China (and perhaps the world) began to real-
ize that these new generation migrant workers might not be the stereotypi-
cal submissive, hardship-bearing “producing subjects”; new research on 
this generation of migrant workers began to flourish. However, as will be 
explored in the next section, much of the existing research is hampered in 
answering these questions by assumptions about the homogeneity of the 
migrant workforce rather than paying attention to the diversity behind the 
collective term “migrant workers” (nongmingong) (Fu and Huang, 2009: 
24). 
The desire to be a proper person  
Even if these young migrants wanted to stay in the countryside, a 
high proportion of them cannot actually make a living there. Most young 
workers do not know how to farm. Only 30% of them said they had previ-
ously done farm work. Even so, when asked to say something about farm-
ing methods, some of them could not elaborate because their experience of 
farming was simply assisting their parents, following their parents’ instruc-
tions without any reflective or abstract knowledge of the work. Those were 
the ones who claimed to have some knowledge of farming. The other 70% 
of those I interviewed said they knew nothing about farming, even though 
their households were registered as farmers and they themselves were 
born with the class status of farmers. In her ethnographic account, Pun also 
describes her surprise at learning that the migrant workers she met did not 
even know the size of their household’s landholding or even roughly what 
the annual farm income was (Pun, 2005: 55). This seems a widespread 
phenomenon among rural migrant youth today. 
Even if they wanted to learn to farm, some of them would encoun-
ter another problem: They have no land (Gao, 2010: 10). Only 60% of the 
households of workers in my sample were still engaged in farm work. Their 
own parents had also left home to be migrant workers or to engage in petty 
business in nearby country towns. They rent out their household’s land to 
relatives (close or distant) or to professional farming teams. Such teams 
have grown up as part of a new business model that has emerged, in which 
companies rent the farmland of migrant workers. By joining up the small, 
fragmented lands from each household and combining them into a larger 
whole, such companies can farm the land professionally and make a higher 
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profit than the sum of the households who previously farmed the land. The 
relationship between peasants and land in China, as Fei (1992) describes, 
had already significantly changed before the current generation of migrant 
workers. 
Although lack of farming knowledge and access to land to farm are 
practical reasons that may lead to the migration decision, the more influen-
tial reason is the moral discourse among villagers about “what an ideal 
youth should do.” Although born in rural villages, it seems that no one seri-
ously expects them to become farmers or stay in their place of birth. For 
villagers, the synonym for “staying in one’s home town” is “not engaged in 
decent work” (buzuo zhengjing shi). When I went with Silk to her home 
town in Hubei, I found many middle-aged villagers in the town who could 
hardly explain what they did for a living. They did all kinds of different jobs 
to earn money, taking advantage of whatever was available. For example, 
they would do farm work; help neighbors who were building houses; go 
fishing in the river in order to sell the fish; or engage in some small-scale 
business. It is hard to give this kind of “career” a name; while they can earn 
some money through this kind of casual work, neither their relatives nor 
they themselves feel proud of their occupations.  
Correspondingly, it appears that the “ideal typical” understanding 
of “youth as a stage in the life course” has changed from its meanings for 
previous generations (Gold, 1991). Today, a young person who chooses to 
stay home to farm will inevitably be subject to the negative moral judg-
ments of those around them (Fu and Tang, 2009). There was a consensus 
among the villagers that young, healthy, and decent people are supposed to 
work outside their hometown doing a “decent job” (zhengjing gongzuo) 
rather than stay at home doing this kind of casual work. These temporary 
and ad-hoc jobs in the village are viewed as having “no future” and “no 
promotion prospects,” as “not promising” and “not an opportunity for 
something bigger.” In short, to stay in a rural village means that the oppor-
tunities provided for social mobility by dagong will be lost (Fu and Huang, 
2009). In comparison to middle-aged villagers, young people are expected 
to show greater concern for the future and, in effect, to try harder. If they 
do not leave home for work, their rural network will deem them “conserva-
tive,” lacking a “sense of progress” and “incapable” (Fu and Tang, 2009: 47). 
It will be said of such a young person that this is someone who is meichuxi 
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(has no future): without a serious purpose in life—as shown by migrating 
for dagong—they are useless and will never amount to anything.  
Interestingly, this builds on a dichotomy that emerged during the 
migration of previous generations: The idea that one goes out of the village 
in order to work and one stays at home in order to engage in leisure activi-
ties such as gambling, attending banquets, visiting friends, and so on. Ex-
hausted migrant workers often opted to go home in order to rest and “play” 
(wan) for a while. Therefore, today a young person staying home after 
graduating would be judged as lan (lazy). They should go out to “work,” not 
stay at home to “play” (zai jia wan).  
Older villagers have other reasons to push young people to leave 
(Fu and Tang, 2009). Thanks to financial remittances from migrant work-
ers, new houses have been built, and modern furniture has been bought 
(Murphy, 2002). Although it has been argued that the comparison between 
households that benefit from dagong income and those that do not is often 
not obvious (Murphy, 2002; Zhou et al., 2008), one important potential 
impact is on marriage decisions. A young girl and her family will judge if a 
household is worth marrying into on the basis of its material conditions 
(Yan, 2003; Yan, 2006). If a young man or woman does not follow their 
neighbors in migrating out for dagong, their household is likely to experi-
ence “downward mobility” in their village (Zhou et al., 2008).  
What Murphy has termed “social remittances” (Murphy, 2002: 11) 
also plays a part in this pressure to migrate. Villagers look forward to the 
information, skills, and new ideas brought back by young migrants. For 
example, Silk’s parents expect her to integrate into the modern world and 
bring new knowledge of modernity back to them. This desire to have up-
dated information about the developments in the city is part of what young 
workers hope to gain for themselves from “seeing the world” (jianshim-
ian)—but it also reflects the fear of the rural villagers that they might be 
left out of modernized China. Therefore, to have some members migrate 
out will, in theory, benefit collective welfare. No matter how slim the 
chances of success, villagers take the potential for success into account and 
expect their young people to at least try, not only for themselves alone but 
as an obligation or responsibility to “the bigger self.” It is also important to 
note that, especially in respect to expectations of “social” remittances, it is 
young people’s success not only as workers, but as consuming subjects that 
their fellow villagers, parents, and relatives expect (Yu and Pan, 2008). 
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Thus in both practical ways and through the huge pressure of 
moral discourse, new generation migrant workers are virtually forced to 
participate in the competitive milieu of marketized China as part of their 
process of “growing up.” While their parents at the outset still had some 
choice as to whether to farm or migrate for work, there is almost no alter-
native for today’s rural youth. In order to be an adult, they must make the 
step of going to the city for work. In this sense, it is legitimate to speak of a 
“crisis” in their life course. Once they leave, they feel they cannot go home 
with nothing to show for it (Murphy, 2002; Fu and Tang, 2009). Therefore, 
they rarely give up trying, on the basis that “if they must die, they would 
rather die in the city” (si yeyao sizai chengshili)—that is, die trying to suc-
ceed. To be migrant workers is related to their future identity, whether in 
the hope of being successful urbanites or decent rural adults. 
When the young migrant workers at the KS2 and THS factories are 
asked why they had left home, they do not say “because we want consumer 
goods,” nor do they say “because we are victims of the Chinese govern-
ment’s rural policies.” During interviews with these workers, nearly every-
one said that the reason they left home was because they hoped to do two 
things: to “grow up” (chengzhang) and to “become independent” (duli). 
This answer seems to fit strongly with the impression that they are like 
children in many respects—but they are on their way to becoming adults. 
Typically, they leave home when they are 17 or 18 years old, although 
some leave earlier and some later. They have just graduated from school 
and are supposed to find a job and get married. In this period, they are 
between being children and adults. So what exactly do “growing up” and 
“becoming independent” mean, in this context? 
The changing meaning of “growing up” and its difficulties  
For them, “growing up” (chengzhang) means to learn something 
new and to change in ways that will enable them to see, fit into, and then 
take part in “modern China,” which is taken to be very different from their 
rural home towns. The hope to take part in the society of the modern city is 
often described by young migrants as the desire to kanshijie or jianshimian 
(literally “to see the world,” meaning “to become worldly/sophisticated”). 
Given the various “push” factors leading young people to leave 
their villages, and their education and skill levels, the jobs they can easily 
get are in factories that require low-skilled workers. As a result of the eco-
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nomic boom, there are such factories all over China. Quite a few are very 
close to their home towns, where they can work in a Township–Village 
Enterprise (TVE); indeed their parents may already work in these factories. 
In other words, if they wanted, they could just find a job in a factory near to 
their home town rather than traveling thousands of miles to Shenzhen or 
Kunshan. When young workers are asked why they had chosen to go to the 
big cities along China’s east coast, they answer that it was because they 
wanted to jian yixia shimian (see a bit of the world). These youths from 
rural areas have neither the money nor the time to do a “grand tour” in the 
classic European style. Factory work far from home becomes the best op-
tion for them to see modern China, which they have heard a lot about. Their 
first month’s wage from the factory is neither sent back home nor is it used 
to buy things they want. It is usually used to pay for the debt they have 
incurred just in traveling to the city.  
Delicate, a factory worker at THS factory, explained how important 
dagong—waged labor, almost always undertaken away from home—is for 
young people from the countryside today: 
No matter what you do in the future, if you have had the 
experience of dagong, then people will consider you to be a per-
son who has jianguo shimian [seen the world]. If you always stay 
at home, people will think that you know nothing and you are just 
like an idiot. 
The desire to jian shimian could in turn be interpreted as resting 
on a more general desire: To change one’s identity. A rural youth will be 
recognized as no longer being only a rural youth if s/he has had the experi-
ence of working in the big city. The identities associated with the place of 
destination lead rural youth not to want to stay near their home towns. 
Moreover, migrant workers have a very hierarchical judgment of various 
cities in China. Because the city where a migrant worker goes implies dif-
ferent levels of the “modernity” that they can see and experience, this is 
closely related to their identity.  
For example, Silk is from Hubei. She left her home for Shanghai 
when she was 14, and then later moved to Shenzhen. But Shanghai is con-
sidered more modern than Shenzhen. Having worked for five years in 
Shanghai, Silk feels she is superior to her colleagues in Shenzhen. She left 
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Shanghai for the Shenzhen factory on 5 March 2004 (she still remembers 
the exact date) very reluctantly and considered the move a “down-grade.” 
She left only because she had no other choice: Her cousin Ling, who took 
care of Silk for several years in Shanghai and at whose house Silk stayed, 
had now been relocated to Shenzhen. She asked Silk to come and help her. 
Silk felt she could not say no. Yet, intriguingly, Silk also said that she actual-
ly hated Shanghai people because they “abused their power and bullied 
people from other places” (zhangshiqiren, paiwai). She was looked down 
upon while she was in Shanghai—just as she now looks down upon Shen-
zhen and her colleagues there. Her feelings of superiority were also be-
cause the factory where she had worked in Shanghai was owned by a Japa-
nese businessman (rather than a Taiwanese or mainlander). Because she 
attached her identity to the city where she had migrated for dagong, she 
reckoned herself to be a person who had “seen the world,” just like a 
Shanghai local or even a Shenzhen local. 
But chengzhang—growing up—is not only about seeing the mod-
ern world; it is also about the endeavor to fit into it. In this sense, cheng-
zhang is strongly related to learning, specifically getting some knowledge 
that will be “useful” (youyong) in the neoliberal economic environment 
they actually have to cope with. In interviews, young people mentioned a 
highly varied list of things that they thought might be worthwhile. For ex-
ample, it is useful to gain knowledge of electronics and computers. It is 
good to have the skill of recognizing “quality” in goods (whether you are 
making them or consuming them). It is good to be able to cook, drive, do 
hairdressing, and manage other people. It is good to have social skills ap-
propriate to an urban environment (and in particular communication skills, 
coordination skills, and tactics for surviving in the factory, for achieving 
promotion, for avoiding scams and conflict, for seeking and seizing oppor-
tunities, etc.). Interestingly, they do not normally consider it useful to learn 
English, which is useless for their current stage of upward mobility. 
Many of the skills they are most interested in relate, in some way, 
to their working lives. For them to succeed in their working lives is clearly 
one of the most important aspects of “growing up”—as is getting married 
and forming a family. Many of the informants gave a simple and firm an-
swer to what would make them adults: “getting married and forming a 
family (chengjia) and establishing oneself in a career (liye).”  
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What these young people are actually yearning for is a change of 
status—from child to adult and from a rural villager to a sophisticated 
urbanite. However, change of this kind is not only an individual desire. 
Friends and relatives in the migrants” home village also expect to see such 
effects in someone who has had the chance to “see the world.” If a young 
worker fails to display “changes” after they have stayed in the city for sev-
eral years, they will be judged as failures. In this sense, the desire for young 
people to change and grow up is collective. There is an expectation on the 
part of the individual and also the collective that a change in identity (e.g., 
an improvement in their “quality,” suzhi) is a desirable outcome of migra-
tion. An individual’s hope for change thus reflects the wider social attitude. 
What kind of change would count as the chengzhang (growing up) 
that a migrant worker is expected to achieve and to demonstrate to others? 
Some clues are provided by the case of Phoenix, a young woman. She 
worked at a big hotel for businessmen near THS. She had formerly worked 
for three and half years at FXK, an electronics factory with 800,000 work-
ers. Just as the cities are ranked by migrant workers, so too are the facto-
ries. Because FXK is big and famous, working there is the kind of job that 
nearly every young worker dreams of getting in the early period of migra-
tion. To work there would definitely be to “see the world.” When migrant 
workers talked about someone getting a job offer from FXK, their tone of 
voice suggested she had got an offer from Harvard University. People 
would assume s/he must be outstanding because the recruitment process 
of FXK is stricter than other smaller factories. But, Phoenix had decided to 
quit her job at FXK a few months earlier. The reason was that, when she 
went home during Chinese New Year, her relatives and friends all laughed 
at her and said:  
You left for the city several years ago. Tell us why your 
dresses still look like those of a country bumpkin. Your disposi-
tion is still so stupid and uncouth. Didn’t you learn anything from 
dagong? You’ve come back from the big city. You shouldn’t still 
look the same. Look at your classmates; they worked in a hotel in 
Shanghai. See how beautiful they are! 
Therefore, she quit the factory job and “job hopped” to the hotel, 
where she gives massages to businessmen. Compared to the routine job in 
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the factory, she thought the hotel job offered a better chance for her to 
become an articulate, fashionable young woman, like the ideal youth of her 
relatives’ expectations.  
When discussing this topic with a group of factory workers, they 
agreed that the “change” they are seeking and expecting via migration for 
work should include the following: First, young workers should become 
more articulate (hui shuohua) than before. Second, they should know a 
good deal about “fashion” (hui daban) and other “modern things.” Third, 
they should be smarter, more poised, and confident (jingming nenggan). 
Where do these expectations come from? In part, they come from the city 
life rural people see depicted in television dramas, which are the basis for 
many urban expectations, imaginations, and fantasies. When they set off 
from the countryside, they were looking forward to this kind of life. 
However, they soon discover that life in factories is not as “color-
ful” as rural people collectively assume. The working schedule is always the 
same, day after day. The only people you meet and talk to are your fellow 
workers. Most often, the people who become friends in the factory are 
those who share similar backgrounds. In addition, the working hours are 
extremely long, leaving limited leisure time, which they usually spend in 
big supermarkets or food stalls at night markets nearby (which are still 
part of the SEZ). In fact, the real city, Shenzhen city, is about an hour by bus 
away from the factory. Coming out of the factory after working for hours, 
all migrant workers can see are endless factories, and other young people 
from very similar rural backgrounds wearing the uniforms from their vari-
ous factories on the streets. 
Although factory life is disappointing in some ways, the yearning 
for change is not abandoned. This results in an interesting attitude among 
the young migrants: They are willing to learn and welcome new things, no 
matter what. They are highly open to new values and discourses and ap-
pear to easily accept, at least superficially, the new morality that the factory 
inculcates. Fly, a 19-year-old man from Hubei, told me that, from his per-
spective, life in rural villages was actually freer. There he could sleep as 
long as he wanted and decide how to use his own time. In the factory, he 
has to work on the shop floor 12 hours a day, 6 days a week. The strict daily 
schedule of the factory means that he has almost no personal time. Despite 
all that, he thought this change was good and he felt happy about it. He said 
that life in rural villages was too lazy and comfortable. Now he has turned 
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into a useful young man. Not long afterward, I heard similar words spoken 
by the factory director at the monthly assembly of workers. The young 
workers seemed to absorb what he said like a sponge. 
Why was Fly seemingly prepared to embrace this system whole-
heartedly, rather than resisting, even though it arguably exploits him? His 
acceptance probably comes from his hope for a bright future, that is, the 
anticipated change of status and identity. Migrant workers come for better 
life opportunities—a sense of unknown chances—which are generally 
presumed to be unavailable in their rural hometowns. They hear many 
inspiring stories from their neighbors, friends, and mass media about how 
people changed their lives overnight. Most of them want to “give it a shot.” 
It could be said that they come here as a gamble. 
Becoming independent by declaring independence 
The term duli, “independent,” is often heard in the factory. In the 
talk of young migrant workers the phrase rang ziji duli (so that I will be 
independent) comes up again and again. At one level, this probably reflects 
the way that the whole society is embracing a modernization process in 
which talk of “individualism” and “being independent” is politically cor-
rect—even though the Chinese version of individualism does not entirely 
copy the Western model. At a more personal level, the desire to be inde-
pendent is partly grounded in migrants’ hope to say goodbye to their rural 
family backgrounds. 
Again, Silk’s case offers a fascinating example. She does not like go-
ing back to her home town during the Chinese New Year holiday. When she 
took me to Hubei for the Chinese New Year holiday, she apologized to me 
many times before we set off. As she saw it, for me to go home with her in 
winter was to chiku (literally, “eat bitterness,” in this context meaning to 
endure a poor quality of life), and she worried that, “You won’t be able to 
endure it” (shou bu liao). When we arrived, she kept on telling me, “I am 
just like you. I’m not used to it” (bu xiguan, not used to village life). Later, I 
realized that this was Silk’s way of telling me that she was not a country girl 
any more. She is modern and civilized. 
Silk spent most of her free time while at home hanging around 
with laoxiang (friends from her home town or home province). As a young 
migrant worker, she has a relatively wide network of friends in the city. 
When we arrived in the countryside, a new house for Silk’s family had just 
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been completed. She told me that she had organized borrowing the money 
for the new house building through her guanxi (network, connections) 
among the factory leaders and her friends in Shenzhen. She saw it, there-
fore, as her responsibility to pay back the debt. (Although her parents did 
share some responsibility for the debt, it was mostly on Silk’s shoulders.) 
She told me that she had chosen to take on this burden entirely of her own 
free will. Her parents had not forced her or put any pressure on her. She 
had taken it on because she “had more [rich] friends than them.” Here, we 
can see newly established social relationships, that is, those created by Silk 
in the course of migration and work, interacting with her given kinship 
relationships and changing her bargaining power within her family. Thus, 
overall, the bargaining power of the daughter in the household has in-
creased because of her newly established knowledge and relationships. 
This, at least to some extent, gives Silk a new identity within the household. 
On the first day of the Chinese New Year, Silk and I woke up very 
early. Silk shouted at her brothers and sisters to get them out of bed. She 
led us all out of the house to visit every household in the village to make the 
traditional New Year calls, offering New Year greetings, gongxi facai (con-
gratulations and become rich). As we visited, Silk would sit for a while with 
some families in their homes, asking the host how everything was going, 
inquiring after the health of their elder members, teasing the children, and 
praising children as cute in front of their mother. She seemed to know well 
the courtesy expected of her, and how to talk gracefully on such occasions. 
Silk, like the other young migrant workers, is basically the public repre-
sentative of her natal family.  
Walking along the street and greeting people on the way, we saw 
many other young people in groups led by their eldest siblings. They were 
all doing the same thing: visiting relatives and neighbors, making New Year 
calls. Silk explained to me that when they were small children the family 
visits were led by their parents, but now the children have grown up, their 
parents stay at home and rest. Only the children now go out to bainian (pay 
New Year calls). Once they have reached a certain age, the eldest child, 
whether male or female, substitutes for the parents and acts as the repre-
sentative of the household. 
They too were migrant workers just returned home for the Chi-
nese New Year. When they met on the snowy, winding path, one of the first 
questions they asked each other was, “When will you go back to the city?” 
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Their connection to the city was emphasized; returning to the city is taken 
for granted. No one assumes these young people will stay in their home 
towns after the Chinese New Year. They constantly declare their independ-
ence: from their parents, and from their hometown. 
Silk is using a very strong method in order to “declare” that she is 
different now. She is different from her past, and will become an adult who 
is very different to her parents. In other words, she is independent, de-
tached, and separated from her previous connections. She uses the rude, 
crude, and most obvious way to show her independence, which implies not 
only that she no longer depends on her parents but also that she has a su-
perior status to them. 
Separation from parents and their kind of adulthood 
Young migrant workers generally do not pay much heed to their 
parents’ suggestions because they feel that the experiences their parents 
went through when growing up are not applicable or relevant to their own 
lives. As first- or second-generation migrant workers, parents were gener-
ally married before migrating out, as noted earlier. They went out mainly in 
order to earn money and support their families, who still lived in rural 
areas. But for new generation migrant workers, the problems they need to 
deal with during their migrant journey are mainly about sorting out their 
future, a situation that their parents have never encountered and thus have 
no experience to share. In addition, given that the world is changing so 
quickly, most parents of new generation migrant workers, even though 
they are migrant workers too, know almost nothing about their situation in 
the cities. This means that the new generation workers have to “figure out 
the future” for themselves from the vantage point of places like Shenzhen 
or Kunshan. 
Indeed, parents frequently have to learn things from their chil-
dren, a phenomenon known as “cultural feedback” (Zhou, 1999). The par-
ents of young migrants, typically rural peasants, lack the confidence to 
insist that their children obey their instructions, not least because they rely 
to a great extent on their children’s knowledge of the modern world. Alt-
hough parents still shoulder the responsibility of guiding their children as 
they grow up and become independent, and although the children are still 
supposed to show respect and filial piety to their parents, the situation of 
these parents implicitly pushes the young peasants to seek other role mod-
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els to follow. Considering their parents’ experiences to be mostly irrelevant 
to their lives, young migrant workers have to grow up, to some extent, 
without effective guidance from their parents.  
In sum, then, “growing up” and “becoming independent” can be 
seen as a two complementary goals that migrant workers are keen to 
achieve. Duli, independence, represents their hope of separation (from 
their old, past village context, including their parents) and—to use the 
terminology of Victor Turner (1967) in characterizing rites of passage—the 
creation of “anti-structure,” that is, the breaking down of pre-existing social 
relationships. By embracing this hope, they come to the factory in the SEZ. 
Chengzhang (growing up) represents the process of entering a new world 
(the neoliberal world in this case) and gaining a new social status. It is a 
process that makes young migrant workers integrate into the social struc-
ture again but a different social structure from that of the villages they 
hope to have left behind. Their duli (independence) follows from their de-
nial of the past and the breaking down of their former relationship with 
their parents, while their hope of chengzhang (growing up) follows from 
their embrace of an (imagined) “modern world.” 
Thus, it should be emphasized that these young people from the 
countryside have a quite different relationship with their parents from the 
one described in Vanessa Fong’s research (2007), which was carried out in 
the large city of Dalian. These young people did not seem to take their par-
ents’ words that seriously or try to internalize their parents’ views into 
their own way of seeing things. If migrant workers, like urban singletons, 
feel confused about the society around them, this is not likely—as Fong 
suggests of her urban informants—to arise from the complexities of cultur-
al transmission (Fong, 2007). On the contrary, young migrant workers from 
the countryside are keen to detach themselves from their relationship with 
their parents. Consequently, they make themselves responsible for becom-
ing adults. 
“Independent, yet not grown up”: Separation without integration  
To return to the notion of rites of passage: The period when mi-
grant workers stay in the factory can be understood as a period of liminali-
ty associated with the change from one status to another; they have sepa-
rated from the world of the countryside but not yet re-integrated into the 
world. Although the factory might be the easiest way available to them to 
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gain access to “modern China,” it does not really provide the appropriate 
conditions for them to (re-)integrate into “society.” In the factory, they 
struggle to form a stable identity against the background of the alienat-
ed/impersonal and differentiated environment (Carrier, 1992) produced 
by industrialized capitalist society. Young migrant workers in the factory 
can thus be seen in terms of liminality, a stage of “betwixt and between” 
characterized by “ambiguity, openness and indeterminacy,” in Turner’s 
terms, “a period of transition where normal limits to thought, self-
understanding, and behavior are relaxed—a situation which can lead to 
new perspectives” (Turner, 1967). 
From this point of view, a job in a factory in the SEZ is not the ul-
timate destination that the young migrant workers are seeking, unless it is 
accompanied by a transformation of social status. In fact, as we have seen, 
for this generation of young workers the change of social status from child 
to adult is equated with a change from being a “traditional” rural person to 
a member of “modern” China. A job is therefore just the starting point, the 
opportunity to create something new and make the desired transformation 
possible: getting married and establishing a working life that is different 
from that of their parents. Migration separates the young people from their 
fixed position and kinship ties in their villages and gives them a certain 
freedom to negotiate their identity. They have temporarily left their posi-
tion in the fixed social structure. At the point where they enter the factory, 
they are just leaving their identity as rural people and are “negotiating” 
their state of being. Their sense of freedom may be seen not so much as a 
reflection of the new world itself—which in the case of the factory is in fact 
highly constrained—but, rather, as associated with the state of liminality, 
which Turner characterizes as a “realm of primitive hypothesis, where 
there is a certain freedom to juggle with the factors of existence” (1967: 
106). 
The reality is that the modern city does not welcome these young 
rural migrants, as has been extensively noted by other authors. For exam-
ple, Jacka (2006) describes in her ethnography how urbanites discriminate 
against migrant workers and view them as dirty and uncivil. Pun describes 
an occasion when a group of female migrant workers go to a cafe to buy a 
drink and are treated scornfully by the waiters and local guests, who look 
down on them, saying they have “dirty hands” (Pun, 1999; Pun, 2005). It 
could be argued that it is their ambiguous and incomplete transformation, 
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the fact that they are “in between” social statuses, that causes them to be-
come a scapegoat for social problems (see Douglas, 1991). To integrate into 
modern China is harder than to separate from a rural village. They have, in 
effect, announced their separation from their parents and the past. Yet, in 
the factory, the transformation that young migrant workers desire does not 
seems to come naturally. To put it simply, they get stuck in the liminal 
phase. 
The search for a process of “growing up” and “being independent” 
leaves young migrant workers in a predicament: They have renounced 
their rural identity but they do not yet have a new one. Achieving a new 
identity as a “player” in modern China turns out to be much harder in reali-
ty than in their expectations—not only in the social milieu of the city, but in 
the factory itself. Indeed, all young people in today’s China face a far more 
complex social world than the type of social situation that Turner focused 
on, stable stratified societies. What has been said of urban youth in China 
(Weber, 2002; Fong, 2007), also applies—perhaps even more strongly—to 
these young rural migrants: They are confronted with many different value 
systems, which sometimes contradict each other. Just like urban Chinese 
children (Fong, 2007), these new generation young migrant workers can be 
said to be “confused” with respect to cultural models possibly without 
being aware of it, but in very different ways. So how do young migrant 
workers handle this situation?  
Kwong’s research (1994) suggests that Chinese youngsters some-
times reject certain of these values and adopt the relatively attractive ones 
from among those on offer. The migrants also select particular values—
especially in order to legitimize their behavior when the context allows 
them to do so. For example, they might quote their cousins’ or colleagues’ 
words in response to lectures from their parents—but sometimes they 
would quote their parents’ words or traditional values if they felt it would 
benefit them in other contexts. For some, who realize that there may be no 
future for them in either the rural village or the city, profound depression 
and despair may follow. 
Conclusions 
The argument suggested here is that migrating for work is the cru-
cial process through which new generation migrant workers gain their 
adulthood—and that this was not the case for previous generations of mi-
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grant workers. Previous generations had effectively finished their rite of 
passage and become adults before the experience of outside work. To put it 
simply, the structure of the older generation’s rite of passage would be: 
separation phase (in home town), liminal phase (short, in or near home 
town), and reintegration (home town). The structure of the new genera-
tion’s rite of passage would be: separation (from home town), liminal phase 
(in urban factory), and (attempted) reintegration (in urban setting). This 
different structure of the rite of passage is the fundamental difference be-
tween new generations and the old ones. Through paying attention to mi-
gration as a rite of passage, we thus can see clearly that the difference be-
tween these generations is deeper and more profound than some have 
suggested—it is not just that they are “spoiled” children.  
Today, adulthood does not come “naturally” for young people, that 
is, via marriages arranged by their families or via state policies offering 
them land. For rural youth, this leads them to face an awkward, challenging 
situation. Rural home towns are almost empty after mass emigration and 
social relationships there are often fragmented. It is impossible for them to 
gain adulthood there and, in fact, no one in the village expects them to do 
so. They have little choice but to go out to the city to earn their adulthood 
and become a recognized member of society.  
The factory may look like the destination of their migration but ac-
tually it is only a start, the beginning of their search for adulthood and self-
responsibility. Young migrant workers are keen to chengzhang (grow up) 
and hope to integrate into neoliberal, modern China. Equally, they are keen 
to announce/declare their duli (independence), hoping to say goodbye to 
their parents, their village backgrounds, and the “backward” peasant world 
of the countryside. Their boldness in announcing their separation to their 
parents to some extent reflects the fact that their parents are incapable of 
providing useful guidance and support as they move toward (self-
responsible) adulthood. However, their endeavor to grow up and become 
independent arguably leads them to have little sense of their class situation 
in the factory, and it also leaves them in a liminal situation. Because of their 
wish to integrate into modern China and become an adult, they are willing 
to absorb and embrace change, new things, values, and ideas that the facto-
ry feeds them. Driven by the wish to be independent and separate/detach 
from their home town and natal family, that they get trapped in a liminal 
situation. It is actually hard for them to integrate into urban life because of 
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the alienated/impersonal environment of the factory, which they face every 
day, and the hostile social milieu. Yet they have limited access to the state-
supported rights of the hukou system and so cannot simply “return” to a 
rural way of life. 
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Aldrie Henry-Lee, Christos Papatheodorou, Maria Petmesidou, and Enrique 
Delamónica 
Poverty anywhere is a danger to prosperity everywhere. 
(Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization [DECLARATION OF PHILADELPHIA], 
p. 1) 
As nations turn their attention to the fulfillment of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), this book underscores the urgent need to focus 
and specifically target some of the most disadvantaged groups in our socie-
ties: poor children and unemployed youth. While there has been some 
progress in the global reduction of monetary and multidimensional poverty 
in the last three decades, there are still billions of children and youngsters 
materially deprived, struggling to survive with insufficient income to pur-
chase a minimum amount of food, and lacking opportunities to become 
fully productive citizens. The recent global economic crisis has reversed 
any hope for sustained poverty and unemployment reduction. It has been 
made evident that these phenomena are embedded in modern societies. It 
has also been revealed that the relevant policy responses at local, national, 
and supranational level have failed to produce promising results in alleviat-
ing poverty and promote full employment and sustainable development. 
Even many developed countries have experienced an alarming increase of 
child poverty and youth unemployment in recent years. The African Youth 
Decade 2009-2018 Plan of action, the Europe 2020 Agenda, the Japan-
Asian Plan of Action and the Strategic Plan for the Caribbean Community 
2015, and the 2014 Baku Commitment to Youth Policies will fail miserably 
if the global community does not increase its focus on the younger mem-
bers of their societies. Investment in children and youth is key to the ful-
fillment of the SDGs. The full participation and engagement of children and 
youth are critical for the development of national economies and societies. 
By providing empirical and theoretical analyses in Europe, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia, this book assesses the structural causes 
of child poverty and youth unemployment and their short-and long-term 
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effects on individuals and societies. Furthermore, it discusses key policy 
interventions aiming at alleviating child poverty, youth unemployment, and 
employment precariousness. It reminds us that we need to harness the 
productive capabilities of children and youth to secure safe and economi-
cally viable societies. One striking point of this book is the consensus 
among authors from varied disciplines on the urgency of the problems of 
child poverty, youth unemployment, and social exclusion. Focusing on 
various aspects of child and youth poverty and labor force participation in 
different countries and regions, the chapters of this book expose the multi-
dimensional nature of these phenomena. Also, the variety and plethora of 
complex issues associated with these phenomena manifest the need to 
expand and adjust our theoretical and methodological tools.  
The contributions to this volume engage and critique the current 
definitions, concepts, and theories of child and youth poverty, unemploy-
ment, and social exclusion. They provide new and different ways of examin-
ing these complex phenomena. For example, Dedoussopoulos and Papa-
christopoulou argue that youth is not a homogeneous social category since 
sharp diversities exist as far as gender, age, and level of education are con-
cerned. Thus they go beyond the standard single index of unemployment 
rate to include youth participation, employment and unemployment rates, 
the ratio of youth unemployment rate to mature (30–55 years old) unem-
ployment rate; the share of youth unemployment to total unemployment; 
the rate of youth unemployment to youth population; the scholarization 
index, that is, the rate of youngsters in formal education to the youth popu-
lation; and the out-of-work-out-of-school index. This more thorough exam-
ination of youth unemployment lays the basis for more gendered, detailed, 
and focused empirical research. The theoretical contribution is further 
enhanced by the development of vulnerability indexes to grapple with 
definitions of poverty. Minujin, Born, Lombardía, and Delamónica, found 
the category NEET (not in education, employment, and training) that dom-
inates the contemporary public and academic debate, restricting and mis-
leading in analyzing and exposing the nexus between education and em-
ployment for adolescents and youngsters (A&Y). They develop an alterna-
tive measurement of vulnerability in education and employment among 
A&Y, the VEL (Vulnerability in Education and Labor), which incorporates 
educational achievements and type of employment (formal/informal em-
ployment, unemployment). Utilizing this new measure they reveal that in 
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Latin America and the Caribbean the proportion of A&Y with vulnerability 
in education and labor is almost 30%, which is twice as high as the relative 
NEETs figure. Moreover, Garrido, Gutiérrez, and Guillén introduce the con-
cept of “biographical dualism” to describe youth employment in Spain, 
which emphasizes two outstanding traits: On the one hand, the low quality 
of school-to-work transitions and, on the other, the high intensity of the 
insider-outsider dualism in the labor market. Biographical dualism is a 
major trait that links the temporary pattern of incorporation into the labor 
market with the dimension of age. One conclusion from this book is that 
child poverty and youth unemployment cannot be examined without a 
multidimensional and multifaceted analysis of the phenomena.  
This book also underscores that the analysis of poverty and un-
employment, and consequently the definitions and methodology employed, 
must reflect the objective and subjective nature and effects of poverty, 
unemployment, and social exclusion. Bastos cautions that in spite of the 
importance of the family in the child’s everyday life, even the integration of 
family’s conditions in the analysis should be carried out through indicators 
that could measure the impact of these conditions on children. Focusing on 
the EU countries, she stresses the limitations put by the broadly used 
measures (such as income based) in analyzing and understanding child 
poverty, and consequently in designing effective social policies to alleviate 
this issue. She further states that child poverty assessments should avoid 
the inclusion of data that is not directly related to children’s material dep-
rivation. Even more, appraisal of child poverty should take into considera-
tion children’s specific needs and vulnerabilities. Thus, apart from the in-
come-based and multidimensional approaches, she also reviews the holis-
tic and the child’s rights approaches that go beyond the access to material 
and market goods, where qualitative and quantitative data are combined 
for assessing children’s well-being. Finally, in order to overcome the limita-
tions of the child poverty approaches that are broadly used in analyzing 
and assessing child poverty, Bastos suggests methodological guidelines 
concerning the unit of analysis, the multidimensionality, the type of varia-
bles, and the data employed. 
The contributions in this book have shown that problems and 
challenges facing children and youth are a global phenomenon. From the 
Caribbean to Europe to Africa to Asia, the authors examine the structural 
causes of poverty, based on both quantitative and qualitative research. The 
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authors reveal that child and youth deprivation pose serious social and 
economic problems that affect both developed and developing countries. 
Using available data for the EU countries, Papanastasiou, Papatheodorou, 
and Petmesidou enhance the literature by providing empirical estimates on 
child monetary poverty and its intensity, poverty spell duration, and the 
probability of exit from or reentry into poverty. They combine these ele-
ments to assess the magnitude of intergenerational poverty transmission 
and the impact of social protection system on mitigating the influence of 
the family of origin on children’s future outcomes. The analyses embrace 
association statistics, correlation structures, and log-linear models.  
Schenk, Blaauw, and Viljoen examine youth in the informal econ-
omy in South Africa utilizing longitudinal data for a period of 10 years and 
employing a variety of quantitative (surveys) and qualitative data collec-
tion methods, such as observations, ethnography, and individual inter-
views. Whether through qualitative or quantitative data analysis the au-
thors examine the causes of the increased participation of youth in informal 
economy (waste picking and day laboring) as survivalist activities. Special 
attention is given to the barriers of entry into formal economy of these 
groups of young unemployed.  
Utilizing sound empirical data, this book reveals that large num-
bers of children and youth are subjected to cumulative disadvantages, 
which have deleterious effects on their adulthood. Some of these detri-
mental effects include: social exclusion, marginalization, homelessness, and 
improper transition from adolescence to adulthood. The authors discuss 
the long-term effects of youth unemployment, informality, and labor pre-
cariousness. There is enough evidence in this book to show that quality of 
life and contribution of adults to their societies depend on what assets they 
had access to when they were younger and the enabling environment that 
was created for them as they grew up. From the streets of South Africa to 
post-Mao China, the effects of lack of effective investment in the early years 
are discussed using novel empirical evidence and analytical tools. 
Poverty in the 21st century is complicated by issues of social ex-
clusion, denial of rights, security, and migration, increased individual and 
household vulnerabilities in a context of trade liberalization, globalization, 
and global conflict. While there are negative effects of poverty and unem-
ployment on individuals and households, increased social instability may 
ensue if the marginalization and social exclusion of children and youth are 
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not addressed immediately. The adverse effects of child poverty and youth 
unemployment are not confined to one country or a continent and it is 
imperative that these issues be given immediate global attention.  
The contributions to this volume critically raise the question of 
what policy strategies can break the vicious cycle of intergenerational 
transmission of poverty and social exclusion. There are proposals made at 
global, national, local, and micro level (individual and household). At the 
global level, the Millennium Development Goal Number 8 (Target Number 
8 C) did call for special attention to be given to the special needs of land-
locked developing countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), an 
issue that remains relevant and is included in the SDGs. Henry-Lee laments 
the low achievement of the goals set in the Programme of Action for Sus-
tainable Development of SIDS since its adoption in 1994. In the pursuit of 
global partnerships, particular attention must be paid to the special condi-
tions of the less-developed nations, which remain heavily dependent on 
external markets and sometimes, unfavorable trade rules. Small island 
developing states are also very susceptible to climate change and natural 
disasters. They need some specific policies and programs that address the 
multiplicity of their vulnerabilities. However, it must be noted that the 
Sustainable Goal number 17 reemphasizes the role of partnership in the 
fulfillment of the global development agenda and the responsibility of all 
countries (in particular the richest one) to improve their productive and 
consumption patterns to protect the environment. In developed countries, 
the social protection system has proved to be a crucial factor in alleviating 
poverty and mitigating the intergenerational transmission of disad-
vantages. Differences in child poverty rates between EU countries are 
mainly attributed to the combined impact of cash benefits, social services, 
parental leave arrangements, and working conditions supporting family–
work balance. As stressed by Papanastasiou, Papatheodorou and Pet-
mesidou, among EU countries, generous dual-earner transfers and exten-
sive family policy arrangements characterizing longstanding welfare states 
strongly contribute to children’s well-being.  
At the national and local level, governments should invest in chil-
dren and youth as a priority. Sustained strong economic growth is useful to 
the reduction of vulnerabilities among children and youth. However, to 
reduce poverty and inequality this economic growth must be inclusive and 




as	experience	 in	the	 last	decades	 in	both	developed	and	developing	coun‐











Policies	 must	 establish	 and	 strengthen	 the	 various	 and	 intricate	
links	 between	 education	 and	 the	 labor	market	 so	 that	 the	 training	 of	 the	










offspring’s	 poverty	 risk.	 Quoting	Williams	 et	 al.	 (2013:3),	 Henry‐Lee	 lists	
the	 following	 recommendations	 for	 more	 effective	 social	 protection	 pro‐
grams	 (SP):	 (1)	 harmonize	 SP	 systems	 and	 policies	 across	 the	 region	 to	
better	respond	to	increased	regional	mobility;	(2)	consolidate	SP	programs	
within	 countries	 to	 improve	 efficiency;	 (3)	 foster	 key	 human	 capital	 im‐
provements	 among	 the	 poor	 to	 break	 intergenerational	 transmission	 of	
poverty;	 (4)	 improve	monitoring	 and	evaluation	 systems	and	data	 collec‐
tion	 capacity	 to	 facilitate	more	 responsive	 SP	programs;	 and	 (5)	 increase	
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partnerships with civil society and private sector. Social protection pro-
grams must reflect the adherence to the right that everybody has the right 
to adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, and security. 
Dedoussopoulos and Papachristopoulou show that the institution-
al reforms in Greece, such as the increase of the flexibilization in working 
conditions, the lower minimum wage for the youth (compared to adults), 
and the relaxing precondition for dismissal compensations—imposed by 
the “rescue-deal” that the country has signed with its international lenders 
as a response to the debt crisis—have further deteriorated labor market 
integration of young people. Thus, the authors argue that policy in Greece 
has contributed greatly to the increase of precarious jobs, with significant 
short-term and long-term impacts on the society and the economy of the 
country.  
Adam examines whether and under what conditions social econ-
omy activities and social entrepreneurship constitute useful strategies 
against unemployment and social exclusion (in particular among young-
sters), a view that is widely promoted by national and international organi-
zations. She addresses this issue in relation to Greece and in comparison to 
Latin American experience. Adam argues that in Greece, a series of defi-
ciencies/inconsistencies in policy implementation, following new legal 
frameworks to regulate social entrepreneurship, have prevented social 
enterprises from delivering on their promises. Drawing upon the Latin 
American experience, she proposes improved managements and promo-
tion of the so-called “solidarity economy” (i.e., cooperatives, mutual-benefit 
societies, social enterprises, and other similar economic efforts).  
All authors agree that the resources targeted to children and youth 
be used with greater efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, in the case of China, 
Fang calls for the lifting of the barriers imposed by the hukou system on 
migrant workers and develop a social protection system that makes citizen 
rights fully accessible to them. Again, Fang reminds us that all programs 
and policies targeting children and youth must be informed by sound da-
ta/evidence. In the execution of the programs, there must be harmoniza-
tion of efforts, equity, transparency, and accountability. Minujin, Born, 
Lombardía, and Delamónica propose a set of policies that could promote 
inclusion of adolescents and youngsters (A&Y), such as higher and more 
equitable investment in education, specific employment programs and 
policies focused on A&Y, addressing of gender issues in schools, valuing 
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and supporting the (unpaid) care economy, and promoting competencies, 
connections, and confidence among A&Y. The authors argue that in order 
for these policies to be effective, they have to be combined with the proper 
macroeconomic and productive policies that promote full employment and 
decent jobs. 
At the individual level, education is generally acknowledged as a 
key “liberating tool” from monetary poverty. There is a need to improve 
skills and facilitate integration into the formal labor market, as well as to 
strengthen the psychosocial well-being of youth and, consequently, of soci-
ety. The nexus between poverty eradication and decent work cannot be 
overstated and individuals must have access to “decent work” and decent 
wages to break the vicious cycle between child poverty and youth unem-
ployment and precarious employment. Children of poor households are 
often forced to work at early age (and thus to drop out of school) in order 
to contribute to family income. Consequently, due to their lower education 
compared to the rest of the labor force, they face profound obstacles in 
obtaining a decent and well-paid job. This not only violates children’s rights 
(i.e., to education) but obstructs their future potential earnings and in-
crease the risk to become poor as adults. Thus, parental and community 
support are also crucial for the reduction of child poverty, youth unem-
ployment, and social exclusion. The contributions to this book reveal that 
individual policies alone cannot be effective in this matter. Child poverty 
and youth unemployment are structural problems of modern societies. 
Policy interventions to alleviate these phenomena need to be effectively 
incorporated to broad social and macroeconomic policies that promote 
economic growth, full employment, and social inclusion. By all indications, 
long-term strategies are essential to tackle the intergenerational transmis-
sion of disadvantages, which is a critical priority in combating the structur-
al causes of present and future poverty. This constitutes a major challenge 
to various stakeholders at international, national, and local level. Within 
this framework, participation of children, adolescents, and youngsters in 
decisions that affect their lives is of crucial importance. However, the global 
consensus on austerity and the post-2015 sustainable development agenda 
serve incompatible goals, leaving no room for optimism concerting the 
eradication of child poverty and youth unemployment.   
While the book provides some critical data and enhances the liter-
ature on child poverty, youth unemployment, and social inclusion, the au-
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thors advise that more longitudinal data would better inform the policy 
process. At all stages, policies must be formulated based on on-time and 
appropriate data. Improved monitoring and evaluation of policies is needed 
to better the targeting the needs of childhood and youth.  
Overall, we hope the book will prove to be an important one which 
reminds academicians, students of development studies, childhood and 
youth advocates, policy makers, and implementers that the reduction of 
child poverty, youth unemployment, and social exclusion must be based on 
the principles of social justice, equity, and participatory governance. All 
humans must be considered equal citizens in whatever country they reside 
and nations are duty bound to provide an enabling environment for the 
fulfillment of the full potential of all citizens. 
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